

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XI.

April, 1905.

No. 2.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,
LANCASTER, PA., AND WASHINGTON, D. C.

PRESS OF
THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY,
LANCASTER, PA.

Ca

Vol.

T
each
favor
ter o
this
idea
atten
calle
nent
towa

T
pess
This
mod
ing
been
thou
in th
the
"str
It is
dent
the
than

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XI.

April, 1905.

No. 2.

IS OUR VIEW OF "FALLEN MAN" PESSIMISTIC?

The climate of the human mind changes. The culture of each age creates a mental atmosphere more often hostile than favorable to views surviving from the olden time. It is a matter of fine appreciation to determine the nature and extent of this influence of environment on the acceptance or rejection of ideas. For our immediate purpose it is sufficient simply to call attention to the fact that the "psychological climate," as it is called, has again changed decidedly, and to draw some pertinent illustrations from the present trend of thought and culture toward an optimistic view of Man.

The charge is frequently made that Christianity teaches pessimism professedly in the doctrine of a "fallen" humanity. This accusation is largely the result of a powerful movement in modern thought away from "the old misery-habit" of brooding over one's imperfections, with which religion is said to have been identified. By a strange coincidence, an equally strong, though far more moderate current of optimistic thought started in the Middle Ages only to have its development checked by the Reformation. In consequence of this interruption, these "streams of tendency" have never united in "secular" thought. It is the object of this article to bring them together, and incidentally to show that the theology of the mediæval cloister finds the present conditions of mental weather more to its suiting than seems to have fallen to the lot of some, at least, of the

Reformation confessions. Let history, therefore, speak, and the logic of events tell its own story.

When the theory of evolution some fifty years ago made its second entry into human thought, it had a chilling effect for a while on the spiritual and moral ideals of the race. Men turned away disheartened from the low and unseemly origin to which all that is best within us could apparently be traced. The pedigree of man seemed but a degree removed from that of the beast; he was no longer "a little less than the angels." The trail of the serpent was visible over all his history, only this time the serpent was not the loquacious one mentioned in Genesis, but the grim, crawling monster of Necessity. Articles were written on the "Unrelenting Cosmos," the "Sorrows of the Atoms," and the "Sadness of Science." The idea gained ground rapidly that human character is nothing else than the accumulated drift of heredity and circumstance. Professor Huxley declared that the physical and the spiritual were in a death-grapple, with the chances for the latter's survival slim. Mr. Spencer took for his model of primitive man the modern savage, and never quite recovered from the effect which this composite photograph produced. It was not long before the novel began to revive the well-worn theme of the ancients—Man conquered by Circumstance. The stream of consciousness could not rise higher than its source. Nature was "red with tooth and claw."

"We are no other than a moving row
Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go
Round with the sun-illumined Lantern held
In Midnight by the Master of the Show;

"But helpless Pieces of the Game He plays
Upon His chequer-board of Nights and Days;
Hither and thither moves, and checks, and slays,
And one by one back in the Closet lays."

This attempt to make man's history a sort of last chapter to physical science brought about a profound reaction in favor of a more healthy-minded view. Science is not committed to the material theory of causality any more than it is to the spiritual,

being in fact indifferent to either, so long as it remains true to its own methods, keeps well within its own bounds of inquiry, and does not seek to inflate itself to the dignity of a universal philosophy. It was only by accident that the interpretation of evolution fell at first into the hands of men prepossessed in favor of a materialistic view of reality. They saw everything from the physical standpoint, and sought to understand the highest in man through the lowest in nature. Matter variously distributed in forms of motion sufficiently accounts for all.

The philosophy of mind was not slow in wresting from its historical rival—materialism—the territory over which the latter had extended its claims. Our knowledge of reality, it was shown, is not exhausted in looking backward with science to some remote physical antecedent out of which the actual world of the present slowly emerged by an inner law of necessity; the mind can also look forward with philosophy and behold an order of development in accord with rational foresight. The man of science was accordingly reminded that, however true it may be that the quantity of energy in the world always remains a constant sum, there are differences in the qualities of the energy displayed for which no "merely physical" explanation will suffice. The history of man's progress in science, religion, morality, art, and statecraft cannot be reduced to the level of a problem in mechanics; nor can the idea of Nature's uniformity be converted into a law of physical necessity, so as to yield a self-administering world.

"Neither matter nor energy," says Sir Oliver Lodge,¹ "possesses a power of automatic guidance and control. Energy has no directing power. Inorganic matter is impelled slowly by pressure from behind, it is not influenced by the future, nor does it follow a preconceived course nor seek a pre-determined end." Man is and ever has been a purposive agent acting in view of an end and initiating new series of consequents. How then can design and purpose be excluded from the universe when humanity itself possesses these attributes? Is the philosopher, like the photographer, to leave himself out of the picture which he takes? Is nature to be judged by the

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, Jan., 1905, p. 327.

highest term of its manifestations which is man or by the meanest which is unconscious energy?

Once attention was drawn away from the narrow study of man as one among many other natural objects, and fastened upon the study of man as a conscious purposeful agent in a world of subjects, the philosophy of the impersonal began to lose its hold. The universe was read in the light of the end rather than the beginning, and the question of origin and pedigree was seen to be a thing apart from the question of content and value. Not what man was originally, but what man is actually, engaged attention. The human individual was no longer conceived as a passive resultant of physical, chemical, and other forces. Human initiative received the recognition that is its due, and the individual was described as an elementary force controlling Nature to some extent and bringing it slowly to realization. This energetic conception of the individual as of one able to shape his own ends and influence his environment, displaced the pessimistic notion that he was a mere creature of circumstance, a storage-battery of forces over which he exercised no control.

This rescue of human personality from the very maws of Fate deserves praise unstinted. But, as is usually the case in all reactionary movements of this kind, the very force of the reaction carried those who shared in it over to the opposite extreme. Thought in such cases is not placid enough to seek its level. An extravagant optimism succeeded the outgrown pessimism, and endeavored to construct a theoretical and practical scheme of life in which all things would be made good by the mere magic of our thinking. Nothing's bad but thinking makes it so. It is this prevalent optimism that is now attacking the Christian doctrine of sin, whether original or personal, as a misery-making habit of thought not worth taking into account.

Many lesser streams of tendency, besides the general reaction just described, have poured their contribution into the success of the new optimism. For the past twenty-five years the "mind-cure" movement has shown the good effects to be derived from cultivating healthy habits of mind. It is no longer considered good form to speak of the disagreeable. Anything

that savors of the morbid or tends to discourage rather than to enhearten, is politely eliminated. The etiquette of the drawing-room is endeavoring to set itself up as a working philosophy of life, despite all that a sensational press may be doing to make moral scavengers of the masses. The suppression of cruelty to animals has grown into a positive kindness to criminals. The modern tendency which Francis Parkman deplored is the tendency to discover objects of sympathy in vagabonds, thieves, and ruffians. Belief in future retribution has vanished into thin air. It has been replaced by a vague feeling that the world of men and things is on the way to betterment and that the good alone will finally triumph.

It would only be pedantic commonplace to recount here the wonders of the subconscious region of the soul, the almost automatic life of the mind which hypnotism has revealed; the suggestive influence of muscular processes on ideas, and the inhibitive influence of ideas on muscular processes. "Forethought and not fearthought has become the new evangel." Stress is laid on the dignity rather than on the depravity of man. The result of these many tendencies is a growing persuasion that it is better to forget than to remember the disagreeable facts of our mental life; better to let our consciousness of evil suffer a total eclipse than to be forever detecting sun-spots in our consciousness of the good.

"Christian science" represents the high-tide mark in this so-called healthy-minded movement against pessimism. Practically, it is nothing more than "mind-cure" with a dash of the old Indian metaphysics thrown in for seasoning. It has special designs on the medical profession and the use of drugs—superstitions of the "carnal-mind"—which do not concern us here. On its theoretical side it professes belief in the identity of man's spirit with the world-soul or God. By realizing this spiritual unity man will grasp the saving truth that sin is a destructible human belief, not a divine fact. So long as man believes sin to be real, he is punished for his belief. Once he professes faith in the "allness of spirit and the nothingness of matter," sin ceases to have reality. It is only "incorrect thinking" which lies at the root of the sin-conception. The

spiritual understanding that evil physical and moral is unreal and undivine, is the essence of eternal life.

The conception of sin first became attenuated in modern thought when the theories of man's animal origin and descent passed from the lecture-hall and the laboratory into the receptive head of the "man of the street." It seemed so natural to believe that the "submerged savage" within us should once in a while come to the surface and have his say and fling. It remained for "Christian science" to abolish the reality of sin altogether by conceiving the human soul as divided into two compartments—the "carnal mind" and the "spiritual"—by passing from one to the other of which we could leave sin behind as an occupant of the "ground-floor." This transfer of sin from the order of right action to the order of correct thinking so as to make of it a blunder and not a crime, escapes detection by the unwary. It seems so ingenious to keep the books of life on such a convenient system of double-entry with one page for mistakes, and the other for corrections!

Students of the history of philosophy are familiar with this sort of thinking which solves a problem, or rather goes through the motions of solving it, by suppressing one set of facts altogether and by diverting the attention of the mind to others. To be asked to cultivate such a habit of ignoring the evil that is in certain actions in order to accept a babel-tower of metaphysics in which we may take refuge therefrom, is hardly an invitation to be heeded if pains are taken to inquire into the insecure foundations and structure of the tower. After all, the Manicheans were not quite so far astray in personifying evil as are our contemporaries in whitewashing it with a large metaphysical brush.

And students of the history of theology do not need to be reminded that this invitation to "lie down in the stream of life and let it flow over you" comes originally from the Reformers. Luther's doctrine of justification by faith was just such a gospel of relaxation. Practical illustration of it was furnished by the man in the story who, when asked if he needed help to hold the wild animal he was wrestling with, replied by saying that the help he stood most in need of was not to hold, but to let go. Salvation consisted in loosening one's hold on one's self rather

than in tightening it. The function of the Christian religion was to declare men "not guilty" of punishment; to cover sin with a cloak, not actually to extirpate it. It was with this thought in mind that Luther once likened nature and grace to a "dunghill covered with snow." "Christian science" has merely detached justification-by-faith from its old Lutheran anchorage in total depravity and associated it with the counter idea of man's total goodness.

The success of the movement here under review cannot, therefore, be appreciated unless by force of contrast with what it displaced. The conception of human nature as an inert, sinfull mass upon which the Spirit occasionally acted, was worthy neither of God nor man. It implied that salvation was from the outside and not from within, an influence that man underwent passively, but did not work out vitally by his own inherent, even though borrowed, powers. It soon gave way perforce to the mystic view that a remnant of man's sinless state survived the fall and dwelt still within him in the guise of a "spark divine," by fanning which into flame man might slowly recover the rest of his lost spiritual heritage. Through a natural evolution this total eclipse of human powers by evil was gradually modified so as to become only partial, and has now disappeared altogether from the "new" thought. The idea of indefinite progress, with sin regarded as a mere incident in man's development somewhat as the child's stumbling in learning to walk, has taken its place. Salvation is from within, not from without. All thought of a re-birth through grace is dismissed as a part of the old externalism. The kingdom of God is within us. The conception of sin had become so strongly and wrongly associated with belief in man's inherited depravity that the accessory met the same fate as the principal. The problem is no longer how to make the wholly depraved man good, but the good man better. And to this end the door of the conscious mind must be kept tightly shut to the delusive thought of sin. *Turpius eiicitur quam non admittitur hospes.*

The complex movement which we have just tried to analyze out into its component factors has destroyed whatever belief there still remained in total depravity. In this it has done Christian thought no mean service. It has shown that the

mediaeval trend of theology in favor of an optimistic view of man was in the right direction until interrupted by the Reformers and diverted into pessimistic channels; it has also shown the mistake of thinking that the Christian doctrine of man is that of the evil-sodden, vile creature which Luther conjured up before the religious imagination. No doubt it will surprise many to have the statement made that Christianity is not and never was committed to the thesis of man's utter spiritual ruin through sin; and that the idea of "progressive" man has no terrors for the theologian whose knowledge of his subject dates from the days before the Great Revolt. It is only those who do not take the pains—nobody nowadays takes pains where theology is concerned—to investigate what is meant by the adjective "fallen" when applied to "man" in this connection, who devote themselves to refuting imaginary theologians. The whole question at issue is the meaning of an adjective—the adjective "fallen." We have already traced the success of the modern movement against the gruesome meaning which Luther attached to this expression. It is interesting to know what little reason for hostility or opposition this adjective would have furnished if its history prior to the Reformation had been borne in mind by the modern optimists. Needless to say, we are not here concerned in establishing the fact of the Fall, but only in determining its significance as understood during the course of theological development.

We may begin this rapid survey of history with St. Augustine—that "sombre genius" who is sometimes, and wrongly, credited with having invented the doctrine of original sin. When the Manicheans called into question the essential goodness of human nature, no one more than he insisted to the contrary. It is only when the Pelagians attempted to place actual man on the same level and footing with the first man—the highly gifted Adam of Genesis and Tradition—that he repudiated the parallel with a set of opprobrious adjectives against human nature that have since become historic. A question of fact and of history was raised by the Pelagians. To meet it, St. Augustine sharply contrasts the ideal man described in Genesis—innocent, just, impassible, and imperishable—with the forlorn creature of the present, dispossessed of these quali-

ties at birth, and subject to concupiscence, sin, suffering, and death. The result of this contrast between man's present and primitive condition was the positive idea of the corruption, vitiation, and wounding of human nature in all its powers, the darkening of the intellect, weakening of the will, and consequent difficulty in the accomplishment of good. This historical contrast between man as he was and is, dominated St. Augustine completely. He had no other point of view. For him human nature embraced at the outset all that Adam is described in Holy Writ as possessing. How could Pelagius dare to measure the height of such a creature by the shortened stature of fallen man?

It never occurred to the Bishop of Hippo to ask himself whether all the qualities ascribed to Adam were simply his natural belongings as man, or freely bestowed bounties over and above his due and deserts. These were days when men did not think under the categories of the natural and the supernatural as they did in the Middle Ages. St. Augustine never attempted to sift rights from privileges, or to appreciate human nature for its own sake apart from the description of it furnished by Revelation. His only concern was the poor equipment for life which man, as he is, undeniably showed by comparison with man as he first came into being, perfect and ideal. The influence of this point of view on the writings of St. Augustine is not sufficiently taken into account, even by critics of the temper of Harnack. They fail to see that St. Augustine did not so much discuss the question of fallen man on its merits as with regard to the issue raised by Pelagius. In one passage of the *Retractations*,² St. Augustine himself seems conscious that he went too far. Overborne by the controversy in which he was engaged, he gave a positive turn to the meaning of the Fall and its consequences, especially concupiscence, which it took the reflection of centuries to correct. Concupiscence thus appeared to him not merely a consequence, but a formal constituent of original sin. The theologian needs the philosopher's point of view to appreciate his own properly, and St. Augustine wrote only from the theologian's standpoint against Pela-

² Lib. I, cap. 26. "Quod non ita accipiendum est quasi totum amiserit homo quod habebat de *immagine Dei*." See *Contra duas epist. Pelag.*, lib. I, cap. 2, no. 5.

gius. The vividness of the contrast which he was forced to draw between Adam and his descendants misled him to liken the effects of original sin to those of physical heredity, and to fill the adjective "fallen" with a meaning which the uncritical reader does wrong to take according to the letter.

In the thirteenth century, a new problem arose and pressed for solution. These were the days of the philosopher-theologians who learned to keep apart for purposes of distinct appreciation the interests of Faith and Reason in this question of man's primitive innocence and lapse. It was gradually recognized that Reason could construct a conception of humanity altogether distinct from that furnished by Revelation. Man could be appreciated for his own sake and with regard to his natural environment and end. The direct vision of God which Faith proclaimed to be man's final destiny thus appeared in the clear light of a superadded privilege to which human nature, analytically studied by the philosopher, had no right or claim. Two competing conceptions of humanity—the natural and the supernatural—were accordingly constructed, the former as possible, the latter as actual fact. The two views were set over against each other in contrast, and a problem unknown to Saint Augustine began to be discussed, namely: what does the adjective "fallen," which the theologian employs, add to the pure conception of "man" which the philosopher frames? In other words: what is the difference between "fallen" and "natural" man?

Though thought was divided on the answer, the persuasion slowly grew that there is no difference whatsoever between the two. Man simply fell from a high spiritual estate to the conditions of normal humanity; below this level he did not fall, nor were any of his rights and powers as man invaded or injured. His fall was relative, not absolute; he lost privileges, but he retained all his natural belongings as unimpaired as if he had been created on a purely human plane and had never sinned. The effect of original sin was privative; it implied that certain superadded gifts were withdrawn, but it meant nothing in the line of inherited habit of evil or of positive disposition to run a degenerate's course unhindered. The only inheritance it implied was the inheritance of a privation—a

superexcellence which man should have had as his birthright was no longer his. Fallen man, therefore, so far as equipment for his natural environment went, is the same as normal man would have been in an order of existence wholly natural.

The immediate result of this new point of view was to reverse the strong phrases of St. Augustine that had by this time become almost axiomatic. Nature was not corrupted, vitiated, or wounded, because what the just man lost was not nature, but grace. He could not lose the image of God—namely, his spiritual powers of thinking, willing, and doing—to which as man he was entitled; it was only the special, not the essential qualities, which had disappeared. The Church at the time of the Council of Trent said nothing either for or against this new phase of doctrinal development. From an historical standpoint, the council merely repeated the traditional language of the Church, and declared it of faith that "the first man Adam was changed for the worse" after his transgression. Whether this "change for the worse" was to be understood in the sole light of a privation, or as a positive element of vice introduced into human nature itself, the council did not determine. The theory of total depravity had not yet been clearly formulated by the Reformers, and the Church had no occasion to close the question which reason raised in the person of the schoolmen. She spoke, as is her wont, from the point of view of faith, Scripture, and tradition. Wrappage is not always a sure indication of contents, and many have mistaken the letter of this conciliar language for the spirit.³

But the time soon came for a statement of the mind of the Church on the rational issue which the Middle Ages, especially St. Thomas, had made prominent. It came in the sixteenth century. Michel de Bay, a professor at Louvain, raised the alarming cry that St. Augustine was being slowly eliminated from Catholic thought, and advocated a return to the Great Father whom he wished to see restored outright in spirit and

³ Dominicus Soto, one of the theologians of the Council of Trent, says that the "deterioration" in question is relative to man's condition before the Fall. "De Nat. et Gratia," lib. I, cap. 13.—Ita Pallavicini, Vega et al.—Trent merely repeats the language of Mileve and Orange without changing the state of the question.

in language. De Bay, however, like the Reformers, overlooked one essential fact which proved his undoing, and led to such a war of subtlety and recrimination, with Jansenists, Quietists and Port-Royalists all engaged in making confusion worse confounded, as has seldom been seen of men. The fact overlooked was simply this: St. Augustine, when writing against the Pelagians, never even so much as had in mind the thought of distinguishing the natural from the supernatural, much less of deciding the question whether a purely natural condition of humanity was conceivable. Accordingly, if St. Augustine was to be restored, his language should not be so misread as to make it solve a problem that did not occur to the human mind until centuries later. Yet this is what De Bay attempted. Augustine writing against the Pelagians became for him Augustine writing against the Schoolmen. De Bay, consciously or unconsciously, crossed two divergent lines of thought when he held that Reason could not construct an ideal of humanity distinct from that of Faith. To his way of thinking, the conception of a normal man, created to run his course in a natural environment, was physically impossible, as it was morally impossible to the mind of the Jansenist. To the day he died, De Bay labored under the misapprehension that in condemning him the Church had condemned Augustine.

The fact of the matter is that one may speak or write correctly from either the historical point of view, or the philosophical, may describe the man of history, or the unhistorical man of speculation. The two views act as mutual correctives, not as exclusive opposites. To employ one against the other, to belabor St. Thomas with texts detached from St. Augustine, or vice versa, is not scholarly. The Church was compelled to disentangle the situation by showing that even fallen man is capable of some good without grace; and that the conception of a normal humanity was neither physically nor morally impossible, but fully consistent with the rights of man and with the mercy, love, and justice of the Creator. Perhaps the most redeeming feature in this great civil war of Catholic theologians is the decided stand which the Church took against allowing the Lutheran pessimism a foothold within her pale. Harnack says the Church at this time sacrificed Augustine to appease the ris-

ing spirit of rational criticism. This statement only goes to show the wisdom of the saying that "in a point of view, it's the point that will bear watching more than the view."

One thought stands out luminous in this development of doctrine. It is that the adjective "fallen" has within it no meaning incompatible with the idea of "progress." Fallen man is no more, no less than normal or natural man, because the relation which his fall expresses is one of privation, not depravity. No positive inheritance of vice handicaps man in beginning his career on this planet. Whether this career was one of slow progress, or of rapid decline, is a matter for history and science to determine. The Christian doctrine of the Fall is not bound up with the admission of either theory; the fact of belief may remain the same even when the interpretation of it changes with the larger growth of human knowledge.

It is beside the point, therefore, to speak of a radical opposition between the scientific view of man as a rising, and the religious view of him as a fallen, being. The Old Testament mentions side by side the scientific and the religious ideals of humanity. It tells the story of man's progress in clothing himself first with leaves and afterwards with the skins of beasts; in seeking to subsist on the flesh of animals after having been long content with wild herbs; in iron-making, brass-working, and in the building of tents and towns. Yet some naively imagine that whoever believes in man's fall must needs accept the thesis of a high primitive civilization from which he fell.

Need the critic be reminded that science and history never, so far as facts go, reach beyond the "primitive?" that it is only by the "constructive imagination" that we are able to reach the "first" of anything? that the religious condition of the first man was not likely to leave "fossilized remains" behind for our purpose of reconstruction? and that fallen man stood equally ready to run his course of "rhythmic progress" as did the rising creature which science hails first member of the race?

Nor should it be forgotten that the history of man is large enough and mysterious enough to give all our partial reconstructions of it representation in the whole. The mistake is

in considering any single one of our incomplete views, such as the scientific, so adequate and final as to crowd all others, especially the religious, off the scene. Primitive man is largely made in the modern study, and smells of the lamp or laboratory. He is savage or civilized according to prepossession. The puppets of our own imagination thus take the place of concrete man. The real first man was more complex in nature than the "barely conscious" creature which we build up out of "select" material to suit the requirements of a favorite theory. The moral, religious and intellectual elements of human nature were not acquisitions in the course of time, but an original endowment progressively developed. It is all a question of making our analysis complete before we start to build.

Of course, to the eyes of Christian faith, it is not enough, nor indeed the divinely established order, that man should be born with the mere human essentials when his destiny is *special* and other than natural. The active presence of God in all humanity is one thing and the indwelling of the Divine Spirit in the souls of the just, another. The insufficiency of the individual to live out fully the life commanded by his moral ideals and aspirations, unless aided by those divine helps to all offered and to none denied, is a conclusion written all over the pages of human history. But it is only the *human essentials*, after all, that concern the philosopher; and if the theologian offers him at the outset, just such an essentially intact human being as science requires, why should he not mind his own business, and stay within his own sphere of study undisturbed?

But no! He must rush forth with the proclamation to the people that he cannot accept for the working purposes of science a wholly depraved creature. Christianity enjoins no such acceptance; his quarrel is with Lutheranism. He will insist grandiloquently with Professor Haeckel that he would rather be the descendant of a progressive ape than of a degenerate Adam. There's no disputing about tastes according to the old proverb, but we might ask him, notwithstanding, where he found this alternative. Christianity has no objection to these two adjectives exchanging places. In very truth, they have become attached to the wrong nouns by those who so

dearly love an antithesis that they invent one where it does not exist.

Looking backward, they say, is unhealthy. The fate of Lot's wife awaits those who indulge in this curiosity. The scientist will surely resolve you into physical and chemical elements if you allow him to show you your "real antecedents," and the theologian has that old Adam always ready to trot forth on occasion as his first object lesson in ancestry. Look forward! Face the future with courage, and not the past with fear! The "ideal man" was not once made and then forever lost, rather is the human ideal being slowly realized through progress. "Are we to teach our children that they are diseased offspring of a remote sire, physical and moral degenerates, victims of an inheritance which they cannot hope to overcome? Inspiring doctrine this, to call Christian!"

Aye, there's the rub, to call it Christian! The price paid for this false association has been very dear. Teach your children the enormity of actual personal sin. This is the positive factor in depravity and heredity, which holds back the individual and the race from increasing the total amount of good and diminishing the sum of moral evil. The present condition of humanity cannot be explained by mere reference to ancestral sin. Concupiscence would have resulted from man's natural constitution, even if we were to suppose the race normal and unfallen at the start; and though we believe by faith that concupiscence is, historically speaking, a liability of sin, we could never establish by reason that such is the case. The modern pedagogue, whoever he be, should therefore be progressive enough to acquire a clear conception of original sin as a state of privation, not one of depravity, before confining it to the rubbish heap of outgrown notions with some, or of exaggerating its import with others. It is better to make actions consistent with the moral and the Christian ideal than to make thought harmonious. And to make actions thus correspond to the moral ideal, none of your categorical imperatives will suffice. Only clear and definite belief in the Christian doctrine of "the sinfulness of sin" will prove an adequate basis for genuine Christian conduct.

The acceptance of the doctrine of original sin is no invita-

tion to become morbid, or to brood over the lost and unattainable; to lose the "sense" of sin is no return to healthy conditions of thought, unless indeed mental health bears no relation to upright conduct. Our moral ideal can not be stifled by any trick of metaphysics which would substitute the harmony of thought for the harmony of action, or blot out the wide difference between what we are and what we ought to be. Sorrow for sin with a firm purpose of amendment is an appreciation of true spiritual health by contrast with the moral sickness from which we have escaped or recovered. We are asked to look back with sorrow only to look forward with renewed courage. The two tendencies strong at all times in Christian thought,—self-denial and self-expansion—may have been exaggerated during the course of history into polar opposites, but rightly understood they only serve to express the negative and positive side of character-building. We are forced to specialize in conduct no less than in knowledge. The pursuit of a high ideal means abandoning along the way much that appears a real loss only to him who treads the path of dalliance for pleasure's sake.

A great deal is said of progress, but little of its definition. To-day the morality of commerce has become confounded with universal morality, and even the word "honor" has an air of the counting-room about it. The business-group of ideas is dominant, the self-made man fills the public eye, cheap standards of success have arisen in consequence of material prosperity, and a corresponding shrinkage in spiritual values has taken place. The idea of progress has come to mean little else than novelty and comfort. The result is that we are forming our standards on the shifting needs of the present, and forgetting the lessons which only the past can teach by giving us true perspective. Excessive craving for what is new, like excessive admiration for what is old, does not reflect the sound judgment of mankind which is registered in the slowly-reasoned out experience of the race. The ant, says Bacon, collects without constructing; the spider spins his web out of his present inner store; but the bee pursues a middle course, transforming by a power of its own the material gathered from many fields. The parable is obvious. Progress is transfor-

mation, not destruction, or isolation. And need it be said that the progress of man must now as ever consist in extracting spiritual value even from the most material of his pursuits so as to transform all in the crucible of the spirit, so as to remain the master, and not become the servant of his surroundings?

The two ideals of man—Christian and rational—are to a large extent sympathetic, as these pages have shown. The dignity of man as the image of God by nature and as the likeness of God by grace is good Catholic doctrine, else Michel de Bay would not have come to grief. We would do well in our preaching and writing to keep the two portraits of humanity distinct, and yet to show that one is but the completion of the other, not its opposite. We have no doctrine of depravity to hinder us from accepting what is good in any environment, past, present or future. The parable of the man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, fell among robbers who stripped him of his goods, inflicted wounds upon him, and left him half-dead, furnishes no stereotyped picture of man's positive condition after the fall. Stript as he was of the bounties according to the old axiom, he was not wounded in his natural powers. It is only the larger life, therefore, upon which Christianity insists, the life which is through faith, hope, and charity a created replica of the intellectual and moral life of God. The possibilities of man by nature and the greater possibilities of man by grace need to be emphasized to-day no less than the heinousness of sin which is spiritual death to the sinner. *Oportet hæc facere et illa non omittere.* The "psychological climate" has again changed, and our ideas ought to be clothed in a language suited to the spirit of the Church and the temper of the times.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

A LIVING WAGE: PRESUMPTIONS AND AUTHORITIES.

THE PRESENT METHOD OF FIXING WAGES.

The doctrine that every laborer has a moral right to a living wage is obviously in direct conflict with existing business practice and theory. In the great majority of wage-contracts, a decent livelihood for the worker is not among the aims that are consciously and earnestly sought by *both* parties. Sometimes it is not explicitly thought of by either of them. The amount of remuneration, as well as the hours and other conditions of employment, are fixed by the method of bargaining, according to which both employer and employee try to obtain the best terms possible. The latter strives to get as much as he can; the former, to pay no more than he must. Both will derive some advantage from the bargain, but more for one will mean less for the other. The greater share of gain will be reaped by the stronger bargainer. When through a combination of laborers, or employers, or both, collective is substituted for individual action, the end, the procedure, and the determining factors are essentially the same; the decisive element is not moral, but psychological and economic, namely, the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties.

There are, indeed, many cases in which bargaining power has no place, and many others in which it is not the final determinant. The remuneration of a large proportion of government employees is fixed by law, and in some of the older trades and services bargaining is limited by custom.¹ Again there are to be found employers who will not force wages below what they regard as a fair level, just as there are laborers who will not exact compensation that they believe to be unjust. On the whole, however, the labor contracts affected by these forces of law, custom and moral convictions, are exceptional.²

¹ Nicholson, J. S., "Principles of Political Economy," I, p. 325, New York, 1893.

² Instances where the employer, believing in the "economy of high wages," willingly pays more than the bargaining power of the laborer could command, do not constitute exceptions to general rule, since even here the former tries to get his work done as cheaply as possible.

So much for the prevailing practice; what of the underlying ethical theory? Are the laborers who try to get all that they can and the employers who pay no more than they must, utterly indifferent to the questions of right and wrong involved in the wage-contract? Or, has business become so widely separated from ethics that, although desirous of being fair to each other, the parties to the labor contract do not advert in any way to its ethical aspects? Or, do they explicitly maintain that, despite frequent and grave differences in the bargaining power of the parties, the transaction is essentially just? All three of these attitudes are undoubtedly represented among both employers and employed. In fixing wages, as in other actions, there are men who will not hesitate to gain their ends by conscious dishonesty or extortion. Others ignore the moral side of the wage-contract merely because it does not attract their attention; they are conscious only of a business transaction. The greater number, however, of those who strive to make the best possible bargain, regardless of any formal ethical standard of wages, seem to think that the contract is fair, inasmuch as it is free and made under the rule of competition. The assumption that a free contract is necessarily a fair contract, will be examined later; our present concern is with the doctrine which makes competition a measure of justice. To a very large extent, this notion, as well as the attitude of those who quietly ignore the moral aspects of the rate of wages, is the result of practical deductions from the teaching of the earlier English political economists. "Indeed we may say that political economy has importantly modified ethical conceptions; so that the price which competition tends at any time to fix as the market price of any kind of services, has been taken to represent the universal or social and therefore mortally valid estimate of the 'real worth' of such services."³

Now if political economy warrants this popular conclusion it creates at once a presumption of some value in favor of the justness of wages that are determined by the method of unlimited bargaining. The method is apparently sanctioned by the authority of science. To what extent is this true? It will

³ Sidgwick, H., "The Principles of Political Economy," p. 504, New York, 1887.

conduce to clearness if a distinction is made between political economy as a system of supposedly rigid laws, and the practical precepts that have been laid down for the guidance of industry by a certain school of economists.

ECONOMIC LAW AND THE RATE OF WAGES.

Throughout the first three quarters of the Nineteenth Century political economy was committed to the theory that the rate of wages was determined by forces beyond the immediate control of either laborer or capitalist.⁴ Wages, it was said, are paid out of the fund of capital that has been saved from the product of the past. The amount of this wage-fund at any time was regarded as absolutely predetermined, and consequently not variable by agreement between the parties to the wage-contract. If any section of the laborers of a country succeeded in raising their wages some other section or sections would necessarily have their remuneration lowered. The general rate of wages was therefore fixed by an economic law that was as little subject to the wills and efforts of men as the law of gravitation. It was consequently no more immoral than the action of the tides.

Although the wage-fund theory is no longer held, either by economists or by intelligent men generally, an equally irrational belief in the power of economic laws to prevent any lasting modification in the rates of wages by human action, seems to retain a considerable body of adherents. It is cherished for the most part by those who have a personal interest in keeping wages low, and whose mental horizon is circumscribed by limitations of experience, education, intellect and will. To them the most convincing reply that can be made to the demand that the wage-contract be moralized seems to be the assertion that the rate of wages is fixed by economic law. Is the assumption valid, and if so does the inference really follow?

According to Marshall, an economic law "is a statement that a certain course of action may be expected under certain

⁴ See chapter on "the Verdict of the Economists" in "Industrial Democracy," by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, London, 1897.

conditions from the members of an industrial group.'"⁵ Hence a particular economic law merely declares that, given certain external social conditions, men may be expected to perform such and such economic actions. It does not say that they will act thus in all conditions, nor does it specify how frequently the assumed conditions will be present in actual life. For example, the law which causes the workers in the Southern cotton mills to be so poorly paid would not continue to operate there in changed conditions, and the existing conditions differ from those that obtain in the mills of Massachusetts. In the words of Marshall, "economic laws are applicable to a very narrow range of circumstances, which happen to exist together at one particular place and time, but quickly pass away." They are consequently quite different from the laws of mathematics, which are absolute and universal. The sum of the angles of a triangle will equal two right angles always and everywhere; but the law that an increase in the supply of labor lowers wages, will not produce the same effect among organized as among unorganized workingmen.

The question whether the rate of wages is fixed by economic law, is chiefly a question of language. The affirmation is in a sense true, but it is not a very important or a very illuminating truth. At any rate, the inference drawn from it, that wages cannot be modified by human effort, is utterly invalid, and indicates a complete misunderstanding of the character of economic laws. For the laws are operative only in certain conditions, are descriptions of what is likely to happen in certain conditions, and are consequently dependent upon conditions. But the conditions themselves, especially in the field of distribution, are in a large measure under the control of men. Thus, it is an economic law that in a competitive regime wages are regulated by the interaction of supply and demand, but these factors are partly determined by the wills of the buyers and sellers of labor. Supply will be restricted by a combination of laborers; demand by a com-

⁵ "Principles of Economics," Book I, Ch. VII, London, 1890. Cf. Ritchie, D. G., "Darwin and Hegel," Ch. V, London, 1893; Keynes, J. N., "The Scope and the Method of Political Economy," Ch. VII, New York, 1897; The Duke of Argyll, "The Reign of Law," Chs. II and VII, New York, 1868.

bination of employers. Some of the dogmatic assertions made concerning the inflexibility of economic laws imply the notion that the latter are like the edicts of a despot; whereas the simple fact is that they are to a considerable extent moulded by the human beings whom they effect. A strong labor union might meet the objection of the employer, that efforts to get more pay must prove futile, since wages are fixed by economic law, with the declaration: "Yes, but we will help to make the law."

The scope of economic laws is further restricted by the fact that they describe, not what men *must* do, but what they may be expected to do. Herein they differ from the laws of physical nature, which admit of no exception in the conditions to which they apply. The laws of economics are not concerned with purely physical forces, which operate uniformly, blindly and necessarily, but with human actions, and these are free. Hence even where all the external conditions are suitable a particular economic law may not work out its normal and expected effect. For example, the condition of supply and demand in a labor market may call for a reduction in wages, yet a generous employer may refrain from taking advantage of favorable conditions, may do otherwise than he is expected to do, and allow wages to remain at the present level. In a word, economic laws describe uniform *tendencies* rather than uniform modes of human action.

Indeed, the custom of speaking of economic laws and producing, or tending to produce, certain effects is confusing and ought to be avoided.⁶ Subjectively, they are merely statements of uniformity; objectively, they are relations of uniformity. The element of compulsion or causality behind this uniformity is contained in certain physical, social and psychological forces. All of these can, to a greater or less extent, be counteracted by forces within the control of man. In any concrete situation it is the comparative strength of the two sets of forces that decides the kind of economic action that will be produced. Whether any class of underpaid laborers must continue to receive the meagre wages that the system of unlim-

⁶ Cf. Bonar, James, "Philosophy and Political Economy," pp. 194-196, London, 1893.

ited bargaining now assigns to them, depends upon whether the economic forces that produce this result can be overcome by forces working in the opposite direction. The question has no real relation to the abstract bogey that is sometimes appealed to in the name of economic law.

THE PRACTICAL TEACHING OF THE ECONOMISTS.

There is nothing consequently in the nature of economic laws to render existing rates of wages necessary, or the unrestricted use of bargaining power morally legitimate. Let us now see what warrant there is for the statement that economic writers have regarded a contract made under competitive conditions as just, and what value is to be attached to their pronouncements in this matter. In general, their views of ethical aspects of economic facts ought to have special weight because of their superior knowledge of the facts, and their superior facilities for applying ethical principles. The authority attaching to their opinions on the morality of unlimited free contract can be overcome only through an examination of the processes by which they reached their conclusions.

The assertion is sometimes made that economists have laid down no ethical doctrines of any kind, that their province is merely that of positive fact and their work that of analysis, observation and induction. The best reply to this statement is an appeal to the facts of history. "While affecting the reserved and serious air of students, political economists have at all times been found brawling in the market place."⁷ This is especially true of the "classical" or "orthodox" school of economists, who held undisputed sway in England during the first half of the Nineteenth Century. With the great majority of these, says Edward Cannan, "practical aims were paramount and the advancement of science secondary."⁸ As a rule they were men of strong moral convictions, and, of course, advocated no practical policy that in their view would be at variance with the right. On the contrary, they taught more or less explicitly that the measures that they favored—notably, unlimited freedom of competition and contract—would natu-

⁷ Toynbee, A., "Industrial Revolution," p. 25, New York, 1890.

⁸ "Production and Distribution," p. 384, London, 1894; cf. Hobson, J. A., "John Ruskin, Social Reformer," p. 99, London, 1898.

rally and automatically bring about a regime of social justice. Professor Sidgwick, who cannot be accused of unfriendliness toward the traditional political economy, tells us that "the teaching of political economists has generally pointed to the conclusion that a free exchange, without fraud or coercion, is always a fair exchange."⁹ The logic of their teaching, therefore, has been that wages freely bargained for would be just wages. What were the reasons that lead them to hold and promulgate this theory?

The political economy of Adam Smith was based partly on a priori assumptions and partly on induction.¹⁰ The a priori principles that he assumed as valid and that did most to give his system its distinctive character were, (a) the philosophical doctrine of an order, or law, of nature in favor of individual freedom, and (b) the theological doctrine of an all-wise Being who will "maintain at all times the greatest possible amount of happiness."¹¹ The idea of a law of nature came to him principally from the Physiocrats and the political doctrinaires who flourished immediately before the French Revolution; the ideal to which it pointed, individual freedom, was the dominant aspiration of his age. The order of nature meant that system of relations between man and man which had obtained or would obtain in a state of nature. The *law* of nature, consequently, required that political institutions and restraints be reduced to a minimum. This being accomplished, the equality of men, which also was a part of the order of nature, would secure for them the greatest measure of well-being.¹² Unlimited individual freedom was the practical ideal of those "nature philos-

* Article on "Political Economy and Ethics" in "Palgrave's Dictionary of Political Economy," New York, 1891.

⁹ See Ingram, J. K., "History of Political Economy," pp. 89-93, New York, 1894; Cohn, G., "History of Political Economy," chapter on Adam Smith, Philadelphia, 1894; Cliffe-Leslie, T. E., "Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy," chapter on Adam Smith, London, 1888; Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 11-26; Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 19, 20; Bonar, op. cit., chapter on Adam Smith; Ely, R. T., "The Evolution of Industrial Society," chapter on "Industrial Liberty," New York, 1903.

¹⁰ "Theory of the Moral Sentiments," Part VI, Sec. II, Ch. iii, 1759.

¹² W. S. Lilly's interesting volume, "A Century of Revolution," London, 1889, contains a thorough, though severe, criticism of the Revolutionary assumptions of liberty and equality.

ophers" who exercised so profound an influence upon Adam Smith. It was, indeed, the ideal of the age. Personal and political liberty was preached and longed for in England, France and America, as the one adequate remedy for the social ills then existing. Adam Smith sought to have it applied to industry. Every page of his writings, says Toynbee, "is illumined by one passion, the passion for freedom." The supreme need of the hour, to his mind, was the removal of those petty public and quasi-public restrictions that hindered in the industrial world freedom of movement and freedom of contract. Abolish these and the laborers would of themselves be able to realize their natural economic equality and their longed-for economic prosperity. "All systems either of preference or restraint," he declared in a passage that has become famous, "being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord."¹³

It is surprising that Adam Smith, whose work abounds with proofs of his ability to observe facts accurately, could enunciate a principle so contrary to the fundamental facts of human nature and human conduct. Then, as now, it must have seemed clear that the legal power to enter into contracts is not sufficient to obtain for men the conditions of well-being. Freedom from physical and political coercion does not of itself render men truly free and equal in bargaining. The explanation seems to be found in Smith's second *a priori* principle, which, as so frequently happens with preconceived theories, prevented him from seeing conditions as they actually were. This was the assumption of the all-pervading beneficence of the Author of Nature. Though man is by nature essentially selfish and aims only at his private gain, he is led by an "invisible hand" to promote the welfare of all. His most selfish acts redound, at least in the long run, to the common good. Hence both individual and social prosperity and justice are best secured and conserved by allowing each to seek his own interests in his own way, by setting up the system of complete liberty, which is founded on the constitution of nature and the benevolent designs of nature's God.

¹³ "Wealth of Nations," Book IV, Ch. IX, final paragraph, New York, 1895.

These two assumptions of the supreme value of individual liberty, and the sufficiency of enlightened self-interest, were adopted in substance by all the great economists of England down to the middle of the Nineteenth Century. Most of them, indeed, cared little or nothing for—probably knew little of—the philosophical and theological prepossessions that underlay these theories in the mind of Adam Smith, but they had no hesitation in advocating as the correct principles of industrial action, abstention from combination and regulation, unlimited competition, and the fullest individual liberty.¹⁴ They did not, however, preach competition and freedom of contract as invariable laws, to be disregarded only under the greatest peril; that fault was committed by the popular expounders of political economy, chiefly journalists and politicians.¹⁵ They never asserted that wages fixed by bargaining in competitive conditions would in every case be just. Indeed, their primary aim was not with distribution at all. Professor Sidgwick says that Adam Smith and his followers sought before all else the improvement of production.¹⁶ The question with them was how to make the national product as great as possible at a minimum of cost. And the answer seemed to them to lie in the one word, competition. That the existing inequalities were far from being ideal, they were well aware; but they thought that the injury resulting to production from any interference with competition would more than offset the improvement in distribution.¹⁷ They made an unquestioning act of faith in the beneficent and levelling influence of competition. "Unrestricted freedom of action and contract would tend to reduce the actually inevitable inequality of economic opportunities to the lowest attainable minimum."¹⁸ With inequality of opportunity at a minimum, the prices of things, including the price of labor, would correspond as closely to the requirements of justice as could be expected in a world inhabited by human beings.

¹⁴ Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, p. 399; Keynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-74. John Rae seems to be almost alone in opposing this view of the mind of the classical school of economists: "Contemporary Socialism," pp. 345-374, New York, 1896.

¹⁵ Cliffe-Leslie, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 24, 396.

¹⁷ Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 22, 400.

¹⁸ *Idem*, p. 506.

Now, this theory of the equalizing force of unfettered competition and unlimited freedom of contract, together with a very inadequate observation of the facts of industrial life, formed the basis of whatever claims the older economists had to be regarded as judges of the morality of wages fixed by the method of unlimited bargaining. That their theory was false and their study of facts one-sided, was abundantly proved by the industrial experience of the land in which the theory was most widely preached and most thoroughly tested.¹⁹ The rise of the factory system in England and the introduction of the policy of *laissez-faire* were, indeed, followed by a remarkable increase in the production of wealth; but inequalities of opportunity were not reduced to a minimum; the remuneration of labor did not tend to conform to a measure of substantial justice. Nearly the whole of the increase in wealth went to the newly-made capitalists, while the wages received by the laborers were barely sufficient to keep them alive.²⁰ The levelling influence of competition was confined to the ranks of the workmen, and its tendency was invariably downward. Starvation wages compelled husbands and fathers to send their wives and children into the mills, with the result that their own pay was still further reduced through this unnatural competition between husband and wife, between father and child. To such an extent did women and girls supersede men in the manufacturing industry that the latter frequently were obliged to remain at home to attend to the duties of the household. Children from the workhouses were impressed into the factories under a system of apprenticeship that rendered their existence "literally and without exaggeration that of slaves." In a word, "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty" advocated by Adam Smith and his successors, brought, instead of a regime of justice, a period of horror that is known in economic history as the period of English Wage-Slavery.²¹

¹⁹ On the incomplete inductions of the classical economists, see: Marshall, op. cit., Book I, Ch. IV, par. 6; Hobson, "The Social Problem," pp. 28-30, New York, 1901; Ruskin, "Unto This Last," Essay I, New York, 1885.

²⁰ Gibbins, H. de B., "Industry in England," p. 381, New York, 1898.

²¹ For a general description of this period, see: Gibbins, op. cit., pp. 381-406; "Alfred," "History of the Factory Movement," passim, London, 1857; Cooke-Taylor, R. W., "The Modern Factory System," passim, London, 1894; Engels, F., "Condition of the Working Classes in England," passim, New York, 1887; Carlyle, T., "Past and Present," Books I and III, 1841.

That the beliefs and hopes of the classical economists concerning the ethical efficacy of competition were utterly mistaken, is well understood by the economists of to-day. The latter realize very clearly that in some lines of production, at any rate, the natural and normal result of the competitive system is to have "our work done by a large number of low-grade laborers, instead of by a comparatively small number of high-grade laborers."²² Whole classes of laborers, for example, those employed in sweat shops, are "underpaid, underfed and undersupplied with everything which contributes to civilized life." Contemporary economists feel and acknowledge that conditions such as these are at variance with the requirements of justice. They are consequently desirous that competition should be modified in various ways; by custom, philanthropy, labor organizations and moderate legislative action. Beyond this the majority of them seem unwilling to go. In so far as they touch the ethical aspect of the matter at all, they seem to hold that the system of bargaining for wages satisfies the demand of justice as fully as is at present practicable. The question of replacing the practice of unlimited bargaining with a definitely moral standard of wages is discussed not so much from the standpoint of ethics as from that of feasibility. This is especially true of their attitude, in so far as they have any, toward the standard of a Living Wage. Their contention seems to be that even if this standard could be established in practice, for example, by legislation, it would be productive of more social harm than good. Professor Smart rejects the Living Wage, and defends the present method of bargaining on the ground that no more satisfactory plan is workable outside of socialism.²³ The existing freedom of contract secures for all "a certain rough kind of justice." President Hadley likewise declares against the Living Wage as impracticable, and ac-

²² Hadley, A. T., "Economics," sec. 361, New York, 1898; cf. Lavoisier, E., "The American Workman," p. 449, Baltimore, 1900; translated from the French by T. B. Adams; and especially, Walker, F. A., "The Wages Question," chapter on the "Degradation of Labor," New York, 1876.

²³ "Studies in Economics," chapter on a "Living Wage," New York, 1895; and "The Distribution of Income," Ch. XXVIII, New York, 1899.

cepts the sliding scale as the fairest method of determining wages that has yet been proposed.²⁴

The position of the two writers just named probably reflects the general views of all present-day economists except those who profess to give more than usual attention to the moral aspects of industry. These naturally lay greater stress on the immorality of unlimited bargaining, and pay less attention to the difficulties in the way of a better method.²⁵

THE ATTITUDE OF NINETEENTH CENTURY LEGISLATION TOWARD UNLIMITED BARGAINING.

Since the beginning of the Nineteenth Century the laws of England have allowed the fullest freedom of contract in the determination of the wages to be paid for all except government work. England is mentioned particularly because the history of her legislative attitude toward the wage-contract during the last century is typical of the greater part of Europe and of the whole of North America, and because she was the first to adopt the policy of non-regulation. The causes of the changed attitude of the law are very much the same as those which induced the economists to advocate unlimited competition and freedom of contract. The Industrial Revolution had rendered the old regulations of industry inadequate and harmful, and the dominant political ideal of the day was wider liberty for the individual. Thus the champions of non-interference with the industrial activity of the British subject were able to enforce their theoretical arguments by pointing to the disastrous results of the opposite policy. Prominent among these champions were the economists, whose influence upon English legislation during the first half of the nineteenth century has not been equalled in any other time or country. Ricardo alone, we are told by Toynbee, revolutionized the economic thought of the British Parliament during his brief stay in that body. Again, the middle classes, who were rapidly

²⁴ "Economics," secs. 404-406; cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, P., "Traité Théorique et Pratique d'Economie Politique," II, pp. 484, et sq., Paris, 1896.

²⁵ Cf. Ely, "Outlines of Economics," p. 206, New York, 1896; Hobson, "The Social Problem," Chs. II, VII.

gaining in wealth and political power, urged the *laissez-faire* policy because they felt that "with freedom they were more than a match for all competitors." The effect of these combined forces was to restrict state regulation of industrial life to the narrowest proportions known to history.

The causes of the regime of non-interference in America are included among those just described. The influence of the economists was not as great as in England; but the cult of individual freedom, and the self-confidence and self-assertion of the middle classes, were for a long period the dominant forces in shaping, both positively and negatively, the course of legislation regarding industry.

Obviously the attitude of the civil law toward the wage-contract, or toward any other human action or institution, is not per se a criterion of the morally good. The ordinances of legislatures are not always in accord with the principles of right and justice. The fact that the laws of a country allow the citizens by means of free contract to depress wages to the starvation level, or enhance them beyond the limits of extortion, does not make the transaction just; but, since the legislatures should, and generally speaking do, endeavor to promote just dealings in the most important social relations, there arises a presumption in favor of any institution that the law sanctions and protects.

In the present case the presumption vanishes as soon as we examine the causes of the legislation. As above described, these causes may be reduced to three: the insufficiency of the old restrictions; the fancied sufficiency of individual freedom; and the selfishness of the middle classes. The first afforded a good reason for such new legislation as would be appropriate to the new conditions of industry, but not for the anarchical policy of non-interference; the second was a hypothesis that has been utterly discredited by the subsequent history of industrial development—individual freedom has not brought either economic equality or economic justice; while the third should have been checked, instead of fostered, by legislation.

The presumptions in favor of the existing method of fixing wages and against the principle of living wage, which are

drawn from the teachings of political economy and the attitude of the law, disappear, therefore, when we realize the reasons upon which this teaching and this attitude were based. Economic laws are not inexorable, are not independent of the wills of the men whose actions they describe, do not compel wages to be adjusted by an unlimited use of the economic strength of the bargainers, and do not render existing rates of wages just. The practical recommendations of the economists and the ordinances of the legislators, can be traced to false principles, false reasoning, incomplete analysis of facts, and the selfishness of the dominant industrial class. Consequently the doctrine of a living wage cannot be refuted or put in peril by any mere appeal to economic or legal authority. We shall now review briefly the chief authorities, contemporary and historical, that are against the method of unrestricted bargaining and in favor of a professedly ethical standard.

LEGISLATION PREVIOUS TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

The policy of indifference which nearly all governments pursue with reference to the wage-contract to-day has not always prevailed. From the year 1349 to the year 1563 the remuneration of the unskilled laborers of England, both in town and country, was regulated by law—by the various “Statutes of Laborers” that were re-enacted or amended by nearly every monarch that reigned during those two centuries. In the last named year was passed the famous “Statute of Elizabeth,” which applied not only to the unskilled workers, but “to the greater part of the industry of the period.”²⁶ It continued on the statute books down to 1813, when at the bidding of capitalists and political economists, but against the protests of the laboring class, it was “peremptorily repealed.” A great economic historian has contended that from first to last these laws regulating wages were designed to, and actually did, benefit the employer at the expense of the workingman. The first of them was, indeed, framed for the express purpose of reducing the unusually high wages which prevailed

²⁶ Webb, “History of Trade Unionism,” p. 42, New York, 1902.

in consequence of the Black Death of 1348. In general, the legal rate of wages was for a long time a maximum which both master and man were forbidden to exceed, and the "Statute of Elizabeth" was almost invariably administered unfavorably to the laborer. According to the provisions of this act, wages were fixed by the justices of the peace, who were in most cases employers or men friendly to the employing class. This policy, together with the disastrous effects of the debasement of the currency and the confiscation of the gild lands by Henry VIII, and the progressive separation of the workers from their little plots of land and from their rights over the common, had no doubt gone very far toward making "low wages and famine wages traditional."²⁷ And yet we find that again and again during the eighteenth century the workingmen appealed to the justices and to the House of Commons to enforce and re-establish the legal regulation of wages.²⁸ However this may be, the question that concerns us now is not whether the laws fixing wages were favorable to the laborers, but whether the English people did not for centuries believe that wages determined by free contract were not necessarily just. That they believed in an objective standard of justice, a standard independent of the terms of the wage-agreement, is evident from their continued efforts to regulate the remuneration of labor by law.²⁹

The policy of legal regulation was carried out not only by means of the formal enactments just described, but also through the rules and customs of the gilds. During a considerable part of the Middle Ages the rates of wages determined by the gilds had virtually all the force of public laws. There was, moreover, an indirect regulation through the legal or quasi-legal regulation of the price of goods. Now, if a gild was able to fix wages so effectively that no one ever thought of

²⁷ Thorold Rogers, "The Economic Interpretation of History," p. 43, New York, 1889.

²⁸ Webb, "History of Trade Unionism," pp. 42-54.

²⁹ A detailed account of the various "Statutes of Laborers" enacted by the English Parliament will be found in the work of Thorold Rogers already cited, Ch. II. See also articles, "Government Regulation of Industry," "Laissez-Faire," and "Statute of Laborers," in Palgrave's "Dictionary."

departing from them, it performed the essential functions of a civil legislator; and if the central authority, or the municipality, or the gild, or even custom, determined the price of goods it virtually determined the price of labor.³⁰ And this legal supervision of the rewards of labor, direct or indirect, explicit or virtual, seems to have prevailed not only in England but throughout Western and Southwestern Europe, during the whole of the later Middle Ages. The accepted principle of mediæval society, say Sidney and Beatrice Webb, was that some kind of social organization was necessary in order to protect the standard of life of the workers, and to prevent their degradation.³¹ The sense of solidarity, mutual dependence and mutual responsibility among the members of a community, the conviction that the industrial world should be ordered by law, rather than left to individual caprice and selfishness, were far more prominent in the thought of that period than they are to-day.³² Hence, "every sort of economic transaction in which individual self-interest seemed to lead to injustice . . ." was regulated "by the general principle that a just or reasonable price should be paid."³³

THE TEACHING OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL WRITERS.

This attitude of the public and of legislators was the result of Christian conceptions of fair dealing, and of the widespread influence of the Christian Church. Christianity succeeded in the Middle Ages in "moralizing industrial and commercial conceptions and institutions," and it impressed men "with a keen sense of personal responsibility in the employment of secular power of every kind."³⁴ It was the uniform teaching of the Fathers of the Church and of the mediæval theologians that every human being had an imperishable right to a livelihood

³⁰ Cf. Brants, V., "Théories Economiques aux XIIe et XIVe Siècles," pp. 201 sq., Paris, 1895.

³¹ "History of Trade Unionism," p. 19.

³² Cf. Gierke, O., "Political Theories of the Middle Age," pp. 7, sq., Cam-

³³ Ashley, W. J., "English Economic History," I, p. 181, New York, 1894. bridge, 1900; translated by F. W. Maitland.

³⁴ Cunningham, W., "Western Civilization," II, pp. 104, 105, Cambridge, 1900.

from the common bounty of nature. This they regarded as a natural right; independent of and superior to all human laws, conventions and institutions. According to this doctrine, therefore, the laborer was endowed with an absolute right to at least sufficient remuneration to maintain his life. Moreover, the principle that the laborer should receive *just* wages was virtually contained in the canonist doctrine of just price. The theologians and canonists held that every commodity had a certain fair valuation, or just price, which was independent of the arbitrary and fortuitous valuation resulting from the higgling of the market.³⁵ The just price in any market being

³⁵ The somewhat puzzling doctrine of "just price" is not always understood by either its critics or its defenders. The former sometimes assert that it was based on an incorrect analysis of the phenomena that give rise to commercial values, individual and social. This is a complete misconception; for the doctrine in question was not an attempt to explain the actual, but to describe the ideal. Comparisons instituted between it and modern theories of value are, therefore, entirely irrelevant. A theory of value is a scientific explanation of the ultimate causes of the values that prevail or tend to prevail in a regime of free contract. Now, the medieval writers concerned themselves very little with this question: first, because values and prices were in their time fixed for the most part by law or custom; and, second, because their main purpose was to lay down rules for knowing the price at which a thing *ought* to sell, not to tell the price at which it would sell. Even if they had held, as some modern writers have asserted, that the just price of a commodity was something strictly intrinsic—a belief that cannot be correctly attributed to any of them—their teaching would not conflict with economic theories of value. (Cf. Cunningham, "Western Civilization," II, pp. 78-80.) The doctrine of just price may sometimes have been associated with incorrect views of industrial life, but all competent authorities agree that it was a fairly sound attempt to define the equities of medieval exchanges, and that it was tolerably successful in practice.

On the other hand, over-zealous apologists of the doctrine have tried to show that the "*communis aestimatio*," which was held to be the proximate criterion of just price, is essentially the same as that complex of social forces that fixes present market values, and that some modern writers have called the "*social estimate*." The resemblance is only of name. The common estimate of which the canonists spoke was a *conscious social judgment* that fixed prices beforehand, and was expressed chiefly in custom, while the social estimate of to-day is in reality an *unconscious resultant* of the higgling of the market, and finds expression in market price.

For a complete exposition of the doctrine of just price, with abundant citations and references, see: "*L'Idée du juste prix*," by Henri Garnier, Paris, 1900; and "*Allgemeine Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie*," by Julius Costa-Rosetti, S. J., Ch. XV, Freiburg, 1888; Brants in the work cited above, Ch. V and p. 193; Ashley in "*Economic History*," I, p. 134, sq.; and Cunningham in "*Growth of English Industry and Commerce*," I, pp. 232, sq., New York, 1890, are also quite satisfactory.

determined by the appraisement of the general public, it was said to be measured by the "communis æstimatio." To ascertain the just price of any article, account had to be taken of its general utility, scarcity and cost of production. The last element, which in the Middle Ages was mostly represented by labor expenditure, was regarded as the most important. When, therefore, the mediæval theologians and canonists taught that a just price should be paid for every commodity, and that its chief determinant was labor-cost, they virtually insisted that the laborer should be paid just wages.³⁶

To the searcher for explicit and precise rules for determining what is a fair remuneration for labor, the mediæval writers are, indeed, disappointing. St. Thomas Aquinas says that, as justice demands that a fair price be paid for a material commodity so it demands that a fair price should be given for human labor.³⁷ Other writers likewise content themselves with the general declaration that wages should be in accordance with justice. Their failure to be more specific seems to be explained by the industrial conditions of the time. During the greater part of the Middle Ages there was, properly speaking, no such thing as a wage system; for there was no class of laborers either in town or country, depending solely on employers to whom they sold their labor.³⁸ The master craftsmen in the towns and the men who tilled the soil on their own account, received just wages if they were paid a just price for their products. Even after the rise of a distinct laboring class, that is, men who could never hope to become master craftsmen, or men who spent the greater part of their time in the service of the lords of the domain, the question of just wages was not of supreme importance. In town industries the journeymen were quite commonly fed and lodged by their employers;³⁹ the relations between masters and journeymen were akin to those existing between father and sons;⁴⁰ and between the average

³⁶ Cf. Brants, op. cit., pp. 107-116.

³⁷ "Summa Theologica," 2a 2ae, q. 114, a. 1, Rome, 1894.

³⁸ Gibbins, op. cit., p. 150; Ashley, op. cit., II, p. 101; Levasseur, "Histoire des classes ouvrières avant 1789," I, p. 598, Paris, 1900.

³⁹ Levasseur, idem, I, p. 455; Brants, op. cit., p. 123; Martin Saint-Leon, "Histoire des corporations des métiers," p. 155, Paris, 1897.

⁴⁰ Ashley, op. cit., II, p. 103.

earnings of the two classes there was not a great difference.⁴¹ Agricultural laborers usually had possession of a piece of ground, to the cultivation of which they devoted their leisure time, and from which they obtained a part of their sustenance.⁴² These conditions were not, indeed, universal, nor did they always secure for the laborer a reasonable living, but they explain sufficiently the failure of mediæval writers to treat specifically the question of just wages.

Later on, when the wage-earning class assumed greater proportions, we find the ethics of their remuneration explicitly discussed by theological writers. Molina, De Lugo, and Bonacina, writing about the beginning of the seventeenth century, declare that in general that wage is just which is customary for a given service in a given place.⁴³ The two first mentioned say that a wage insufficient for the subsistence of some laborers will nevertheless be fair when there are many who *willingly* sell their services for that amount. We are told that numerous workers do accept this lower wage, either because they have other sources of income, or because they can live more cheaply than fellow members of their own class. From the context it would seem that both Molina and De Lugo assume that a laborer has a right to a living from his toil, and that their chief concern in the passages cited is with cases in which the circumstances are exceptional.⁴⁴ At any rate they do not discuss the question of a living wage adequately and in all its relations. The only general standard of just remuneration that they lay down is custom. Whether the customary wages of those days complied with the requirements of a living wage as then understood is not easily determined. However, since wages remained stable during long periods of time, and since the direct influence of religious and moral teaching on economic laws was very considerable—much greater than at present—it may well be that the essentials of reasonable wages were fairly well realized.

⁴¹ Levasseur, *idem*, I, p. 313; Brants, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁴² Gibbins, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

⁴³ Molina, "De Contractibus," disp. 506, nos. 2, 3, 4, Venice, 1611; De Lugo, "De Jure et Justitia," disp. 29, no. 62, Lyons, 1670; Bonacina, "De Contractibus," disp. 3, q. 7, Venice, 1754.

⁴⁴ Cf. A. Vermeersch, S. J., "Quæstiones de Justitia," pp. 572, 573, Bruges, 1901; Pottier, A., "De Jure et Justitia," pp. 234-241, Liège, 1900.

From the time of the writers just mentioned down to the year 1891, the theological and canonist doctrine on the ethics of wages seems to have undergone no important development. The old phrases about customary wages and just wages are constantly recurring. A curious instance of this unprogressiveness is found in the pages of the canonist, Reiffenstuel, who wrote during the first half of the nineteenth century. He maintained that it was wrong for an employer to pay a laborer less than was usual in similar circumstances, but that when the usual wage was paid all obligations of justice were satisfied, even though it did not suffice for a livelihood.⁴⁵ According to this interpretation, the "customary wages" of the mediæval theologians and canonists become "current wages," and the "common estimate" of just wages becomes the wages that men actually pay in the strife of competitive bargaining. What was in the minds of the Schoolmen a conscious moral judgment is thus converted into an unconscious resultant of men's efforts to buy cheap and sell dear. The author's principle would justify starvation wages if these were common to a whole class.

In the year 1891 the late Pope Leo XIII formulated the doctrine of a minimum Living Wage in his celebrated encyclical, "*Rerum Novarum*," better known by the title, "On the Condition of Labor." Its most important passages relative to the present matter are the following:

"We now approach a subject of very great importance, and one on which if extremes are to be avoided right ideas are absolutely necessary. Wages, we are told, are fixed by free consent, and therefore the employer, when he pays what was agreed upon, has done his part and is not called upon for anything further. The only way, it is said, in which injustice could happen would be if the master refused to pay the whole of the wages, or the workman would not complete the work undertaken; when this happens the State should intervene to see that each obtains his own, but not under any other circumstances.

"This mode of reasoning is by no means convincing to a fair-minded man, for there are important considerations which it leaves out of view altogether. To labor is to exert one's self for the sake of procuring what is necessary for the purpose of life, and most of all

⁴⁵ "*Jus Canonicum*," lib. III, Decretal., tit. XVIII, nos. 108-114, Rome, 1831.

for self preservation. 'In the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread.' Therefore a man's labor has two notes or characters. First of all, it is *personal*; for the exertion of individual power belongs to the individual who puts it forth, employing his power for the personal profit for which it was given. Secondly, man's labor is *necessary*; for without the results of labor a man cannot live; and self-conservation is a law of nature which it is wrong to disobey. Now if we were to consider labor merely in so far as it is personal, doubtless it would be within the workman's right to accept any rate of wages whatever; for in the same way as he is free to work or not, so he is free to accept a small remuneration or none at all. But this is a mere abstract supposition; the labor of the workman is not only his personal attribute, but is necessary; and this makes all the difference. The preservation of life is the bounden duty of each and all, and to fail therein is a crime. It follows that each one has a right to procure what is required in order to live; and the poor can procure it in no other way than by work and wages.

"Let it be granted, then, that as a rule workmen and employer should make agreements, and in particular should freely agree, as to wages; nevertheless, there is a dictate of nature more ancient and more imperious than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in *reasonable and frugal comfort*. If through necessity, or fear of a worse evil, the workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or contractor will give him no better, he is the victim of fraud and injustice."

Pope Leo XIII was not, indeed, the first Catholic authority to proclaim this principle of a Living Wage. It had already been more or less explicitly laid down and defended by Kettler in Germany, Vogelsang in Australia, de Pascal in France, Potier in Belgium, and Manning in England.⁴⁶ It was the principle of social justice that was clearest and most definite in the consciousness of those numerous groups of Catholic thinkers and agitators who during the preceding quarter of a century had been seeking a remedy for the industrial ills of modern Europe. It was at least a partial application to existing economic conditions and institutions of the traditional theological and canonist doctrine of a just price. Indeed, the activity of

⁴⁶ Cf. Nitti, F., "Catholic Socialism," *passim*, New York, 1895; translated from the Italian by Mary Mackintosh.

this Catholic social movement, more perhaps than all other influences together, led the late Pontiff to issue the encyclical, "On the Condition of Labor." In a conversation with the Swiss social reformer, Gaspard Decurtins, Pope Leo referred to the father of the movement, Archbishop Kettler, as his "great forerunner." Nevertheless, it was his encyclical that made the Living Wage doctrine an explicit principle of Catholic ethics throughout the whole civilized world.

The subject of the authoritative Protestant teaching on the ethics of wages cannot be adequately treated here. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, a large number of able Protestant divines, such as Kingsley and Maurice in England, Stocker and Todt in Germany, and Gide in France, did, and some of them are still doing, valuable work by opposing the oppression of labor under the guise of free contract, and by insisting that to pay the laborer as little as one possibly can is to violate Christian justice.⁴⁷ There seems, however, to be no systematic body of Protestant doctrine on the ethics of wages that is traditional, uniform, and recognized generally as authoritative. Hodge's "Systematic Theology," the principal work on Protestant theology written in English, devotes a few pages to such questions of commercial morality as deception, adulteration, and extortion, but contains no word on the moral aspects of the wage contract.

CONTEMPORARY OPINION REGARDING AN ETHICAL STANDARD OF WAGES.

The ethical theory underlying the method of unlimited bargaining, namely, that contracts made without force or fraud are necessarily fair, is, despite the prevailing practice, condemned by the majority of disinterested men. This is most clearly seen in the general conviction that the excessive prices exacted and the enormous profits obtained by some of the great trusts, are not merely opposed to the public welfare, but positively unjust and dishonest.⁴⁸ Yet the contracts by which this result is brought about are all free. Speaking of the exorbitant profits made by a prominent corporation in the manu-

⁴⁷ Nitti, *idem*, pp. 85-99.

⁴⁸ Cf. Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics," p. 288, New York, 1901.

fracture of steel rails (twelve dollars per ton, which he maintained was ten and one-half dollars in excess of a fair profit), a capitalist and ex-Senator of the United States not long ago declared: "If this is not robbery I would like to find some stronger word to characterize it." With this view practically the whole of the American people would agree. Nevertheless, the purchasers of steel rails are neither deceived nor coerced; the transaction is free. Again the money shark who trades on the distress or ignorance of the poor by charging exorbitant rates of interest, gives his victims the benefit of a free contract; yet he is restrained by the civil law and condemned by the public conscience. Similarly with bargains where the subject matter is human services. A drowning man calls to another for help. The latter replies: "I will save you if you pay me a million dollars." The distressed millionaire prefers life on this hard condition to death without it, and quickly closes the contract. The contract was free, was a source of some gain for both parties, but who would affirm that it was just? And the employer who takes advantage of the need of his fellow-man and hires him at starvation wages, has merely made a free bargain. The laborer agrees to the harsh conditions because they mean for him the preservation of life; they represent an advantage as compared with the alternative of starvation. Still, with the exception of the employer and those who look at the matter from their own point of view, the entire community would insist that somehow the transaction was wrong. In the words of Dr. Cunningham, "we feel that it is unfair for the economically strong to wring all that he can out of the economically weak."⁴⁹ Hence, in a dispute between an employer and his poorly paid laborers, public sympathy is invariably on the side of the latter. Indeed, it may be said with confidence that the common sense and unbiased convictions of the community not only repudiate the theory that free contracts in general are just, but maintain that when the laborer is compelled to accept less than a certain decent minimum of remuneration he is in truth defrauded.

Belief in the Living Wage principle has always been more or less firm in the consciousness of the laborer himself, but only

⁴⁹ "Western Civilization," II, p. 80.

recently has it taken the form of an explicit demand.⁵⁰ In England the right to a reasonable minimum of pay has become one of the fundamental assumptions of trade unionism. "It is a vital principle," says one of the trade union leaders, "that a man by his labor should live, and notwithstanding all the teachings of political economists and all the doctrines taught by way of supply and demand, a greater doctrine overrides all these, the doctrine of humanity."⁵¹

The labor unions of America do not often use the phrase, "a living wage," nor explicitly outline the concept that it represents, but they express the same idea in their "union scale." This is the rate of wages that the union demands for its members in any particular industry. It is in reality the minimum that the unionists regard as compatible with right living. They reject, therefore, the standard of unlimited bargaining, inasmuch as they establish a minimum; and they substitute the standard of a living wage, inasmuch as they look upon this minimum as the lowest rate for which a man *ought* to work. It might be objected that the union scale is not intended to be an ethical standard, but merely represents what the unionists think they are strong enough to obtain. It is true that they try to get as high a wage as possible, but this is a matter of practical policy arising out of actual conditions. Behind it is always the conviction that there is involved a question of morals. They believe that they ought to have at least sufficient remuneration to afford them a decent livelihood. Many of them, indeed, hold that they have a right to more than this minimum; but this is merely an additional proof that the idea of an ethical standard is present to their consciousness.⁵²

Nor is the principle of the minimum wage entirely unknown to existing legal codes. The Compulsory Arbitration Act of New Zealand decrees that minors shall not be employed in factories for less than a certain sum per week, and that all

⁵⁰ Webb, "Industrial Democracy," pp. 582, sq.

⁵¹ Idem, loc. cit.

⁵² Cf. the address, "A Living Wage," delivered by President Gompers before the Nineteenth Century Club, and printed in the *American Federationist* for April, 1898; also the testimony of Presidents Gompers and Schaffer before the U. S. Industrial Commission; Vol. VII, pp. 397, 614 of the Report of the Commission.

laborers on public contracts shall receive at least the rates of wages that "are considered usual and fair in the locality." A law containing the latter provision was not long ago enacted in the State of New York. In Victoria, Australia, legal boards have been created with authority to establish a minimum wage, for the express purpose of preventing the remuneration of any class of workers from being reduced below the cost of living. And the New Zealand Court of Arbitration is empowered to fix a minimum wage that will apply, not only to the parties interested in any particular dispute, but to all who are "connected with or engaged in the industry to which the award applies within the industrial district to which the award relates."

This brief discussion of the authorities for and against the practice of unlimited bargaining is not, of course, an adequate historical review of the subject. It has, however, a certain value, inasmuch as it gives some notion of the different attitudes which men have taken toward the ethical side of the wage-contract. For if there is any field of study in which principles stand out in clearer light when they are seen as others see them, it is the field of ethics, and especially of applied ethics. Every new view-point that is taken, and every new opinion, no matter how fantastic, that is considered, contributes something to our understanding of the nature and bearing of ethical truths.

Our conclusions from the present study are: First, that men have always regarded the fixing of wages as in some degree an ethical action; and, secondly, that the preponderance of human opinion is decidedly against the method of unlimited bargaining. The belief that the amount of remuneration given the laborer is entirely devoid of moral aspects, in other words, "that there is no such thing as fair wages," has never been held by any considerable section of any community. Either explicitly or implicitly men have always been virtually unanimous in the conviction that the standard for determining wages should be a moral standard. Even the method of unlimited bargaining, which is on its face non-ethical, was advocated by economists and legislators chiefly because they believed that its results would be morally good. They expected it to bring

about the greatest attainable measure of social justice. Indeed, so long as men remain ethical beings, they cannot ignore the moral aspects of any practical policy that they recommend.⁵³ Finally, although the method of bargaining is the prevailing one, it is less than a century in existence, and was established through the mistaken efforts of economists and legislators. Previous to that period, it was frowned upon by the political, religious and moral forces of society. It is condemned to-day, not merely by the laborers, but by the moral sense of the greater and saner part of the community.

JOHN A. RYAN.

⁵³ Cf. Professor Foxwell's Introduction to Menger's "Right to the Whole Produce of Labor," p. xi, London, 1899; translated from the German by M. E. Tanner.

HISTORY AND INSPIRATION.

II. THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH.

A. GENERAL REMARKS.

§ 1. *Origin and limitation of the authority of the Fathers.*

I. The New Testament writings were addressed to Christians and not to infidels. Neither the Gospels nor the Epistles were written with the view that pagans should learn the Christian faith by reading them. We mistake the character of the Gospels completely if we consider them as, or even compare them to scientific and complete treatises on Christian doctrine. The letters of the Apostles were written to communities of people who had already received the faith. It was the purpose of the Apostles to instruct those Christians more fully regarding some particular question or local circumstance, and to confirm them in the faith which had previously been preached to them. Writing his letters to the "Saints" in Corinth, Ephesus or Philippi, St. Paul intended to induce the faithful of those cities to regulate their lives in accordance with their faith. His letters become unintelligible and even absurd, if he is supposed to have addressed people who knew nothing of Christianity. He takes it for granted that the readers are already acquainted with the bulk of Christian doctrine.

Regarding the truth of this body of Christian doctrine, which had been preached to them, there could be no doubt whatever. St. Paul himself wrote to the Galatians: "Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach a gospel to you besides (opposed to) that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema" (Gal. I, 8). Therefore, Christianity or Christian doctrine being a living whole, and every part of it being in vital connection with every other part, it stands to reason that the faithful to whom the New Testament writings were first committed, carefully avoided taking from them any meaning, which would be found to clash with the *body of Christian doctrine* already known. The letters received from the

Apostles had to be interpreted in such a way as not to be at variance with the unity of the whole.

This shows the soundness of our Catholic teaching according to which Christian interpreters have to take as a guide the *analogy of faith*. Even if the doctrine in question is not explicitly expressed in the creed of the Church, it must agree with the spirit of the whole.

II. Christ did not teach men by writing books. He founded a Church. If there is one thing clear in the life of the Master of the Apostles, it is that He did not found His Church upon dead writings but upon living teaching. The Church of Christ is a living organism. St. Paul likes to call the Church "the body of Christ." "The faithful," he says, "are but one body in Christ" (Rom. XII, 5). "He (Christ) is the head of the body, the Church" (Col. I, 18).

"The kingdom of heaven is like a grain of mustard seed, which is the least indeed of all the seeds; but when it is grown up, it is greater than all herbs, and becometh a tree so that the birds of the air come and dwell in the branches thereof" (Matt. XIII, 32). In later centuries this tree produced branches, whose development or evolution was not known to those who saw its first appearance: but, although growing, Christianity always remained *the same tree*. Whatever grew beside or around this tree, was not the tree of Christ.

The vital fluid of the celestial mustard tree is, in the first place, divine grace, ascending and feeding all the branches through the Sacraments. Secondly, the divine doctrine, taught by the Apostles or their successors and held by the faithful. This organism can never change. It is of the very life of the tree. No one therefore can ever alter the divine constitution of the Church.

In the New Testament and in the history of the first Christian centuries there is nothing more evident than that the transmission of Christian doctrine was not left to the occasional speeches of men or women, enthused with a kind of inspiration; but that Christ founded a Church to whose divine constitution belongs an institution of official teachers. "All power is given to me in heaven and earth. Going therefore teach ye all nations" (Matt. XXVIII, 19). "He that heareth

you, heareth me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth me" (Luke X, 16).

The Apostles taught mankind what Christ and the Holy Ghost revealed to them. Their successors do not receive additional revelations. They must keep and guard the revelation once received. They teach, explain and apply the doctrine of the Twelve. But they, as well as the Apostles themselves, are *jure divino* the official teachers of the living Church of Christ.

In this Church the ordinary way of teaching is oral preaching. Through this oral preaching of the Church, taught by the Pope and Bishops and held by the faithful, we know that—in setting forth the Christian revelation—the Apostles never taught any error in matters of faith; that, if occasionally they committed their teaching to writing, these writings were inspired. Through the Church we know the divine character of those Gospels and Epistles which out of so many apocrypha of the first two centuries, are acknowledged by the faithful to be the Word of God. The New Testament is the canon of the Church.

The successors of the Apostles, who in the entire course of their teaching never enjoyed additional revelation, were evidently not inspired when they wrote things which they knew belonged to the doctrine revealed by Christ. But nevertheless their writings are the official documents of authorized witnesses and regular teachers of the doctrine living in the Church assisted by the Holy Ghost.

Christ is with His Church "all days even to the consummation of the world" (Matt. XXVIII, 20). Before Christ died, He promised that the Father would give us "another Paraclete" who is to abide with us "for ever" (John XIV, 16). This other Paraclete takes the place of Christ himself: "But I tell you the truth: it is expedient for you that I go: for if I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you" (John XVI, 7). "When he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will teach you all truth. . . . He shall glorify me; because he shall receive of mine and show it to you" (John XVI, 13 ff.). He is "the Spirit of Truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not nor knoweth him; but you shall know him; because he shall abide with you, and shall be in you" (John XIV, 17).

Such being the nature of Christ's divine institution, the faithful easily realize "how they ought to behave themselves in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of truth" (I Tim. III, 15). They know that the official distribution of divine grace was entrusted to the anointed representatives of Christ, administering the sacraments. As regards the doctrines of the Church, the faithful know that they must "hear" the official teachers, with whom that "other Paraclete" now abides.

The Apostles died. But the divine institution of official ministers and teachers will last as long as the Church itself; it is the divine organism of the mystical body of Christ.

Because in their writings the Apostles were inspired, we are perfectly sure of every sacred writer that he has not written a single sentence, which is at variance with the body of Christian doctrines, preached to the Church. But the writings of their successors, not being inspired, must be judged in quite a different way. Taking inspiration in a broader sense, in later days saintly men may indeed have "prophesied" in some of their writings; they may perhaps, personally, even have received some special revelation: but the *Church* did not receive additional revelation: her official teachers were not inspired. We are only sure that the Holy Ghost abides with her in guarding the "*depositum fidei*" preached by the Apostles. We only know that on account of this "*assistentia Spiritus Sancti*," she never will err in matters of faith or morals. Therefore the writings of the successors of the Apostles, considered separately, have no divine authority on account of the personal knowledge of their authors. We need a *proof* that what they teach is the *teaching of the Church*. The authority of the later official teachers is founded, not upon their studies and learning, but upon their being the witnesses of the teaching of the infallible Church. This condition however being fulfilled, it is of course not less impossible that there should be a disagreement between the *sacred writings* and the teaching of the living *Church* at the present day, than there was in the first or second century.

This *unity* of the doctrine, which alone has the right to bear the name of Christian, shows the truth of our Catholic dogma

that no interpretation of Holy Scripture can be lawful or accurate, which is opposed to the unanimous doctrine of the Church.

"Quoniam vero," says the Council of the Vatican (Sess. III, Cap. 2), "quæ S. Tridentina Synodus de interpretatione divinæ Scripturæ ad coercenda petulantia ingenia decrevit, a quibusdam hominibus prave exponuntur, Nos, idem decretum renovantes, hanc illius mentem esse declaramus, ut in *rebus fidei et morum, ad ædificationem doctrinæ Christianæ pertinentium*, is pro vero sensu Sacræ Scripturæ habendus sit, quem tenuit ac tenet Sancta Mater *Ecclesia*, cujus est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione Scripturarum, atque ideo nemini licere contra hunc sensum . . . ipsam Scripturam Sacram interpretare."

But does not history teach an "*evolution*" of Christian doctrine? Is the teaching of the Church at the present day identical with its teaching in the first centuries? If there is a change, how can the interpretation of Holy Scripture in ancient times restrict the freedom of modern Catholic scholars?

There is no Catholic who does not see the great *historical differences* between the Church in the days of the Apostles and the Church of modern times. Although its divine constitution remained unchanged, its form and shape had to be accommodated to the different needs of time, place and peoples. As regards the "*depositum fidei*," Catholics do not lose sight of the great difference between the standpoints, from which in the course of so many centuries Christians considered and examined the doctrines revealed to them. Christianity, as we said, is no dead writing or building, but living teaching. In the teaching of the first centuries there was a vast residuum of unappropriated truth. We have no reason to admit that St. Peter knew clearly every dogma held by the Catholic Church after the Council of Trent. There was and is in the Christian revelation an unfathomable depth of meaning, out of which new disclosures may and do from time to time break forth. Therefore history teaches us *different degrees of knowledge*. But all degrees are animated by the knowledge of the articulate *unity* of the teaching of the

Church: it is only as a living whole that Christians of all centuries conceive their faith. No doctrine can retain its place in the Christian creed which is not a branch of the tree of Christ.

But how do we know whether this condition is fulfilled in regard to doctrines, which are believed nowadays? We need only look: for we are confronted with a fact. The infallible Church herself *is* the tree: her doctrines are the branches. There are no branches but those that grow upon this tree. The answer therefore is not left to the believing instinct of the individual, to which here Protestants might have recourse. We Catholics know; we see.

Catholics would give a dreadful weapon into the hands of the historians, if they admitted that in order to know whether modern teachings are Christian or not, the only question is whether the Church of the first centuries knew and believed them. Trying to find out the condition of early Christianity, Anglicans would entirely misunderstand the nature of the Church, if they discarded all that does not belong to the history of her teaching at that time, all that is not found to have been existing from the very beginning. The "*semper et ubique*" of the theologians must not be interpreted in this way. Seeing an enormous oak tree we realize perfectly that the tree has grown out of the acorn. Those, however, who planted the acorn, were sure that whatever might grow from it, would be an oak tree, but they could not see the height it afterwards attained, nor the boughs and branches which would crown it. Historically boughs and branches did not exist. Nevertheless, in a certain way, even the highest branches were there. Every living thing of the higher orders arises from a single minute cell, which even under the highest powers of the microscope is hardly distinguishable from the cells which are the origin of other living beings: yet this microscopic cell develops inevitably into a complete living thing, with all the organs and peculiarities of its own, not of another species. Thus, all into which it afterwards develops, must have been "*in potentia*" in the germinal cell.

This comparison between the natural evolution of living things and the development of the Church will be admitted by

Catholic theologians, if, instead of the natural law, and its inevitability, we place the "*assistentia Spiritus Sancti*," which makes us sure that whatever grows from what Christ has planted is: the mustard tree.

Christian revelation did not increase. It is the tree of knowledge which was and still is growing. Since, however, Christian revelation does not exist in the dead copies of Holy Scripture or of the Canons of some Councils,¹ but in the living teaching of the Church, it is often difficult to draw the line between revelation and its knowledge. In the living Church the body of known Christian truths is growing: a doctrine may belong to the Christian revelation although its explicit knowledge was not found in the teaching of the Church at the death of St. John.

In the first century, at the death of the Apostles, the Kingdom of Heaven was not merely a seed! In this way revelation is not to be compared to a single cell. It was a tree and all its later limbs, however young, had already grown. These limbs carried branches covered with buds of other branches. The great difference between historians and theologians seems to consist in this: that for the theologians, who study the principles, branch and bud are one; while historians compare the tree in its maturity to the mere sapling.

Nevertheless, the planters of the acorn, who did not go back to the spot where it was planted, until a gigantic oak tree was raising its crown, may not be able to tell us how boughs and branches have grown: history, following as far as possible the development of institutions, nearly always gives us a relatively full account of the growth of the different branches. From the top of each bough historical research slowly descends to the older branch, thus tracing each doctrine to its bud in the early Church. The knowledge of the bud, however, was not knowledge of the branch, except for Him, whose Providence is the law of this divine "evolution."

Thus then, between the doctrine of the living Church in the first and in the twentieth century there is no real difference,

¹ This, evidently, does not mean that there can be errors either in Holy Scripture or in the final definitions given by Ecumenical Councils.

which could suggest the possibility of real opposition or contradiction. There is, in fact, merely the difference of a *less and more perfect knowledge*. Christians of all centuries are children of the same Church. There is but one mustard tree.

III. The Fathers are the official representatives of the Church. They are the authorized witnesses of her teaching. Therefore wherever we can prove that the Fathers unanimously hold or teach a doctrine as belonging to our Christian faith, there we are absolutely sure to have the doctrine of *the Church*. No interpretation of the Sacred text can ever be admitted which runs counter to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.

What once belonged to Christian faith, belongs to it always. Of the growing mustard tree no branch, yea, no leaf will ever wither. We may have to cut down parasitical growth or leave its removal to the slow but sure hand of time: no real branch of the tree of Christ can ever be cast into the fire. Older branches have a color different from that of the younger offshoots: their bark and their whole formation bear vestiges of the influence of the atmosphere in which they grew: but trunk, boughs and branches are *one tree*. What was a part of the Christian faith in the days of St. Jerome, is part of it to-day.

We are often told that upon many scriptural topics modern science throws a new light; that we know a great many things which in olden times were not even suspected, and which nevertheless are of great importance in interpreting Holy Scripture. In the days of the Fathers, it is asserted, mankind had no idea of a scientific study of ancient literature and Semitic history.

All this is very true. Our knowledge of the Bible is much larger than it was in former times. *As scholars*, the Fathers, or at least many of them, were less learned than e. g. St. Thomas and other mediæval scholastics. Regarding biblical history, their scientific knowledge cannot be compared to the amount of information definitely established by modern criticism. About astronomy, physics or chemistry, the opinions held by the Fathers have no higher authority than the arguments they adduce. In all these things the Fathers were sometimes very much mistaken. But we do not consider them here

as scholars or merely as men of learning. *As Fathers* they are the authorized and official witnesses of the teaching of *the Church*. Christ did not open a school of critical studies. He built neither laboratory nor observatory. His Apostles taught mankind the *Christian revelation*. This revelation is the living teaching of the infallible Church. In matters of faith and morals the Church can never err, not on account of the learning of its members, but because the Holy Ghost abides with her. Thus the authority of the Fathers is not founded on their scholarship. Even the unanimous consent of the Fathers has no higher authority than that of other pious and learned men, except inasmuch as it is a *proof of the teaching of the Church*.

Thus then, a Christian is never justified in departing from the teaching of the Fathers in matters of faith, by appealing to the results of scientific progress in modern times. That the Fathers had a most imperfect knowledge of natural sciences and ancient historiography, is generally recognized; but this has no bearing at all upon our Catholic doctrine concerning the inerrancy of the Church, whose witnesses and official teachers the Fathers are when they speak *as Fathers of the Church*.

IV. In the Encyclical "Providentissimus Deus," Pope Leo applies those principles to the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures. "Sanctorum Patrum, quibus 'post Apostolos, sancta ecclesia plantatoribus, rigatoribus, ædificatoribus, pastoribus, nutritoribus crevit' (s. Aug.), *summa auctoritas est, quotiescumque testimonium aliquod biblicum ut ad fidei pertinet morumve doctrinam, uno eodemque modo explicant omnes: nam ex ipsa eorum consensione ita ab Apostolis secundum Catholicam fidem traditum esse nitide eminet.*"

Thus then, where the Fathers unanimously hold that a doctrine belongs to the Christian faith, there can be no doubt that we have in fact the testimony of the Church herself.

"In hisce rebus," continues the Pope, the authority of the Fathers stands very high, even if we consider them separately. The reason is evident. The Fathers were learned and saintly men, who left us many precious works and who, as a rule, are the most trustworthy witnesses of the teaching of the Church.

Seldom or never, however, can the testimony of a single Father, or of a few of them, be a sufficient proof that the doctrine in question is really taught by the Church herself. Practically there must be a moral unanimity. And even this unanimity is not always a sufficient proof.

What we ought to know, is, whether such a unanimous interpretation is not the result or natural consequence of the general condition of philosophical, historical or natural science in the days of the Fathers. In such a case, even the unanimous interpretation of a sacred text would not be unanimous testimony that this interpretation was founded upon the teaching of the Apostles, held by the living Church. It would merely mean that this was a commentary accepted by all the scholars of that time.

"Quocirca studiose dignoscendum in illorum interpretationibus, quam reapse tradant tamquam pertinentia ad fidem aut cum ea maxime copulata" (Encyclical).

As far as history is concerned, it is a fact that Catholic scholars nowadays generally reject the patristic commentary on several Old Testament narratives, although the Fathers are unanimous in their interpretation. For instance, in regard to the creation of the world in six days, the deluge, or the chronology of Genesis, there is not a Catholic of any learning who still holds the opinions patronized by the Fathers. But they never gave those interpretations "*tamquam pertinentia ad fidem*." They never taught that they were part of the living teaching of the Church, that is to say, of the Christian revelation preached by the Apostles.

Whether they speak as witnesses of the Church or as scholars of their day, is a question that is not always easily solved. Catholics ought never to forget the notable example of the great Bellarmin, who misunderstood the meaning of the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers to the extent of appealing to their testimony, against Galileo, in matters of physical science. But once we are perfectly sure that the Fathers unanimously teach or hold that a doctrine, or the interpretation of a text, belongs to our Christian faith, there can remain no doubt whatever that such a doctrine or interpretation is really a part of the teaching of the infallible Church. The Fathers themselves are the Church.

To reject such a unanimous teaching or interpretation of the Fathers, is equal to a denial of the inerrancy of the Church in matters of faith and morals. Here we touch the vital point of Catholicism. Every compromise would involve the Church herself.

There are few biblical texts the positive interpretation of which is unanimously taught by the Fathers to be a matter of faith. On the other hand there are many texts and passages, in interpreting which Catholics must be cautious not to run *counter* to a doctrine which belongs to our Christian faith according to the common consent of the Fathers; no matter whether this doctrine is contained in the Bible or not.

This analysis of Catholic principles shows the soundness of the common opinion of our theologians. Brucker and Lagrange, Vigouroux and Prat, Nisius and Schanz, Pesch and von Hummelauer, Catholic scholars in general now agree that we are not bound to accept the common interpretation of the Fathers in *scientific questions* or in those which are *merely historical*. There can be no other reason why the Councils of Trent and the Vatican and the Encyclical "Providentissimus Deus" always insist on "*res fidei et morum*," when speaking of the authority of the Fathers. "We therefore hope," says Chr. Pesch, "that the Encyclical of Leo XIII will put an end to the objections and anxiety of some exegetes, who cling to obsolete and antiquated interpretations on the plea that they are traditional."¹

This common opinion of modern theologians naturally suggests the question whether it is not a necessary conclusion even from a merely theological point of view, that neither natural sciences nor history of this kind are *taught* in Holy Scripture? If the Bible were to be considered as *teaching* those things, they should belong to the "*depositum fidei*," of which the Fathers are the guardians and witnesses.²

¹ Theol. Fragen, dritte Folge, p. 45, Freiburg, 1902.

² Cornely, *Introductio* I, p. 582, calls out attention to another point. "Profecto Deus," he says, "si libris sacris chronologiam et historiam nos docere voluisset, providentia speciali invigilasset, ut annorum numeri, personarum, gentium, terrarum nomina aliaque id genus, quae in historia alicujus momenti sunt, incorrupta conservarentur. At quanta in illis praecipue rebus editionum nostrarum biblicarum sit incertitudo . . . nemo ignorat."

V. The Fathers are never more unanimous than in teaching that the inerrancy of Holy Scripture is one of the fundamental principles of our Christian faith. With them this question is beyond discussion. It is simply "impious" to admit the possibility of an error on the part of an inspired writer. This dogma is at the bottom of the whole patristic literature. It is an *axiom* from which the Fathers start in their commentaries. If now and then we find them setting forth this principle, it is either because they wish to reject the interpretation of a text on account of its opposition to this axiom, or because they are arguing against an infidel. That the inerrancy of Holy Writ is a dogma of our faith, was considered to be self-evident, and so self-evident as to exclude even the suggestion that any proof was needed. In the Councils of Trent and of the Vatican, and in the Encyclical "Providentissimus Deus," we only hear the echo of this unanimous teaching.

Of course, in the works of the Fathers there are passages where they acknowledge, and even insist, that the historical sense of a biblical text or narrative cannot be true. We shall quote various passages of this kind. But in all these places the Fathers presume it to be self-evident that, when they reject the historical sense, they suppose that the inspired author did not wish to be understood in such a sense. According to them the author of those biblical texts did not intend to write strict history. Their common solution is: *littera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat*. Instead of proving that the Fathers admit exceptions, these spiritual interpretations of the sacred text offer a very strong argument to the contrary. *Because* there can be no error in the Bible, the Fathers in these places have recourse to a spiritual sense. The more strange sometimes their interpretations are the stronger is our argument. It is therefore absolutely false, as some contend, that the Fathers admit the inerrancy of the Bible only in a general way. Evidently the principle is a general one. But this general principle teaches that there is *not a single* error: the impossibility of a single error is the real essence of the principle. Nowhere does any Father of the Church admit a real error on the part of an inspired writer, affirmed by him in the Scriptures.

In their minds this would imply an error on the part of *God himself*. God is the author of Holy Scripture; the human writers are his "pens."

The inerrancy of the Bible is therefore an unshakable principle of our faith.

Another question is, whether the Fathers were never mistaken in *applying* this principle, e. g., to the historical sense of biblical passages which, as scholars of their time, they misunderstood. This application of the principle cannot be considered as the teaching of the Church as long as it is not so regarded by the Fathers. Thus, in studying patrology, we should distinguish very carefully between the unanimous acknowledgment of the principle of inerrancy itself and its application to special cases.

Moreover, correctly to understand the judgment of the Fathers concerning the Bible, and their general way of speaking of it, we must first have a clear idea of the character of biblical study at that time.

§ 2. *Aim and Method of the Fathers.*

I. The aim and method of the Fathers in their biblical studies are nowhere more distinctly described than in the words of St. Augustine, found in his celebrated work *De Doctrina Christiana*, Lib. ii, cap. ix, n. 14:

"In all these books those who fear God and are of a meek and pious disposition, *seek the will of God*. And in pursuing this research, the *first rule* to be observed is, as I said, to know these books, if not yet with the understanding, still to read them so as to commit them to memory, or at least so as not to remain wholly ignorant of them. *Next*, those matters that are *plainly* laid down in them, *whether rules of life or rules of faith*, are to be searched into more carefully and more diligently; and the more of these a man discovers, the more capacious does his understanding become. For among those things that are *plainly* laid down in Scripture are to be found *all matters that concern faith and the manner of life*—hope, to wit, and love, of which I have spoken in the previous book. *After this*, when we have made ourselves to a certain extent familiar with the language of Scripture, we may proceed to open up and to investigate the *obscure passages*, and in doing

so draw examples from the plainer expressions to throw light upon the more obscure, and use the evidence of passages about which there is no doubt, to remove all hesitation regarding doubtful passages."

The aim of the Fathers in studying Holy Scripture was to acquire knowledge of the biblical teaching on "faith and morals." Their method is truly scientific, but philosophical and theological. The possibility that any inspired author had erred was beyond discussion, and therefore, contradiction being *per se* excluded, the scientific character of this method, by which they explain the obscure or doubtful passages according to those more clear, is self-evident. In a theological study of the religious teachings of the Bible no one can find fault with this method.

It need not be demonstrated that at this time the whole purpose of biblical study was the knowledge of *religious doctrines* contained in the Sacred Scriptures. We confine ourselves to a single illustration of the text we quoted: "Whoever thinks"—St. Augustine says—"that he understands the Holy Scriptures, or any part of them, but puts such an interpretation upon them as does not tend to build up this twofold *love of God and our neighbour*, does not yet understand them. If, on the other hand, a man draws a meaning from them that may be used for the building up of love, even though he does not take the precise meaning which the author, whom he reads, intended to express in that place, his error¹ is not pernicious, and he is wholly clear from the charge of deception." "Whoever takes another meaning out of Scripture than the writer intended, goes astray, but nevertheless, as I was going to say, if his mistaken interpretation tends to build up love, which is the end of the commandment, he goes astray in much the same way as a man who by mistake quits the high road, but through the fields still reaches *the same place to which the road leads*. He is to be corrected, however, lest if he get into the habit of going astray (in his interpretations) he may at times take cross roads (with regard to moral life), or even go in the wrong direction altogether."²

¹ St. Augustine himself does not follow his Jewish theory of inspiration. Cf. p. 58.

² Lib. I, cap. xxxvi, n. 40, 41.

These passages show that the religious doctrine of Holy Writ, especially regarding Christian life or morals, was the aim of biblical study. To reach this aim it was only necessary that the Fathers should *understand* the inspired sentences in their immediate context. The readers of Holy Scripture at that time, and during the middle ages, had to answer the question that was put by Philip, the Apostle, to the eunuch on the way that leads from Jerusalem unto Gaza: "*Thinkest thou that thou understandest what thou readest?*" As regards the moral teaching of Scripture, this was in fact the only question that demanded a solution. Why? Because *the intention* of the sacred writers to assert the religious doctrine contained in the Bible, is fully evident.

II. Nowadays the aim of many biblical scholars is entirely different. Historians as well as theologians have made the Bible the object of their researches. Before they can apply the theological method of the Fathers to the interpretation of the sacred writings, modern Scripture scholars must solve a number of other questions.

Apologists are confronted with a multitude of biblical students who deny the inspired character of Holy Writ. The faithful put questions with regard to the value of historical traditions, concerning the authenticity and integrity of the inspired books. Our Catholic magazines are filled with articles discussing the relation between the divine and human element in Scripture. We study many things in the Bible to which the Fathers never paid any attention, because they are new questions suggested by a new science. Living in a time of literary and historical studies, modern scripturists examine the literary character and the history of the sacred books. The critical method, which is the vital organism of historical science, was discovered in recent times.¹

Modern scholars realize the immense distance between the scientific value of sources and that of oral traditions. They know different types of either narrative, pragmatic or genetic history, characteristic of different centuries and races. They are, e. g., perfectly conscious that the historiography of ancient Semitic peoples is a type of literature entirely distinct from

¹ This does not mean that the critical method has reached its full perfection.

our own critical and genetic historiography. The realization of these literary facts was, in a certain way, the discovery of the historical method. The Fathers, however, and the mediæval theologians made no distinction between the various kinds of historical literature. They perhaps attached more credence to Tacitus than to Livy, to Dionysius the Areopagite than to Berosus; but all historical works and narratives were simply "history." Neither did they make a distinction between the narratives found in the divine library we call the Bible, and which contains the whole literature of the ancient Hebrew people. Parables excepted, all biblical narratives were "history."

Evidently this was *not the result of the notion they had of inspiration*. On account of this notion they at times *denied* the historical character of a narrative and explained it in a spiritual sense. The fact that they did not distinguish the various kinds of historical literature in the Bible, was the natural consequence of the more general phenomenon, that they did not examine history, either profane or sacred, according to the historical method. Their purpose was to study religion, not history. They looked upon history from the standpoint of their time, no matter whether it was found in Polybius or in the Bible.

No Father could suspect that on a later day "ignorant traducers" would blame *the Church* on account of his relative backwardness in historical research. It is true that the Fathers believed, for instance, that most unlikely story of the Seventy men in seventy cells, writing the Greek version of the Old Testament; several of them admitted in a general way that equally improbable fable in the 14th chapter of the 4th Book of Esdras; and although we are convinced that in mentioning many stories of this kind, their intention was more to relate than to affirm them, it still remains a fact that in these ancient times, even the most learned had not that critical instinct, which at present makes every one more cautious when he reads an ancient tale. But all this belongs to the history of mankind. The history of the Church teaches us how the preaching of the Gospel was like the rising of the sun in the dark night

of polytheism, and how Christianity has become identified with true and moral civilization.

Still less could the Fathers know or suspect that at a future time even Catholic scholars would seem to consider history as the only science, that has a right to make use of the narratives read in ancient sources or living in oral tradition. They could not imagine that some day it would seem unlawful to pay more attention to idealistic pictures and poetical legends, full of religious truths, than to a realistic photograph of the past. In these olden times people thought that there were higher truths than historical ones, and that the date of a battle was of less importance than lessons of eternal life. Although at that time mankind was not yet trained in critical studies, people were simple enough to think that they themselves might read the ancient sources they have copied for us, and use them in such a manner as suited the condition of their time. Just as their narratives were illustrated with pictures, so these great children used the historical narratives themselves as illustrations of what they wrote in their theological works; which even after so many centuries would still make an ignorant man believe that, in the theological world, "skyscrapers" are not the newest but the oldest style of building.

No one, therefore, can blame *the Church* for this lack of historical science and critical instinct in the theological works of the Fathers. Instead of historical science we find in their works something of a much higher character, which is wanting in most of modern writings.

III. Making no distinction between the various types of historical literature in the Bible, the Fathers evidently viewed Holy Scripture in quite a different light from modern scholars. This will explain facts which otherwise might seem somewhat strange.

For a Catholic it is a matter of course that there can never be a contradiction in the *affirmations* of inspired writers: for God himself is the author of the whole Bible. But it is by no means impossible that there should be a contradiction between the historical forms of several parables, between the historical data of several *midrashim*, or between oral traditions and written sources, whose strictly historical character the author of a

religious book does not intend to guarantee by using them for his religious purpose. If the author of Judith did not intend to write a historical work, but merely a midrash, we have no right to accuse him of error, though we may find several contradictions between the historical form of his book and true history. Since there is no false affirmation on the part of the author, these contradictions are only *material* errors; and in point of fact material errors are no errors at all. *Material* and *formal* are philosophical terms to distinguish between *apparent* and *real* errors. Therefore the errors excluded *a priori* from Holy Scripture are *formal* errors.

This distinction between formal and material errors may be called useless as far as the *religious* doctrines of Holy Scripture are concerned. Here book and author are one: the sacred authors *evidently intend to affirm* those religious doctrines and to deliver their own teaching. *All* biblical books are *religious* books. "No history," says Prat, "is more impersonal than biblical history." But there is no religious *teaching* more personal than that of the Bible: the inspired author demands from every reader a full adhesion to all he affirms. Since thus the whole Bible teaches religious doctrines, every religious error in the Bible would be a formal error. Narratives, however, can belong to a class of literature *that does not exclude historical inaccuracies*, and nevertheless be *used* as an instrument for this *religious* teaching. Therefore, as regards the historical data of Holy Writ, we have to make a distinction between formal and *material* errors.

Now since the Fathers did not study biblical history, but looked to the religious doctrine in Scripture, even in the historical books; since they did not distinguish between strict history and other types of historical literature: it follows naturally from their aim and their method, that in their works we find no explicit distinction between formal and material errors. Moreover this terminology was unknown at that time. In other words, they do not call our special attention to a distinction between *contradictions* in the *affirmations* of the inspired writers and contradictions in the *historical forms* of their religious teaching. Another important yet natural consequence was, that the Fathers tried, as a rule, to maintain the historical

accuracy of all the biblical narratives, without examining first whether the inspired author wished to be understood in a strictly historical sense.

These facts are but different views of the same phenomenon: the Fathers were not critics but theologians, they did not study the history of the sacred books but their religious teaching.

In history the method of the Fathers would lead us to the falsest conclusions. As a rule, the most recent narratives are the clearest, although they may be baseless oral traditions; while often ancient sources, written in the spirit of a different age, and transmitted perhaps in loose and stray fragments, are interpreted rightly only with difficulty. Ancient compilations sometimes are like palimpsests, in which after a careful examination some dark spot is seen to conceal the key to significant questions. The critical analysis of these compilations is the most interesting task of modern criticism, because in many works of relatively recent origin, it discovers ancient sources of the highest historical value. In his precious booklet "*Principes de Critique Historique*," the learned Bollandist, Father De Smedt, justly points out that in a certain kind of historical literature critical research makes us attach much more importance "aux détails qu'à la substance des faits" (p. 196).

Thus then, in studying biblical *history* scholars follow a method quite different from, and in many cases opposed to the method used by the Fathers in their study of biblical *theology*.

IV. It is almost useless to say that in the interpretation of Holy Scripture great caution and prudence are required. On this point all agree. The question is what must we understand by caution. We find the best answer in the Fathers and Scholastics.

It is a matter of fact, to which von Hummelauer calls attention, that the great majority of the Fathers were willing to abandon the truth of the strictly historical sense, when this historical sense offered great difficulties, which seemed to be irrefutable. On account of such difficulties they concluded that the biblical authors did not intend to write history. The Alex-

andrian school sought a solution in assuming a merely allegorical sense. A few of them even went so far as to reject the historical sense of innumerable passages and texts. Some of the Antiochian Fathers went to the opposite extreme. Still they were obliged to interpret parts of biblical passages in a merely typical sense. What is said, e. g., of David or Solomon in the literal or historical sense, they explain as being true only of Christ; in these parts, say they, the author did not intend to speak of David or Solomon. The Antiochians themselves therefore admit that in Scripture we find things, concerning David and Solomon, which modern scholars would call historical "material errors." In the works of the Fathers, who stand between these two extremes, we read several passages, where they explicitly state that in some texts or narratives the sacred writers have no intention of affirming their historical character. How these Fathers explain such biblical topics will be seen in the continuation of this study. Here we merely call attention to the fact that the Fathers did not adhere to the truth of the historical sense, when "*eum vel ratio tenere prohibeat vel necessitas cogat dimittere*" (Encyclical).

There can be no doubt as to the meaning in the Encyclical of the word "ratio." This is seen very clearly in the passage of St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, c. 7, 13, to which Pope Leo refers; and perhaps plainer still in the numerous examples, to be quoted later, where the Fathers abandon the historical sense. In their eyes interpretations ought to be reasonable.

When we are confronted with difficulties, caution becomes most seasonable. Here Fathers and Scholastics are equally "prudent" and for a very good reason.

"It is very detrimental," says St. Thomas, "either to assert or to deny as belonging to the faith things that do not belong to the faith" (*Opusculum* X, *init.*). "If I hear a Christian," St. Augustine writes, referring to scientific questions, "ignorant of such things, and mistaking one thing for another, I look on him with pity: nor does it harm him if he is ignorant of the nature and condition of created things, since he does not believe things unworthy of thee, O Lord, creator of all things: but it does harm if he thinks that they belong to

the doctrines of faith and dares to affirm persistently those things of which he is ignorant" (Conf. V, Cap. V). "It often happens"—says St. Augustine in another place—"that an unbeliever through observation and investigation knows with certainty things concerning the earth, the movements, magnitude and distance of the stars, the chronology, the nature of animals, and such like matter. Now it is a shameful and pernicious thing and much to be avoided, that an unbeliever should hear a Christian speaking of such matters *as taught in Sacred Scripture*, where in fact the Christian is so much mistaken that unbelievers, on hearing him and seeing the extravagance of his blunders, can hardly refrain from laughter. The trouble is not so much that the man is laughed at for his own mistakes, as that our sacred writers are believed to have taught such things by those outside the Church. For when they find a Christian thus going astray in a matter in which they are thoroughly acquainted, how will they trust our sacred books about the resurrection of the dead and the hope of eternal life and the kingdom of heaven, believing that the Scriptures teach error about such things which they themselves know better. . . . It is not easy to tell how much trouble and sorrow such rash and presumptuous men inflict upon their *prudent brethren*" (De Genesi ad Litt., I, 39).

Sometimes the maintenance of the strictly historical character of a biblical text offers great difficulties, while there is at least the possibility of explaining the text in another way; but as long as the *absolute* impossibility of its historical character is not proven in such a way that they themselves—who are not critics—realize perfectly the strength of the argument: some Catholics consider themselves the most "prudent" of all, when nevertheless they cling to the strictly historical truth so that they seem to weigh Catholicism with the historical character of such a biblical text or passage. The Fathers, as we see, did not belong to that class of "prudent" Catholics. Many things, seemingly of a modern type, are very old; but many other things, that appear to be old, are in reality quite modern: the modern prudence of some Catholics is a very old imprudence.

"In such matters two things are to be observed" according to St. Thomas. "First that the *truth* of Scripture be invio-

ably maintained; secondly, since Scripture *can be variously interpreted*, we should not cling to any exposition so stubbornly that, if what we supposed to be teaching the Scripture should afterwards prove to be false, we should still continue to assert it, *lest thereby Scripture should be ridiculed by unbelievers*" (I, q. 68, art. 1).¹ St. Augustine says that in such cases there is danger "lest we should be found contending not so much for the doctrine of Sacred Scripture as for our own, endeavoring to make our doctrine that of Scripture" (De Genesi ad Litt., I, 39).

We hope the readers will answer the question, how some modern "prudent" Catholics would judge of the liberty taken by a Scripturist, who for no other reasons than those of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, would explain the first chapters of Genesis so as to conclude to an instantaneous creation, and a production of all animal and plant life, even of the body of man, by a natural evolution from primordial matter.¹ We only state as a matter of fact, that at the present day "Scripture is ridiculed by unbelievers." Whether this is on account of the reason to which St. Thomas refers, is another question, that is best left unanswered. But one thing is clear: if there should be a clash between true historical science and a theological school, the responsibility for the dishonor and for the far-reaching consequences of such a condition of affairs, would fall upon this theological school. Another thing is sufficiently clear, to wit, that some theologians would soon understand biblical history better, if they would first study the history of Catholic learning during the past hundred years. They would discover that as regards strict history, theologians had to abandon one after another their formerly common interpretations of the most famous narratives of the Old Testament. They would readily realize how dangerous it is to cut off the line of retreat, by defending some interpretations "*tamquam pertinentia ad fidem*." What is styled prudence, is not seldom a very great

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, Dist. XII, q. 1, a. 2. "*Sic ergo circa mundi principium aliquid est, quod ad substantiam fidei pertinet, mundum incepisse creatum, et hoc omnes sancti concorditer dicunt. Quo autem modo et ordine factus sit, non pertinet ad fidem nisi per accidens, in quantum in Scriptura traditur, cujus veritatem diversa expositione sancti salvantes diversa tradiderunt.*"

² Cf. *Critiek. en Traditie*, p. 115.

imprudence. Some Catholic scholars of the present day tremble when they see Catholic laymen going to Universities and studying either natural sciences or history in its original sources, after they had first learnt from some saintly priest—what he himself was taught—that our Catholic faith is incompatible with every theory, according to which the sacred authors used documents and sources that are not strictly historical and scientific. From the moment they discover a single fact in geology, ethnology, philology or ancient history, that is opposed to what they have been taught to be a matter of faith, they are adrift. The conclusions they arrive at, are seen in the case of some who should have been the glory of the Catholic Church, but . . . lost their faith. For, the greatest danger does not threaten those who are satisfied with merely attending the lectures of a professor, but those who pursue their studies with heart and soul, and *live* in the modern intellectual world.

Prudence therefore does not consist in maintaining the strictly historical character of a text as a matter of faith, when, on one hand, there are great difficulties against such interpretation of the text, and on the other hand there are able scholars who defend a different interpretation. Cautious interpreters of biblical history will not abandon the truth of “the literal sense” without convincing reasons. Here there is also a danger. On this point the Encyclical *Prov. Deus* is very explicit. But the greatest and most dreadful danger is on the other side, against which we are warned by the Fathers and ancient Scholastics. Catholic scholars ought to be more “prudent” than, in our opinion, Father Delattre was in writing his *Autour de la Question Biblique*.

§ 3. *Points of Agreement and Disagreement between the Fathers and modern Catholic critics.*

On questions of religious *principle*, Catholic critics declare that they perfectly agree with the Fathers. All emphatically maintain that in the whole Bible there can be *no error* attributable to the sacred author. In those places where they do not follow the scientific or historical sense of a biblical passage, the Fathers and Catholic critics alike sustain that the inspired

author *does not intend* to affirm the truth of such a sense, but wishes to be understood differently. Regarding *facts*, the Fathers and modern critics agree that the Bible contains narratives which appear to be historical, but which, if examined closely, are seen to belong to another class of literature.

The great question is, whether the *discrepancies* between ancient and modern Catholic commentaries imply disloyalty to the unchangeable Christian principle. Is it true that we are able to maintain the ancient Christian doctrine regarding the inerrancy of the Scriptures? Is it true that the existing discrepancies do not touch this Christian *principle*? The elucidation of this point is the aim of the next pages.

I. The Fathers were not scientists nor historians. The knowledge of positive facts has much increased in modern times. Therefore modern scholars of Scripture meet with *difficulties* which the Fathers did not and could not realize.

II. The *solution* of historical difficulties is often different. The appeal of the Fathers to a spiritual sense of the texts in question, could evidently offer no solution, unless they rejected the literal or historical sense. Since Catholics agree that each text has at least also a literal sense, scholars must look for another solution of the facts, whose presence in the Bible is acknowledged by the Fathers. Moreover it is absolutely impossible to give a spiritual interpretation to those passages, that at present offer the greatest difficulties.

III. The Fathers followed the *theological method* in their study of Scripture. According to the *critical method* modern Scripturists *first* examine what kind of literature has been chosen by the sacred author. After the solution of this preliminary question, they study the religious teaching of the historical books and apply the theological method.

A narrative does not lose *per se* its moral value, when it is not historical. On the part of an inspired author, no argument is needed to prove the truth of his religious teaching. The most perfect kind of parables are those that are altogether fictitious. The story of the prodigal son with all its significant details, would not teach those deep religious truths, which touch the heart of every Christian, if we did not know that, instead of being merely the history of a miserable man, whose

double we meet so often, it was entirely invented by our Saviour. As a rule, free narratives of pious authors and even the poetical legends of a faithful, fervent people, teach religious truths more abundantly, than do merely scientific records of historical events. We understand the moral conclusion drawn by the author of Genesis II, 24 just as well, if Cardinal Cajetan is right in interpreting the narrative of the formation of the first woman as a parable, when we have to consider this narrative as strictly historical.

This we ought to keep in mind when we assert that the critics and the Fathers view history in a different light.

In theology, written and oral tradition have the same value. As far as faith and morals are concerned, Catholics must admit all traditions which among the faithful were transmitted orally from generation to generation "as belonging to Christian revelation." The writings of Holy Scripture have no higher authority than the oral teaching of the living Church, assisted by the Holy Ghost.

Living in this theological world, at a time when the critical spirit was not yet developed, the Fathers easily lost sight of the immense distance *in history* between oral traditions and sources, of different kinds, when occasionally they reached the ground where at the present day criticism rules supreme. From their theological standpoint they had a very different view, e. g., of the book of Genesis and its historical value than von Hummelauer, Lagrange and other modern Catholic critics have, who contend that the author of Genesis made use of several popular traditions, and who by no means subordinate the historical value of the more obscure ancient sources to the authority of the clearer passages or books that are of more recent origin.

The Fathers understood perfectly the literal sense of the narratives of Genesis, often misunderstood by later interpreters. As described in Genesis, the world was created in six days of one week; the waters of the flood covered the whole earth; the narrative of the tower of Babel is an explanation or interpretation of the fact that all mankind does not speak the same language. The biblical authors must indeed have written in a very obscure style if they were misunderstood by their

contemporaries and by all the readers of more than twenty centuries. It is much easier to explain how lawyers, and even theologians, misinterpret documents when the obvious sense of the self-same documents causes them trouble.¹

But the Fathers were mistaken in interpreting the narratives of Genesis without first examining *the type of literature* to which they belonged. This remained to be examined by later critics.

Theologians are accustomed to a kind of literature in which every sentence is positively affirmed in its obvious literal sense by the writer. Critics, on the other hand, are dealing with several types of literature that are of an entirely different character. Therefore when questioned about the *truth* of a narrative that is not strictly historical, theologians are inclined to give a different answer from the critics. If asked about passages taken from *midrashim*—without the Bible, the type of historical literature most common among the Jews—probably theologians will say they are not true. But if we ask them about the story of some parable—a kind of literature with which they are perfectly acquainted—and wish to know whether we must hold that story to be true, the theologians will look at us and, shrugging their shoulders, they will most likely answer that it is “of course” a parable! This remark, made by von Hummelauer, is a good illustration of the great distance between the two standpoints. If theologians study Hebrew historiography, if they condescend to climb the hill of modern criticism, they will perhaps discover several kinds of literature, in regard to which an “of course” would be perfectly *ad rem*.²

When Lagrange published his “*La Methode Historique*,” a learned Scripturist—who in history does not attach much importance to what he styles a theory of “*kleine trekken*”—wrote in a Dutch magazine, that he did not see a real difference between the historical method, patronized by Lagrange, and

¹The articles of Professor Happel in the *Biblische Zeitschrift*, 1904 and 1905 (*Der Turmbau zu Babel*), did not convince us that Gen. XI, 1-9, was entirely misunderstood by all previous readers.

²In his legitimate self-defence a Catholic critic sometimes comes to close quarters with “theologians.” But it stands to reason that he does not wish to be understood addressing himself to Catholic theologians at large. Our best theologians are not by any means opposed to sound and moderate criticism.

that method which had always been followed by Catholic scholars. He might view the matter in a different light if he paid more regard to the difference in results.

IV. We proved in the first chapter of this study that we must distinguish two sorts of affirmation in every book: those of the author himself, as an individual distinguished from his contemporaries and addressing himself to his readers—and those of his age, whose common opinions, mentioned in the book, are the author's starting point. The author does not know that these common opinions, which form the background of his book, are untrue. But evidently St. Jude, e. g., did not intend to inform his readers about the origin of the book of Enoch when, as representative of his age, he called its author "Enoch the seventh after Adam." Therefore St. Jude, as author, does not affirm an error either explicitly or implicitly. We consider this question as settled.³

The Fathers express themselves differently. But we saw that St. Jerome's "law of history" is in fact the same thing as our distinction between the writer *as author* and the writer *as representative of his time*. We shall see that St. Jerome does not by any means stand alone among the Fathers. We cannot expect that they apply the distinction to all those texts to which it is applied by modern scholars, who are critics, and thus examine biblical *history* according to a critical method. But the Fathers admit the principle.

V. Another distinction of extremely great importance, to which we would here call the attention of our readers, is that which regards *exclusively* the *inspired* books.

The biblical authors also use such opinions they held as ordinary men, which were *not* the common opinions of *their age*. With regard to things *mentioned* in the Bible, the man himself who wrote the book, may be personally mistaken, without affirming any error *as inspired author*. A short analysis will make us see the soundness of this apparently "new" distinction.

Being inspired, that is to say, his mind being superna-

³ All critics agree that in every book we find "Ueberreste" of the past, which the authors *unconsciously* transmit to us. Provided that they be rightly interpreted, these "Ueberreste" have the highest historical value.

turally illumined and his will supernaturally elevated, in a certain way the author was a different person from what he was before he became inspired. This distinction is not merely logical. An inspired author is a God-man. His teachings and affirmations are divine as much as they are human. His selection of materials, his use of the collected sources, in a word, his inspired writings are by no means the work of that ordinary man, who a short time previously perhaps wrote a letter to his friend. That ordinary man is not the author of a single inspired line. At one time in his life he became the instrument of the Spirit of God, who elevated the human faculties of the ordinary man by divine inspiration. In this supernaturally elevated state the ordinary man *became* the God-man, who was the *author* of an inspired book.

In such an inspired author the ordinary man, however, was by no means annihilated and did not disappear. An inspired author was not completely deified. God did not reveal to him all things. A want of knowledge in an inspired writer does not therefore interfere with his inspired character as author. We must distinguish two classes of things: first, those which God would teach mankind and which the God-man affirmed in his book; here every error is excluded; secondly, those things which God did not intend to reveal or make known, and concerning which the God-man did not intend to inform his readers. Regarding all things of this second class the inspired writer remained the ordinary man with all his doubts and his insufficiency of knowledge.

Since the inspired authors copy sources and use the knowledge of other people, why should they not use the knowledge they themselves had as ordinary men? The ordinary man remained perfectly alive, and the inspired author knew him much better than he knew other people. We know positively that the God-man did use the knowledge of that ordinary man, when this man was the representative of his age. But whether or not the representative of his age, what difference could this make to the God-man in writing his book? Could he not use the opinions of that ordinary man, without affirming them or having the intention to affirm them *as author*? This is the question, and its solution does not seem very difficult.

As a matter of fact we find texts in the Bible where, without doubt, there is a difference between the reality and what we read. This fact is so evident that no one can deny it. We understand that some philosophers can construct the best syllogisms with closed eyes, but they must use their senses in matters of fact. Let us give an example. In the New Testament we read that a text, quoted by the author, is taken from such or such an Old Testament book, when in fact it is not so taken but belonging to another book. To show that an event which happened in the days of Christ, was already foretold by the prophets, St. Matthew, e. g., quotes a text of *Zacharias*, which he says is a text of *Jeremias* (XXVII, 9). St. Mark, I, 2, refers to *Isaias* a text of the book of *Malachias*. How must we explain such *facts*?

To make our explanation better understood let us suppose at first that the author was not inspired.

Most likely, we would say, the author did not attach any importance to the question whether the event had been foretold by *Jeremias* or *Isaias* or *Malachias*. Most probably his intention was merely to show that such an event had been foretold by a Prophet of God in the Old Testament. Still the author thinks and believes that *Jeremias* or *Isaias* was this prophet. And therefore although he does not lie, he is mistaken. He errs.

In an inspired book, however, the case is entirely different. We may suppose that St. Matthew knew some texts of the prophets by heart, and that he considered this text quoted in his Gospel as belonging to the book of *Jeremias*. This Matthew now becomes the instrument of God to write a Gospel. God inspires him. From this moment St. Matthew becomes a God-man. What this God-man affirms and teaches must necessarily be true.

Now, we admit that St. Matthew had the same intention as inspired author which the uninspired writer must be supposed to have had when he wrote such a text. This intention was, to show the readers how the event in the days of Christ had already been foretold in a prophecy of the Old Testament.

But how can this God-man say that *Jeremias* was that prophet, if he did not intend to affirm it? At first sight this

may look strange, but we hope that the reader will agree with us in pronouncing the explanation very simple, when he has read a few more pages.

The text itself proves that God did not reveal to the ordinary man, perfectly alive in St. Matthew, the real origin of the quoted text. Therefore as inspired author St. Matthew affirms that the event was foretold by *a prophet* of the Old Testament, and that *according to him as ordinary man* Jeremias was that prophet.

What the God-man intends to affirm and to tell his readers is absolutely true. Moreover the form in which the author gives expression to his affirmation is perfectly clear. This form, however, bears the stamp of the imperfect knowledge of the ordinary man, who always remained even in the inspired author. Since the Incarnate Word of God was "found in fashion as a man," sin only excepted, why should we wonder at seeing His written Word bearing many vestiges of human imperfections, errors only excepted? The language itself of the New Testament is not classic Greek, but the ordinary language of the people, which was called by the learned "the language of sailors" and which first merited a place in human literature by being used to express the Word of God.

In one of his most interesting letters to Pammachius (LVII), St. Jerome quotes among others the texts of St. Matthew and St. Mark, to which we referred. Addressing himself to those scholars who, like scrupulous men, close their eyes to the facts that confront them, and find fault with others who attempt to explain those facts, St. Jerome writes: "On what grounds then has Mark in the very beginning of his Gospel set the words, 'As is written in the prophet Isaias, behold I send my messenger,' when, as we said, it is not written in Isaias at all, but in Malachias, the last of the twelve prophets? Let ignorant presumption solve this nice question, and I will ask pardon for being in the wrong" (P. L., XXII, p. 575).

Though St. Jerome acknowledges the fact, he does not abandon the Christian doctrine of the inerrancy of the Bible. A few pages before, treating of St. Matthew's text, he says: "They may accuse the Apostle of falsifying his version, and

still worse, that he is mistaken (*erret*) in the name, putting down Jeremias when it should be Zacharias. But far be it from us to speak in this manner of the follower of Christ, whose intention was to teach religious doctrines rather than to look for words and syllables" (P. L., XXII, p. 572).

St. Jerome generally appeals to this principle when he finds that he must acknowledge facts which he feels himself unable to explain: "*Littera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat.*" The difficulty of explaining a fact, was to him no reason to deny it. To suppose the error of a copyist, was a subterfuge, which he knew was excluded by the number of parallel cases and by the unlikelihood of such a hypothesis in these places. Therefore he acknowledges the facts, yea appeals to them against the worshippers of "the letter," but he gives a solution which he himself knew perfectly well did not sufficiently explain the difficulty. Thomas a Kempis might have said: "Our curiosity is often a hindrance to us in reading the Scriptures, when we wish to understand and discuss where we ought to pass on in simplicity" (Imit. I, cap. 5). Listening to the divine teaching of the inspired God-men and to the sacred music of the psalmists and prophets, the medieval mystics were certainly right in not worrying about such insignificant things, when their souls were lifted up to much higher spheres. However, apologists are not permitted to follow this method of meditation, because these apparently insignificant things touch upon one of the most vital questions of Christianity—the inerrancy of the inspired authors.

We have already partly convinced the readers that, as inspired authors, neither St. Matthew nor St. Mark affirm any error. But why did we say that the author would have affirmed the error *if he had not been inspired*, since there can be no error without the *intention* to affirm?

This question hits the nail on the head. But the answer is very simple.

Most likely our readers will agree with us that, at the time when he wrote, the author merely had the intention of making his contemporaries see, how this event had been foretold in a prophecy of the Old Testament. Actually, therefore, he most probably did not have the intention of pointing out that this

prophecy belonged not to Isaias, not to Amos or to Osee, but to no other prophet than Jeremias. On this account we must admit that on this moment he did not commit an "*error actualis*." Still it is evident that the author was mistaken. Why?

To hold an opinion means to affirm it. The intention to affirm it, ought not to be repeated every moment—*actualiter*. As long as the opinion perseveres, the intention to affirm it perseveres—*virtualiter*. The man, therefore, who wrote such a text was evidently mistaken at the moment when he wrote it. The author is the man who formerly *actualiter* affirmed. In a profane book the distinction between author and man is merely logical.

The inspired character of the Gospel does not change the intention of Matthew. The ordinary man persevered in his opinion that the text, which he knew by heart, was taken from Jeremias. And thus, when he wrote his Gospel, the man Matthew was mistaken. But the ordinary man, who is the subject of this opinion, is not the God-man, who is the inspired author of the Gospel. The inspired author has neither the *intentio actualis* nor the *intentio virtualis* to affirm more than that the event was foretold by a prophet. *Actualiter*, we said, the author had no other intention, even in the hypothesis that he were not inspired. And the *intentio virtualis* of the ordinary man does not touch the inspired God-man.

Reading these pages superficially, some might think that this distinction between the affirmations of the inspired author and many opinions still held by him as an ordinary man, can be applied to nearly all biblical texts and passages, offering a difficulty against the inerrancy of Holy Writ. By no means. Why not?

All depends upon the intention of the author. And the *intention* of an author must be judged according to the same law whether a book is inspired or not. Authors affirm what their books affirm.

This does not mean that everything that is said in a book belongs to the teaching of that book. Neither does this law exclude poetry, parables, *midrashim*, or other kinds of literature that have not a strictly historical character. Ancient

history cannot be placed upon the same level as modern historical writings; and especially ancient religious history, in which that ancient history merely becomes an instrument of religious teachings. The character of many ancient compilations would be entirely misunderstood, if every detail of their sources were considered as being affirmed by the compilers or authors of these books. When the compilers found two different versions of the same event, they often copied both of them. At times such books intend to give the sources without determining the historical reality that is hidden beneath. This, being recognized by all critics, should be taken into consideration, when interpreters establish what in fact is affirmed not only *in*, but also *by* a book. Although an ancient book may contain things that are not strictly historical, we are not justified in imputing error to the book and to its author, unless we know that the author intended to write history. His book does not teach an error if it belongs to that class of literature in which history—taken as it was at that time known and admitted—is merely the starting point of religious teaching. Unless we have positive arguments that the book will only give e. g. two contradictory versions, it stands to reason that, some narratives of the book not being historical, the man who wrote it, was mistaken in his historical information. Perhaps we must admit that the writer did not study scientifically the history of ancient times. But since the book belongs to a class of literature which only intends, either to teach religious truths, or to awaken religious feelings, and since freely written ancient history, and even some popular legends, are just as suitable for this purpose as scientific history, the book itself and the author, *formaliter as author*, cannot be said to affirm those historical details, which may be most significant of its religious teaching. The religious book shows, nevertheless, that in those historical details the writer is mistaken, because the man who holds these opinions is the writer himself. But if such a religious book is written by an inspired author, the God-man does not affirm any more than the book itself. The God-man affirms neither the historical mistakes of the ordinary man, who is still alive in the inspired author, nor those of other people, whose sources and traditions form

the background of the inspired book, which may be e. g. a *midrash*.

Now then, to discover the intention of the author is not more difficult in an inspired book than in a profane one. The whole difficulty is in determining the kind of literature of a book or passage.

As a rule this difficulty can be easily solved. Moreover there is no difficulty whatsoever with regard to matters of moral doctrine. All biblical books are religious books, teaching religious doctrines. Therefore of every sacred book the inspired author evidently intends to affirm the religious teaching. The distinction between a God-man and an ordinary man is here useless. We merely have to examine what religious doctrine is affirmed by the man that writes. For, in regard to all things belonging to this class, this man himself has become the God-man and speaks or writes *formaliter* as an inspired author.

Regarding history, however, we should first be sure that we have no epic narrative, no *midrash*, no idealized or symbolical description of either the past or the future, but ancient Semitic history. Knowing this, we have to point out that in its form this history is much freer than modern historical works. Besides, we must never lose sight of the fact that even this kind of history is merely the instrument of religious teaching. Whether it was the "direct" intention of the biblical authors to relate the historical reality itself or the sources and traditions of their times, is a question to be examined later. But once we admit that a book or a passage belongs to that class of literature, whose purpose it is to relate historical events, it is merely a matter of course that not only the religious but also the historical truth of what is told, is taught by such a book. We have only to interpret, according to the common rules of hermeneutics, what the author intended to say when he wrote the book. That this intention concerns the moment when he writes, is true for every book. But for inspired books this circumstance is of importance, because with regard to the God-man who writes, there can be no question of a persevering *virtualis intentio*, originating in a former actual intention or affirmation of the ordinary man. We need

not repeat that in the inspired writer himself the ordinary man did not disappear and that therefore his intention to affirm his own opinion, expressed in the inspired book, persevered *virtualiter*; but this intention is not the intention of the God-man, who is *the author* of the inspired book.

Now these cases, where the author of a strictly historical book has not, at the time he writes, the intention literally to affirm all that he writes, are *exceptions*, which have to be proved by the context and can regard only small details. If e. g. Matthew or Mark had written an inspired book, whose purpose it was to indicate the books of the Old Testament from which the quotations of the New Testament are taken, they would evidently have been mistaken *also as inspired writers*. Unless we show at least the likeliness of another intention, which thus has to be indicated, we never have a right to contend that the author, at the time he writes, has not the intention of affirming everything he actually writes.

Again an example will be the best illustration. If the book of Judith is no midrash, but history, we must leave to others the explanation of the fact that the author speaks of Nabuchodonosor as the king of the Assyrians, reigning at Nineveh. Of this Nabuchodonosor the author speaks about twenty times; but even if he spoke of him but once, what intention could he have, at the time of writing, but to say that this king bore indeed the name of Nabuchodonosor? If this book is to be considered as historical, it (and therefore also the author) affirms that Nabuchodonosor reigned in Nineveh and was king of the Assyrians. Some scripturists contend that in all these places the name of Nabuchodonosor is a corruption of the original text. Whatever may be the scientific value of this hypothesis, which by no means solves all the difficulties urged against the historical character of this king of the book of Judith, those scripturists themselves evidently agree that, if the book is no midrash, the name of Nabuchodonosor cannot be explained without admitting an error on the part of the inspired writer.

We hope that this analysis sufficiently shows the solidity of the grounds upon which our distinction is founded. It is clear that, if we close the Bible and start from an analysis of the

divine authorship of Holy Scripture, we would not arrive at these conclusions.¹ We must, in fact, *start* from the knowledge that all the biblical books were written "*spiritu sancto inspirante*." Since the true nature of divine inspiration does not depend upon the opinion of a philosopher about what he judges to be proper to divine authorship, but depends upon God Himself, who inspired the sacred books: we must examine the divine books themselves, and explain the character of biblical inspiration according to facts. However, we Catholics know that our explanation of those facts cannot be true, if it does not agree with the teaching of the Church, that every canonical book is of divine authorship, which excludes every error.

A confirmation of the soundness of our distinction is found, we would say, nearly everywhere in Holy Scripture.² Christ Himself expressed the most human feelings. The truly human feelings expressed by the Psalmist and other inspired writers are not always on the same moral level as those of Christ. The sacred authors frequently express doubts. They explicitly state that they are not sure about some things which they mention. But who was it who did not know? Who had these doubts? Evidently the man himself who wrote the book. But these doubts and this lack of knowledge merely surrounded or encircled those things that were the object of the inspired book, and of which the God-man informed the faithful. They all touch upon that other class of things of which God did not intend to inform the readers of His book and concerning which the ordinary man, still living in the inspired author and retaining his own opinions, had merely a human knowledge. Doubts and errors are equally impossible in the intellectual act of the inspired author, as God-man. But the inspired author knew perfectly well the doubts of his inseparable companion, the ordinary man, who lived in him. They were the *object* of his

¹ This is one of the reasons why in the following lines we maintain the thesis which we defended some years ago in *De Katoliek* and which was attacked by van Kasteren, *Studien*, LXXXVIII, p. 58 f., and Chr. Pesch, *Theol. Zeitfragen*, Dritte Folge, p. 81. In our opinion Father Lagrange was right in pointing out the real danger to which the theory of Card. Franzelin exposes Catholic scholars.

² Cf. Dr. Schmid, *De inspirationis cieliorum vi et ratione*, p. 329. "*Alia quaestio est, quid tunc Paulus privatim opinatus est. Ista quaestio, ut apparet, nos non tangit.*"

inspired knowledge. This evidently does not mean that they must be the object of the sentences of his book. Those doubts are expressed in whole sentences, and even in entire passages. Sentences and passages are written by an inspired author, and therefore are inspired. The only thing that is not inspired is the doubt itself, which is the object of his inspired writing, not grammatically, but logically.

Did the Fathers never make use of this distinction between the inspired author and the ordinary man?

They did not elaborate the theory. But they not only apply it; at times they explicitly state that an inspired author speaks "*ut homo*." In the context this "*homo*" is our ordinary man.³

VI. Thus far the differences noticed between Fathers and modern Catholic scholars are but so many illustrations of the fact, generally admitted, that the Fathers were not critics, but theologians. They did not study history. They did not follow the critical method of a more recent historical science in their exegesis of the Bible. But even as theologians there is a great difference between the Fathers and modern scripturists in this regard, that the Fathers are much more *free* in their interpretation of the sacred writings. If compared to their works, modern theological studies of Catholic writers are rather of the scrupulous character.

Everybody knows that explanations of the spiritual sense of Holy Scripture are as scarce in the works of modern Catholic theologians as they are numerous in the commentaries and homilies of the Fathers. Why? Catholics realized that even the Fathers underwent the influence of the ancient Jewish methods. Introducing, practically, as much freedom in the

³ Father *Lacome* is right where he says: "La critique, après tout, n'est en l'espèce que l'application au texte biblique de la raison sincère et éclairée, avide de vérité. Et, Dieu merci, il y a eu avant notre siècle, il y a eu en grand nombre dans les générations des Pères de l'Eglise des esprits consciencieux et avisés, des génies passionnés pour le vrai, qui ont fait de la critique avant la lettre. Plus on fouillera l'immense bibliothèque, plus on trouvera les unes après les autres, la liste presque complète des opinions émises par la critique." *Questions de principe*, p. 149, Paris, 1904. This evidently does not clash with what we said about the general lack of critical instinct in earlier times. Cf., e. g., *Grisar*, *Münchener Kath. Gelehrten Congres*, 1901, pp. 131-146.

management of biblical history (*haggadoth*) as slavery in the interpretation of the Law (*halachoth*), these Jewish hermeneutic methods were carved out for the scribes, who tried to find out all kinds of secret meanings in the words of Holy Writ. The Fathers never followed the Jews in their slavery to the letter of the Law. But no one will deny that they often exaggerated the secret or spiritual sense of the inspired writings. They left too much room to the imagination and the inventive genius of each individual interpreter. Their commentaries were too free.

Have we fallen into the opposite extreme? Is it possible that Catholics have been influenced by the ideas of Protestantism, worshipping the dead letter of the Bible?

Luther and Calvin rejected the divine authority of the Church. To their partisans the Bible alone was left. As soon as Protestantism abandoned the "letter" of Holy Writ, it was bound to dissolve Christianity into a countless number of sects. Protestantism was on the horns of a dreadful dilemma from the moment it separated from the Church. It had to replace the authority of the living Church by scrupulously keeping to the unchangeable "letter" of the Bible, or Christianity would soon run aground, if Protestants followed the freedom of interpretation taken by Catholics in the days of the Fathers and their mediæval disciples. The leaders of earlier Protestantism realized this perfectly. And orthodox Protestants feel this keenly nowadays. Amongst Catholics conditions were quite different. The norm and standard of Christian faith was the teaching of the Church. However free, the interpretation of the inspired writings had to agree with her teaching. No doubt ingenious and inventive commentators sometimes read their own ideas into the Bible. The Fathers especially applied this method in their homilies. When expressed in the inspired word of Holy Writ, their preaching of Christian doctrines seemed to receive more unction. For those "accommodations" the New Testament itself had afforded an example. Within the Catholic Church there was no harm in such freedom in interpreting the Scriptures, since the interpretation itself was controlled by the living teaching and divine authority of the Spouse of the Holy Ghost. But within the realm of

Protestantism, "to release the letter" of Holy Scripture meant preparing the way for the ruin of Christianity.

From its very beginning Protestantism was considered by Catholics as heresy. Catholics and Protestants were antagonists. But the great battle was fought about the ancient Christian doctrine of the divine authority of the Church. And this antagonism between Catholicism and Protestantism does not by any means exclude the possibility, that Catholics may have been influenced by the ideas of their opponents with regard to the character of the Bible, whose divine authority was acknowledged by Catholics and Protestants alike. Catholics, of course, had to avoid even the appearance of esteeming the Bible less than Protestants did. In later days Catholics and orthodox Protestants were alarmed by the complete ruin of Christian faith among those Protestants who did not keep to the "letter." Would it seem strange, if some Catholics had not realized that even due freedom is destructive of Protestantism, but is not dangerous to the Church? As a matter of fact, in the later works of Catholic theologians we look in vain for that ancient freedom in interpreting Holy Scripture, which was common among the Fathers.

The critical study of biblical history teaches us that we must once more take up our old Catholic tradition, provided that we avoid in the interpretation of the Word of God that exaggeration of the secret and spiritual sense, which spoiled the work of some of the greatest of our ancient scholars. According to the old Catholic tradition of the Fathers, the fundamental law of ancient *Christian* interpretation is the teaching of St. Paul: "*The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth*" (II Cor. III, 6). We Catholics are not slaves to the letter. Rome is not "that Jerusalem which is in bondage with her children," but, "that Jerusalem which is free" (Gal. IV, 25-26).

Still in another regard, but in a quite different way, Catholics seem to have become influenced by the appearance of Protestantism.

Why are great biblical scholars extremely rare among the new generation of Catholic apologists, who have grown out of the struggle with Protestantism? Our readers will agree with us that the biblical science of more recent Catholic theologians

is frequently second-hand. The Fathers were not critics. But they knew the Bible. They not merely illustrated metaphysical or ecclesiastical teachings by quoting biblical texts; their theology was based upon a steady reading and constant study of Holy Writ. They knew the facts. They knew and realized the difficulties against the historical character of some passages much better than the majority of our modern theologians seem to do. We shall see that not infrequently a Father of the Church felt obliged to abandon the "letter," and did not hesitate to deny the intention of the sacred author to affirm the historical sense. Nowadays many Catholic theologians do not feel that same freedom of the individual. Later Catholic scholars seem to have been influenced by their struggle against the exaggerated "individualism" of Protestantism, which rejected the authority of the Church.¹ There seems to be among some Catholics a strained and quite unnatural fear of the *individual*, who might go his own way in scientific questions of theology, and who examines by himself, without any scruples, the divine Scriptures.

In the middle ages the level of biblical knowledge and original commentaries was falling rather than rising. The time of the "*Catena*" had come. But although Scripture studies did not flourish, other branches of theological science were blooming. The banner of kings of science was flying out from the mighty towers and castles, crowning the steep hills of mediæval metaphysics. The Scholastics respected the rights of the individual.

In the eyes of men like St. Thomas science was a country to be explored. However far preceding scholars might have

¹ The possibility of falling into the opposite extreme, is particularly evident in those countries, where copies of the Bible became extremely rare among the Catholic people. In some Catechisms the question, whether the faithful are allowed to read the Bible, is answered in such a way that many Protestants believe, we Catholics see so great a danger to Christianity in the reading of the Word of God Himself, as to prefer that our people completely ignore the Scriptures! Of course, the Church merely requires that the faithful should not use other editions of Holy Scripture than those which she herself approved, and in which the rather obscure biblical texts are explained to the common people by some footnotes. But we must acknowledge a great discrepancy between some modern Catholic theologians and the Fathers of the Church, in their attitude towards the reading of the Bible by the faithful.

penetrated into its fields and forests, there ever remained infinitely more still to be discovered. But these scientific explorations were, of course, the work of individuals. In modern armies the strength and courage of a single man may count for naught: science hands her palms to giants advancing alone. The ships of our Arctic explorers do not carry a large crew. When Stanley and Livingstone penetrated into the wilds of Africa, they were not accompanied by a large crowd of geographers. They were alone. No one denies that humility is one of the characteristics of truly learned men; no Catholic denies that the most learned man, when confronted with the higher authority of the Church, has to bow his head; no one denies that in things of so great importance and of so far reaching consequences as the interpretation of the Scriptures, prudence and cautiousness are imperiously required. But, nevertheless, in the realm of science the individual is king. Never will a single scientific argument be possible when the individual must appeal to others; never will science introduce general suffrage into its own realm. Her laws and decisions are not carried by sweeping majorities. "There is nothing new under the sun"; even St. Thomas himself was strongly opposed by his contemporaries. But the Catholic Church will ever consider as one of her noblest glories, the exploits of her mediæval explorers, who quite alone ascended as high as possible the Mt. Everest of metaphysical science.

Nowadays some Catholic scholars seem to consider theology a barn wherein are kept the crops already gathered. They do not seem to realize that the territory of science has an everlasting springtime; although people are not always plowing the same lands. Science is not corn drying in a granary, but living in the furrows of the fields from which, according to the book of Genesis, mankind eats its bread in the sweat of its face. In the history of Catholic science we find a barn of precious crops. But these belong to history. They feed our people, and are the seed of future crops. It is not in the barn that theological science is living and working. How, then, must we explain the fact, that some Catholics seem not to like the fresh air of the fields, where—since there are no other fields—the corn is growing among weeds? In our opinion, the principal

reason is, because in the fields of science every one has to plow his own little piece of land, and works alone. And wherever some modern Catholics see an individual alone in the fields of theology, they look upon him with distrust. An object of great alarm to them are those "individuals" especially, who attempt to place in the barn the new crop from the little lands which border on the fields of historical science. They may swear that their crop is of the same seed as that which is kept in the barn; they may declare that they are Catholic to the backbone; they may invite, and even beseech their fellow Catholic to examine the new crop: but they are distrusted: *they are alone.*

It stands to reason that we do not wish to be understood as addressing ourselves to Catholics at large. But we cannot help believing that this picture represents the true state of affairs in some of those little Catholic worlds, which their inhabitants easily identify with the one, saving Catholic Church. Whether in the past this spirit, reigning within some circles, encouraged the personal initiative among our scholars, and was profitable to the progress of theological science; whether after the days of St. Thomas, many carloads of new sacks, that is to say, of new theological crops, were placed in the barn: are questions which we must leave to the theologians themselves. But with regard to Scripture studies, we do not hesitate to affirm that we Catholics ought to study more than we did the works of the ancient Fathers. Many of us would entirely change our views if we knew the Fathers better. When our contemporaries become interested in a question touching upon theology, we cannot put aside the impression that among some Catholic scholars, the reaction against Protestantism has extended the boundaries of authority so far that they never feel sufficiently sure, whether they are in the realm of *science*, where the individual is king. We do not by any means deny that some modern critics fall into the opposite extreme, by going their own way even where they are on the grounds of eternal Catholic principles. But in our opinion the most striking discrepancy between a great number of our modern true blue Catholic theologians and the Fathers, consists in a kind of sickly apprehension of that freedom and "individual-

ism," which in matters of science is a question of to be or not to be. In Catholic Scripture studies the killing of personal initiative would become especially dangerous if, some time, the tendency of those theologians should prevail, who underwent the influence of the Protestant worshipping of the "letter."

St. Jerome, the patron of Catholic scripturists, was such a characteristic and self-conscious "individual" as is rarely seen in history. This will be shown in the second part of this chapter.

Regarding the authority of *the Church* all true Catholic scholars are little children. "He that walketh sincerely, walketh boldly" (Prov. X, 19) and "perfect love casteth out fear" (I John IV, 18). But whoever loves his Mother, the Catholic Church, will never forget the words of Our Lord: "Unless you become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. XVIII, 3).

HENRY A. POELS.

P. S. We evidently do not imagine that every objection raised against the inerrancy of Holy Writ, can be resolved by an appeal to the distinctions we proposed. We merely dealt with two classes of the most serious difficulties. In the continuation of this study we will have to show, e. g., that the historical truth of writings, whose authors interpret and pass sentence over the past, ought not to be judged according to entirely the same standard of truth as mere narratives; that the Scriptures contain rhetorical elements, which cannot be interpreted like positive and philosophical affirmations, etc. But these other difficulties will be easily solved, once we agree on the soundness of the distinctions set forth in those two first articles.—Even if we were to admit the theory of P. Schanz regarding the connection between inspiration and apostleship, we would be obliged, nevertheless, to distinguish the teachings of the God-man from the opinions held by the ordinary man.

H. P.

RICHARD FITZRALPH OF ARMAGH AND THE FRANCISCANS (1349-1360). II.

Fitzralph seems to have been in great demand as a preacher. "Among his collected sermons (of which, either in full or in reports, the Bodleian MS. 144 contains no less than eighty-five), there are some which were delivered before the Pope on July 7, 1335, in November, 1338, in December, 1341, in September and December, 1342, and in December, 1344, dates which may possibly even point to a continuous residence at Avignon, taken in connection with the circumstance that his sermons preached in England begin in 1345."³³ This conclusion seems to be confirmed by a mandate of Clement VI in 1344 to the Bishop and Chapter of Lichfield to revoke certain statutes made by Bishop Walter touching the Deanery of Lichfield "whereby the present dean Richard, S.T.P., has been much harassed during his absence at the papal court."³⁴ It is strange, however, if Mr. Poole's conjecture be true, that this mandate was not given before 1344. There are other sermons extant which were delivered at Lichfield and London and other places in England, and at Drogheda, Dundalk, Trim and other churches in his native country. These, though preserved or reported in Latin, are generally stated to have been delivered in English. Four out of the "seven or eight" sermons preached at St. Paul's Cross, London (1356-7), on the question of evangelical poverty have been printed by Joannes Sudoris at the end of his edition of the "Summa in Quæstionibus Armenorum." Fitzralph frequently made the virtues of our Blessed Lady the subject of his discourse, for many of his sermons are entitled "De Laudibus sanctæ Deiparæ."

These sermons present a uniform plan. The subject is divided according to the scholastic method, and each member or section of the plan is proved and illustrated as if it were a complete whole. The result is a singular clearness which

³³ Poole, *D N B.*, XIX, 195.

³⁴ Bliss, "Calendar," III, 117.

however is never hard or cold because pervaded by a certain warmth and unction.³⁵

Ever since the days of John Comyn, the first English archbishop of Dublin, there was unending conflict between Armagh and Dublin respecting the exercise of the primatial powers. Indeed, the contest was almost inevitable under the circumstances. Dublin, as the political capital and by far the most important city in the country, wished to be entirely free from the primatial powers of Armagh. Popes and kings favored now one side, now the other.

In 1349 the contention broke out more fiercely than ever between Fitzralph and Alexander de Bicknor, Archbishop of Dublin. In that year Archbishop Fitzralph obtained from Edward III a recognition of the right to have his cross borne before him in all parts of Ireland. This right he promptly and vigorously exercised in Dublin. But Edward soon revoked his letters, and wrote to the Cardinal of St. Anastasia to procure the disallowal of Fitzralph's claim of supremacy over the see of Dublin, and also to the Archbishop himself commanding his return to his diocese. But down to the end of 1350 at least we find Fitzralph's claims supported by riots which called for active measures on the part of the government.³⁶ Nor did he give up the exercise of what he conceived to be the right of his Church, for in 1352 we find the Archbishop of Dublin again receiving letters patent from Edward denying the primatial rights of Fitzralph in the Archdiocese of Dublin.

In the following year the controversy was taken to Rome. It would seem from subsequent events that no definite decision was given, as the contest went on until the reign of Queen Mary. Archbishop John Allen of Dublin, in 1529, states that he found a letter of Innocent VI in Rome which decided that the Archbishop of Armagh should be entitled Primate of All Ireland, and the Archbishop of Dublin Primate of Ireland. Whatever be its real value, this is the origin of the present titles of these bishops.³⁷

³⁵ *Irish Eccl. Record*, I, 525-6.

³⁶ Poole, D N B., XIX, 196.

³⁷ Wilkin's "Concilia," IV, p. 81 ff. *Irish Eccl. Record*, 1889, (III Series) X, p. 422 ff. Item, 1900, (IV Series) VIII, p. 193.

Fitzralph was a man who preëminently joined the speculative temper with the practical, and evinced great activity in the administration of his office. He acquired for his diocese the priory and house of St. Andrew in the Ardes from the Benedictines of St. Mary of Senley in Normandy.³⁸ He adopted means to increase the slender revenue of his see by appropriating four churches to his "mensa," and exchanged certain church properties for others more advantageous to the see of Armagh.³⁹

Among other things he tells us in the "Defensorium Curatorum" that he had three or four of his priests studying at the University of Oxford.⁴⁰

He seems to have been diligent in visiting the different church provinces. We find him engaged on a visitation of the diocese of Meath in 1355 when Edward III called on him to return quickly to Dundalk to treat with Odo O'Neill, who was advancing on that town with a considerable Irish army.⁴¹ Indeed we meet with him in the guise of an ambassador of peace as far back as 1348 when he received from the king full powers to treat for peace between the English and the Irish.⁴² Tritheimus tritely tells us that he was famous for his wit, a scholar in speech and of great activity in preaching to the people.⁴³ So that he seems to have justified the eulogy passed on him in the Bull which made him Archbishop: "In spiritualibus providus, in temporalibus circumspectus."

The event most generally connected with the name of Fitzralph is the controversy with the Mendicants. We have seen that he appeared at Avignon in 1349 as the official spokesman of the secular clergy, but there is little to show what attitude he maintained towards the Friars on his return to Ireland. The contest came to a crisis, however, in 1356, and occupied the remaining years of his life, as we have no evidence of his returning to his diocese after the citation to Avignon in 1357.

³⁸ *Irish Eccl. Record*, I, 526.

³⁹ Bliss, III, 398; also Theiner, 295.

⁴⁰ Brown, Appendix to "Fasciculus Rerum Expetendarum," p. 474.

⁴¹ Stuart-Coleman, "Memoirs of Armagh," Dublin, 1900, p. 108.

⁴² Pat. 29, Edw. III, cited in *Irish Eccl. Rec.*, I, 526.

⁴³ See Prince, "Worthies of Devon," p. 366.

Fitzralph died at Avignon, very probably on the sixteenth of November, 1360.⁴⁴ About ten years after his death his remains were brought back to his native town of Dundalk by Stephen de Valle, Bishop of Meath, and deposited in the Church of St. Nicholas, but some doubted whether the remains were his or another's.⁴⁵ The monument was still there in the beginning of the seventeenth century, as Usher wrote to Camden on October 30, 1606, that "it was not long ago by the unruly soldiers defaced."⁴⁶

His memory attracted many of the faithful to his tomb, and many miracles are said to have taken place there, whereat (relates the first continuator of Higden) it is said that the Friars are ill-pleased.⁴⁷ About his person there must have grown up a "cultus" of some antiquity and public importance, at least in Armagh and the neighborhood, for in the beginning of the fifteenth century Boniface IX appointed a commission consisting of Archbishop Colton of Armagh and Richard Yong, Abbot of Osney, and Bishop-elect of Bangor, to inquire into his claims for canonization.⁴⁸ The results of this investigation are not known; but this does not make it evident that the claims were set aside. His memory however seems to have been held, locally, in saintly veneration by many for a long time. A synod held at Drogheda on June 20, 1545, under George Dowdall, Primate of Armagh, ordered that the Feast of Saint Richard of Dundalk be celebrated on the morrow of the feast of Sts. John and Paul (June 27th).⁴⁹ Even as late as the seventeenth century, Fr. Paul Harris speaks of Fitzralph as "called by the inhabitants of the country St. Richard of Dundalk."⁵⁰ And Prince quotes an old couplet from this same writer which the people in Ireland by ancient tradition are said to have often chanted:

⁴⁴ Gilbert, "Chartularies," II, 393; Ware-Harris, I, 83. See Poole for discordant statements.

⁴⁵ Cf. Gilbert, l. c., and Ware-Harris, l. c.

⁴⁶ Camden, "Epist.," p. 86.

⁴⁷ Higden, "Polychronicon," VIII, 392; "Chronicon Angliæ," p. 48.

⁴⁸ Ware-Harris, l. c.

⁴⁹ Canon O'Hanlon, "Lives of the Irish Saints," I, 528, also forthcoming volume under November 16.

⁵⁰ "Admonition to the Fryars of Ireland," pp. 15, 34, cited by Poole, D N B.

"Many a mile have I gone,
 And many did I walk,
 But never saw a holier man
 Than Richard of Dundalk."⁵¹

II.

Before recounting the mass of accusation that was hurled against the Franciscans in the fourteenth century, it is only just that we should first view the movement as a whole, and at its best, and try to determine its place in history, its mission, its genius and its measure of success. Such a retrospect will give us a proper background, and will act as a balancing and controlling force, since accusations against religious orders are to a great extent made, consciously or unconsciously, in comparison with a sublime ideal, or a former high standard. Moreover we must take into account the drastic, uncompromising "Satyra" of the Middle Ages. When we meet with a manuscript headed with a picture of four devils hugging four Mendicants (one of each of the Orders) with evidences of undying affection, we must not immediately conclude that the Friars were really unpopular, or that they had fallen away completely from their first fervor. In dealing with such satire, and in reading detailed accusations, men are too apt to substitute the general for the particular, and to accuse a society as a whole of lapses which should be laid only at the door of the individual.

There are few periods in history whose features it is more difficult to grasp with accuracy than the age which gave birth to St. Francis. It was an age of transition, and had all the contradictory impulses of such an age. The people were becoming daily more conscious of their great latent powers, and their true social destiny. The feudal system, which had served so well and so ill, was passing away before the breath of the new democracy.

Many influences conduced to this awakening of the European mind. Principal among them were the growth of the Universities and the Crusades. The influence of the universities in moulding the thought and the character of the Middle

⁵¹ Prince, "Worthies of Devon," p. 367.

Age is well nigh incalculable. "Their organization and their traditions, their studies and their exercises affected the progress and intellectual development of Europe more powerfully or (perhaps it should be said) more exclusively, than any schools in all likelihood will ever do again."⁵²

The powerful influence of the Crusades had greatly stimulated, almost created, commercial enterprise. All sorts of arts and inventions had been introduced from the East, and towns were constantly springing into existence. The great bulky form of the Third Estate was becoming visible in the light of the new dawn, and a powerful middle class was growing up on the ruins of the European nobility, impoverished by a century's conflict with Islam. But the Crusades were by no means an unmixed blessing. They had, it is true, thrown back the threatening advance of Islam and opened the road to commerce, but they indirectly effected a loosening of faith and morals by the introduction of Oriental habits and forms of thought, and that intellectual independence so strongly furthered by warfare and travel.

The new-born towns were most affected by these evils. Sanitary conditions were poor, and improvement could not keep pace with the growth of the population. Education and spiritual care were deficient, because the monasteries, hitherto the great centers of education, were mostly in the country, and the Church had not yet adjusted herself to the new conditions. Hence, the towns, more especially the suburbs, became nests of pestilence and vice. They became the rallying points of opposition to the feudal baron and the feudal bishop, and centers of all kinds of heterodox religious opinions.

The clergy had lost much of their prestige from the worldliness and contagious influence of that large army of men who donned the cassock, not for love of souls, but for love of preferment and of wealth. This was the cost at which the Church had to enter the political and social enterprises of early mediæval life in order to lift society out of the barbarous chaos in which she found it. And so the life of the thirteenth century presented many ugly and lamentable features. There was a

⁵² Rashdall, "Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages," I, p. 5.

spirit of deep uncharitableness abroad. Princes and nobles did not seem to think that the poor and the lowly were of the same blood and of the same value in the sight of God as themselves. Society was continually immersed in a series of unmeaning wars—civil wars, border wars, wars between city and city, baron and baron, complicated with dissensions, plots, massacres and plunders. There was only one power on earth that could and did restrain this mad medley of sometimes petty, sometimes daring ambitions; and that was the Papacy. It was a final court of appeal, and a just and righteous one, against the overbearing and injustice of autocratic rulers. And no one, probably, who ever occupied the chair of Peter more clearly grasped or more firmly executed this high mission than the man who ruled the Christian Church in the first years of the thirteenth century—Innocent III. But great social reforms are seldom inaugurated by those in authority. Authority is in its nature conservative, and can not rightly initiate radical changes. These must come, in their beginnings at least, from an inner movement of society itself. Hence at this time there was need of some great solvent to influence from within that seething mediæval world which Pope Innocent ruled so firmly from without. The elements of such a reform were already at work and needed but the hand of a chosen son of God to add the quickening touch of unity and zeal.

The people of that day were preëminently a people who would be swept on by the spirit of a great reform. We have spoken of their faults; let us now say a word about their virtues. These were as high and striking as their vices. Above all things they had faith—a simple, manly, unfaltering faith. They constituted a Europe that was budding into manhood, with all the enthusiasm and daring of youth, and all the ambition and grasp of intellect of maturer years.

They aspired to ideals, almost too noble for a world like this, and all but realized them. Witness their adding to the spiritual authority of the papacy the powers of an earthly kingdom, ruling all other earthly kingdoms, asserting the superiority of might to right, and putting before mankind "a conception of the sanctity and dignity of government far nobler

than anything civilization had yet known."⁵³ Even in their architecture the essential note was aspiration. Their Gothic cathedrals have been truly called sermons in stone, raising upward the thoughts of man along their lofty spires and bringing them into living touch with the Common Father in heaven. It was an age of poetry and of chivalry—the age of jongleur and minstrel and troubadour. We also note that the elements of a sounder criticism were waxing into strength; and there was a deeper yearning for freedom among the people. Behind the worldly glitter of the age there was everywhere evidence of a deep and abiding spiritual growth. We can trace its steady progress through the twelfth century, intensified in such mutually uncongenial spirits as St. Bernard and the Calabrian seer, Joachim of Flora.

The essential characteristic of the new mysticism lay in a deeper personal love of Christ. When the Church passed over from Rome to the barbarians, the intimate, personal love of the early Christians, rooted in long-living memories of the God-Man, merged into a more awesome feeling befitting the uncultivated mind of the barbarian. They built magnificent basilicas and stepped back to worship at a distance the Saviour whom the early Christians would press close to their hearts. A certain tendency to arid formalism was the almost inevitable result of such a temper and such circumstances. But the world was returning to a closer union with Christ. The attachments of the mediæval man were intensely personal; and once he clearly grasped the idea of the personal relation of Christ with man, it took but a moment to kneel in humility and love at the feet of his Master and Friend.

Yet these noble ideals and impulses were only as streams of limpid water flowing gently but steadily through marshes of political coarseness, moral corruption and intellectual folly. What was needed was a man in whom they would swell into a noble river, cleansing the grossness from its path, hoisting the soul of the age upon its bosom and bearing it onward to regions of deeper truth and higher morality. This is what happened at the dawn of the thirteenth century, and St. Francis

⁵³ Wakeman, "History of the Church of England," p. 138, 3d ed., 1897.

of Assisi was the chosen one employed by God to accomplish the noble task.⁵⁴

When we look for the reasons of the instantaneous success of the Franciscan movement, we must bear in mind that it combined in itself the two great forces that were stirring the minds of the day—the growing mystic spirit, that brought out at once the flower of Christian thought and emphasized by feudal habit more and more the personal note in religion, and the new democratic spirit that radiated principally from the towns and the universities.

“In St. Francis,” says Harnack, “medieval piety obtained its clearest and most forcible expression. In him it uttered itself most simply, and, therefore, most powerfully and most impressively because its chord—humility, love, obedience—was here struck with the greatest purity.”⁵⁵ St. Francis was also a child of the new democracy. Italy, if I might speak of the Italy of that day as a single entity, was the first to rebel against the yoke of feudalism. Almost every town and city in the land was trying with nervous energy to work out its political destiny in its own way. In the struggle of the different communes for individuality and freedom there arises a bewildering confusion of constitutional forms. But whatever distinctness and diversity of form these various constitutions assumed, they supplied St. Francis with a general type on which to model his society—a type more suited to the times than the feudal form of government of the older orders. In the new orders superiors were to be elected only for a certain period; they were to assume no titles that spelled authority too plainly, but were called simply ministers or guardians.

In their relations to the world and their mode of acting on it the Friars also differed essentially from the monks of old. The Benedictine settling down in a primitive and chaotic society which had to be brought under obedience to law, represented “the political and social concept of Christian life.”⁵⁶ His task was therefore to bring stability and permanency into

⁵⁴ See the Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII on the occasion of the seventh centenary of St. Francis, *Leonis XIII Acta*, Vol. III, p. 142 ff.

⁵⁵ “History of Dogma,” Vol. VI, p. 85, Eng. trans.

⁵⁶ Cuthbert, “The Friars and How They Came to England,” p. 29.

the lawless nature of the barbarian. He represented law and order, and consequently acted on the world mainly through the collective force of his organized society. The influence of the Friars, on the other hand, was more individual and personal. They went forth into the world two by two and tramped over the highways and byways of Europe, their convent being little more than a place of meeting, where they could compare notes and prepare for a fresh start. The monk turned his back on the world. "He made his way into the labyrinthine forest, and he cleared just so much of space as his dwelling required, suffering the high solemn trees and the deep pathless thicket to close him in." In time, perhaps, "he rose from his knees and found himself a city." But this was the encroachment of the world on his ideal. The Friar, on the other hand, from the very first plunged into the stress and misery of the towns, becoming all things to all men, that he might gain their souls to Christ.

There is no more interesting character in history than the early Friar. He had an individualism all his own. He had a profound contempt for the good things of this world, and an utter disregard of artificial conventionality. It was his delight to be scoffed at and humiliated for Christ's sake. He was as light-hearted, as generous and as simple as a child. His love of nature is proverbial; and he seems to have put a premium on human joy. But we must not thence conclude that he did not grasp the idea of the Great Atonement and the grim reality of the Gospel of Pain. St. Francis' dream of perfect joy was to be turned out into the cold night, and to bear it patiently for Christ's sake.⁵⁷ Indeed, his whole life was one long martyrdom for Christ. But he saw more in the tragedy of Calvary than sorrow. He saw that it was a reconciliation of the world with God, and on that account the world assumed a new and brighter meaning for him.⁵⁸

Socially the great distinguishing badge of the Friars was their profession of absolute poverty. They could possess

⁵⁷ "The Little Flowers of St. Francis," Chap. VIII.

⁵⁸ See article by Fr. Cuthbert on "St. Francis of Assisi and the Religious Revival in the Thirteenth Century," *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1900, Vol. XXV, p. 657 ff.

nothing, either individually or in common. Christ was poor; therefore they must be poor—the poorest of the poor. For their ideal was to follow Christ in everything.

There were other movements in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries which clamored for a return to the simplicity and poverty of the early Church—Waldenses, Cathari, Albigenses, and the like.⁵⁹ Apart from their heretical tenets, they were not unjustified, though ill-directed, protests against the wealth and worldliness of the clergy of the day. But they failed. And they failed principally because of their wrongful attitude toward these abuses and toward the Church which had to tolerate them. They were professional reformers, and because the Church would not listen to their wild schemes, they regarded her too as sinful, and turned their backs upon her. With the Friars it was different. “They embraced poverty because Christ was poor . . . They did not set themselves in the first place to reform society. If they became afterwards great social reformers, that was as a consequence of their vocation, not as a conscious motive.”⁶⁰

The actual life of the Friars in the early days of the movement has been happily described by M. Sabatier in his “Life of St. Francis”:

“The first brothers lived as did the poor people among whom they so willingly moved; Portiuncula was their favorite church, but it would be a mistake to suppose that they sojourned there for any long periods. It was their place of meeting, nothing more. When they set forth, they simply knew when they should meet again in the neighborhood of the modest chapel. Their life was that of the Umbrian beggars of the present day, going here and there as fancy dictated, sleeping in hay-lofts, in leper hospitals, or under the porch of some church. So little had they any fixed domicile that Egidio, having decided to join them, was at a considerable trouble to learn where to find Francis, and accidentally meeting him in the neighborhood of Rivo-Torto, he saw in the fact a providential leading.

“They went up and down the country, joyfully sowing their seed. It was the beginning of summer, the time when everybody in Umbria

⁵⁹ For a comparison of the Franciscans and the Waldensian movements see article by St. Beissel, entitled “Die Culturgeschichtliche Bedeutung des hl. Franz von Assisi,” *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, Vol. 33.

⁶⁰ Cuthbert, “The Friars and How They Came to England,” p. 23.

is out of doors mowing or turning the grass. The customs of the country have changed but little. Walking in the end of May in the fields about Florence, Perugia, or Rieti, one still sees, at nightfall, the bagpipers entering the fields as the mowers seat themselves upon the hay-cocks for their evening meal; they play a few pieces, and when the train of hay-makers returns to the village, followed by the harvest-laden carts, it is they who lead the procession, rending the air with their sharpest strains.

"The joyous Penitents who loved to call themselves *Joculatores Domini*, God's *jongleurs*, no doubt often did the same. They did even better, for not willing to be a charge to anyone, they passed a part of the day in aiding the peasants in their field-work. The inhabitants of these districts are for the most part kindly and sedate; the Friars soon gained their confidence, by relating to them first their history and then their hopes. They worked and ate together; field-hands and friars often slept in the same barn, and when with the morrow's dawn the friars went on their way, the hearts of those they had left behind had been touched.

"They were not yet converted, but they knew that not far away, over toward Assisi, were living men who had renounced all worldly goods, and who, consumed with zeal, were going up and down preaching penance and peace."⁶¹

We have dwelt at length on the first ideal phase of the Franciscan movement, because it is then that we can best see its true spirit. But the little family that gathered around St. Francis had soon to face the storm and stress of the world. Its members rapidly increased in numbers, and some kind of definite rule became necessary. The first rule was approved by Pope Innocent III in the year 1210.⁶² This rule has not come down to us, but it was a kind of rough sketch of regulations which afterwards took exact shape in the Rule of 1223, known as the Second Rule.⁶³ Further on in this study we shall get a glimpse of the order's struggle with the world and with the parochial clergy, and of the long contest waged within the order itself. The rent between the two parties within the order—the Observants and the Conventuals as they afterwards became generally known—was already definitely marked, and

⁶¹ Sabatier, "Life of St. Francis of Assisi," p. 77 ff.

⁶² Sabatier, *op. cit.*, p. 88 (note).

⁶³ See Fr. Paschal Robinson, "The Real St. Francis of Assisi," p. 73.

has left its unmistakable echoes and traces in the primitive Franciscan literature. One party, a minority, adhered with tenacity to their first simple ideal, especially the rule of absolute uncompromising poverty. The other party were more inclined to adapt themselves to circumstances and temper the strictness of the original rule.

It would be interesting to trace the ebb and flow of this great conflict between the divine ideal of St. Francis and fallen human nature, as it rose and fell from generation to generation until the final separation of the parties in the sixteenth century. But it is not our intention here to do more than point out the main lines on which it was waged. The great point of contention was the interpretation of the rule of poverty. On this the "spirituales," or observants would have no such thing as compromise. The more moderate party, however, which was also the more numerous, gladly obtained permission from the Holy See to store up goods for temporal use, and to build churches and convents. They adhered to the letter of the rule by allowing the right of ownership to remain with the givers.⁶⁴ But in 1245 they obtained a Bull from Pope Innocent IV which allowed the ownership of all their property to be vested in the Roman Church.⁶⁵ This development was, of course, natural; and the plaint of some modern Protestant writers is out of place, when they accuse the Church of dragging down the order from its original high ideal. The Church had the responsibility of Christendom on her hands, and could not let an army of roving and exalted mystics endanger society with disruption nor see, it may be, a noble movement die away in a few sputtering jets of individual enthusiasm. They had, of necessity, to become part of the existing ecclesiastical framework, with organization, assurance of control, and some kind of settled existence.

The Friars also departed far from their original path in another direction—they entered the universities. St. Francis wished his disciples to be the apostles of humility and love, but he could see little of these qualities in the dry and arrogant intellectual jugglery that was not uncommon in the schools of

⁶⁴ Bull of Gregory IX, 1230; see "Bullarium Romanum," Vol. III, p. 449 ff.

⁶⁵ "Bullarium Romanum," Vol. III, p. 519 ff.

the early thirteenth century, all aglow with the consuming passion of dialectic or mental fencing. Despite his fears the Friars did enter the universities and, it would seem, for the universities' good. In the first flush of the movement it was, indeed, possible for the Friars to accomplish their mission without the aid of much theological learning; but there came a time when the order consisted mainly of men of normal spiritual temper; for such men something more than their natural earnestness was needed, if their preaching was to be regularly effective.

We have spoken of the departures from the original ideal in so far as they were a development, and not a deterioration. Of the latter we shall speak hereafter. Deterioration, of course, there was constantly; for the Friars were only human. But there was as constant an attempt to reform.

The Church did not allow the conflicting parties within the order to separate until the year 1517, when Pope Leo X divided the order into two bodies. He decreed that the strict party should be known by the name of Observantines, and the moderate party by that of Conventuals, all other designations being abolished. Finally, in the year 1525, the more strict Capuchin reform was begun by Friar Matthew de' Bassi, and was constituted into a distinct congregation in 1619 by Pope Paul V. Hence, we have to-day three distinct bodies of Friars Minor or Franciscans—the Observantines, the Conventuals and the Capuchins.

Before speaking of the effect of the Franciscan movement on western civilization, we shall say a few words on their work in England and in Ireland, because these countries are affected more closely than others by the attacks of Fitzralph. Four clerics and five lay brothers, with Brother Agnellus at their head, crossed the Channel in 1224.⁶⁶ As elsewhere their steps were first directed to the wretched denizens of the outskirts of the towns. "Near the shambles in Newgate, and close upon the city gate of that name, on a spot appropriately called Stinking Lane, arose the chief house of the order in Eng-

⁶⁶ Thomas de Eccleston, *De Adventu F. F. Minorum in Angliam*, Ch. 1. Trans. by Fr. Cuthbert in his "Friars and How They Came to England."

land."⁶⁷ Their rapid success and popularity are attested by the fact that thirty-two years after their arrival "there were in the English Province forty-nine houses, and the number of brethren dwelling therein was one thousand two hundred and forty-two."⁶⁸ They seemed to have been truer to their first principles, and more successful, in England than elsewhere, at least in the thirteenth century; and Brewer pays them a high tribute when he says "that poverty, rigid poverty to the last, continues to be the rule rather than the exception with the Minorite Friars is clear from the inventories of their houses taken at the Dissolution by the Royal Commission."⁶⁹ They very early made their way to the universities, and in time the genius of men like Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus and William Occam gave the English Franciscans the honor of being the most learned body in Europe.⁷⁰

The Friars settled in Ireland about ten years after their arrival in England. Their efficiency was naturally much impaired by the antagonism between the native Irish and the English. Most of the monasteries founded before the time of Fitzralph were in the eastern part of the country, namely, that part which was most under English influence.⁷¹ Taking in conjunction with this the fact that the Anglo-Irish excluded the Irish as much as possible from the religious communities situated within the limits of the English power in Ireland,⁷² we are inclined to think that the native Irish Friars had a minor place in the mind of Fitzralph. Hence, we shall not dwell on their history but shall pass on to a review of the benefits conferred on western civilization by the Franciscan movement in general.

⁶⁷ Brewer, "Monumenta Franciscana," Vol. I, p. XVIII (introd.).

⁶⁸ "Eccleston," Chap. II, in fine.

⁶⁹ "Monumenta Franciscana," p. xx, note (introd.), Vol. I.

⁷⁰ Jessop, "The Coming of the Friars," *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1883, Vol. XIV, p. 97.

Dom Gasquet, "English Scholarship in the Thirteenth Century," *Dublin Review*, 4. S., July-Oct., 1898.

⁷¹ Meehan, "Rise and Fall of the Irish Franciscan Monasteries," Dublin, 6th edition, passim.

⁷² Dr. Kelly, article on "Statute of Kilkenny," *Dublin Review*, March, 1844, XVI, p. 181.

This influence was so complex and so far-reaching, that it is impossible to trace it with any degree of fulness. They were the popular preachers of their day. Being constantly on the move, seeing and hearing everything, they had a fund of anecdote and illustration to lend zest and pungency to their preaching.⁷³ Hence their words went right to the hearts of the common people, and in the Third Order they had a powerful means of preserving in the life of the home the sense of deep and sincere piety which they had awakened.

The popular preaching of the Friars also played an important part in the development of the European vernaculars. They prepared the way for Dante and Chaucer. Nor was their influence less profound in raising the tone of the content of literature. This indeed was inevitable from the awakened spirit of purer love for God, and man, and nature. Jacopone di Tode in no small sense anticipated Dante, and both owed much to the Poverello of Assisi himself.

Even in history the first marked instance of the personal note, in contrast with the dry, reserved and impersonal chronicles of the past, is found in the inimitable Salimbene of Parma. In the art of painting we need but mention the names of the Tertiaries Cimabue and Giotto, of the latter of whom it has been said that "he created the special glory of Middle Age Italy—its *schools* of great painters."⁷⁴ He was the first to make a clear-cut departure from the dry conventional Byzantine style, to put life and feeling into the art of painting, and to provide for the popularization and permanency of his work.

In architecture also there was a far-reaching revival in the thirteenth century. Old ecclesiastical buildings were restored and new ones built; the characteristic inspiration of the Gothic rose on the wings of higher and grander conceptions under the impulse of the religious enthusiasm enkindled by St. Francis. In the regions of pure theology and philosophy it is to be noted that the great system of Catholic thought which the thirteenth century produced to counteract the dangers of Averroistic Aristotelianism was begun by the Franciscan Alex-

⁷³ Cf. Lucy T. Smith, "English Popular Preaching in the Fourteenth Century," *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, January, 1892, Vol. VII, p. 25.

⁷⁴ Canon Little, "St. Francis of Assisi," p. 294.

ander of Hales, though it owes its systematization to the Dominicans. But if to the name of St. Thomas must be ascribed the first place in the ranks of the great scholastics, that of Roger Bacon is supreme in another field. He was, we may almost say, the first, and for a long time the greatest, student in the field of natural science. Indeed, the early attention which the Friars gave to sickness and disease, and even to a wider circle of physical studies, gave the first popular impulse to a systematic study of medical science and natural philosophy.⁷⁵

Perhaps the most lasting influence of the Franciscan movement on civilization was in the way of social reform. In many ways it elevated the social condition of woman; and by the religious consecration and ennobling of poverty, by the romantic idealization of its history, its functions and its spirit, made the life of the poor more respected. Misery and distress of every kind received greater practical and religious sympathy from the example of the tender devotion shown by the Friars to the wretched, neglected and oftentimes leprous outcasts of the mediæval towns. Their lives and their teachings stirred all Christendom in its somewhat sluggish depths, and loosened spiritual forces that were alive, indeed, but had become dormant for awhile.

Nor was this the only line along which the cause of the weak was advanced. In the Third Order we find the following articles laid down:

1. The brethren must carry no offensive weapons, except in the defense of the Church and the faith of Jesus Christ, or in defence of their country, or with the permission of the Superiors (Ch. VII).

2. The brethren must abstain from solemn oaths, unless they are constrained by necessity and keep within the limit of the cases excepted by the Holy See (Ch. XII).

3. Each brother will give a farthing of current money to the treasurer, who will collect this money and distribute it suitably, according to the advice of the ministers, to the brethren and sisters who are destitute (Ch. XIII).⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Brewer, "Mon. Franc.," Vol. I, p. xliii (introd.).

⁷⁶ Cf. Le Monnier, "Hist. of St. Francis," Chap. XIII, p. 288.

In a few years by this masterstroke of genius, this universal religious association of laymen, the power of feudalism was severely maimed, if not broken, in Italy. The peasant world of Tertiaries refused to follow the feudal lords any longer to their petty wars. They refused to take any more oaths of fealty. They are organized now, like the guilds, the nobles, the ecclesiastics. They have a strong reserve fund at hand for contingencies. The astonished nobles make a desperate effort to stifle this new movement. But the Holy See refused to issue any judicial injunctions against the Tertiaries and they won, and ended forever any future growth of the old feudal militarism.

We have mentioned here but a few of the many ways in which the Franciscan movement influenced society in the thirteenth century. When all is told it will be found that it was one of the most powerful formative influences of the time, nay, by far the most significant. But the movement is so vast and its sweep so far-reaching, that it would be impossible in the space at our disposal to attempt any adequate appreciation of its achievements. It was necessary, however, to have some estimate of the purpose and spirit and success of the movement, in order to be able to weigh justly the phenomena of its deterioration as set forth in the writ of accusation furnished by Fitzralph.

III.

"The brethren must possess nothing, neither house nor land, nor anything whatsoever, so that, as pilgrims and strangers in this world, they may go with confidence to ask alms."⁷⁷ Such is the profession of poverty laid by St. Francis on his disciples. They must possess nothing either individually or in common. Those to whom the Lord has given the grace of working must work faithfully and devoutly;⁷⁸ but if they are not paid the price of their labor, let them have recourse to the table of the Lord, asking alms from door to door.⁷⁹ But

⁷⁷ Rule, Chap. VI. See Le Monnier, "Hist. of St. Francis of Assisi," Ch. XV.

⁷⁸ Rule, Ch. V.

⁷⁹ "Testament of St. Francis, apud Le Monnier," Ch. XXIII, p. 489.

they are commanded strictly "not to receive money or cash in any way, either themselves, or through another."⁸⁰

It would be too much to expect a multitude of men to abide by the letter of an ideal so high, and a renouncement of all worldly goods so complete. Hence, the growth of a conflict within the Order was inevitable, once the movement had become popular. The first rumbling of this conflict was heard as far back as 1220 when St. Francis was in the Orient, and the affairs of the Order at home were in the hands of Brothers Matteo of Narni and Gregory of Naples who were inclined to alleviate the vow of poverty.⁸¹ The Rule of 1223 was drawn up to curb this tendency, and marks the rapid evolution of the Order. The majority of the Brothers were then settling down to a more stable and normal state of life, and were being swept gradually into the current of contemporary scholasticism.

Under the generalship of Elias the antagonism between the strict and moderate spirits was very bitter. Elias was the incarnation of the spirit of relaxation. While he was yet general in 1230 Pope Gregory IX allowed the appointment of a nuntius through whom the brethren might receive money or alms. By this Bull it was also ordained, that the ownership of property received by the Friars should remain with the givers.⁸²

The opposition of the Spirituals, or strict party, to these relaxing tendencies waxed loud and strong, and through the influence of St. Anthony of Padua, they forced the deposition of Elias in this same year. But the sympathy of the Church seems to have been still with the Conventuals, or Moderate party. In 1245 Pope Innocent IV issued a Bull in which the function of the nuntius was extended to looking after the comforts (*commoda*) of the Friars as well as their necessities, and the ownership of property was vested in the Holy See.⁸³

After the election of John of Parma to the generalate (1247-57) the Joachimite ideas which in one form or another had been floating for nearly half a century in the mind of Southern Europe took definite shape among a party of the

⁸⁰ Rule, Ch. IV.

⁸¹ Cf. Sabatier, "Life of St. Francis," Ch. XIII, p. 235.

⁸² "Bullarium Romanum," Vol. III, p. 449 ff.

⁸³ "Bull. Rom.," III, p. 519.

Spirituals. They believed themselves to be the new order of monks announced by Joachim of Flora.⁸⁴ Their views in their extremest form were embodied in a book known as the "Liber Introductorius Ad Evangelium Eternum" of Gerardus de Borgo San Donnino which appeared in 1254. It was decried by the Magistri of Paris, who were at this time in conflict with the Mendicants, and condemned by Pope Alexander IV in 1255.⁸⁵ Though the great body of the Order was not in sympathy with the radical ideas of Gerardus, its good name and orthodoxy were compromised. The Friars retaliated by obtaining the condemnation of the work entitled "De Periculis Novissimorum Temporum" of William of St. Amour, which was a vehement attack on the principles of evangelical poverty.⁸⁶

The condemnation of the Introductorius did not long dampen the ardor of the Spirituals. To reconcile their demands with actual conditions Nicholas III issued the decree "Exiit qui seminat" on August 14, 1279, in which theoretically he advocated the strict doctrine, though practically he stood by the views of the mitigated observance.⁸⁷ He said that Christ had confirmed the way of evangelical poverty by His own example, and that the Apostles had followed it—words which afterwards were the subject of protracted controversy.

The controversy about this time centered around the names of John Peter Olivi⁸⁸ and Ubertino da Casale;⁸⁹ the great question was whether the brethren were bound to the "usus pauper rerum."

Some held that, as the renouncement of ownership was absolute, so the use of things should be rigidly sparing. The writings of Olivi were condemned by the Order, but Clement V put the matter into the hands of a commission which acted up to the time of the Council of Vienna. Ubertino forwarded to the commission a complete defense of his friend Olivi.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ Gebhart, "L'Italie Mystique," p. 71 ff., p. 200 ff.

⁸⁵ Denifle, *Archiv fuer Lit. u. Kirch. Geschichte*, Vol. I, p. 49 ff.

⁸⁶ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," Vol. I, p. 382 ff.

⁸⁷ Hefele, "Conciliengeschichte," Vol. VI, p. 548.

⁸⁸ Cf. Father Ehrle, *Archiv fuer Lit. u. Kirch. Gesch.*, Vol. III, p. 409 ff.

⁸⁹ Huck, "Ubertin Von Casale," Freiburg im Br., 1903.

⁹⁰ Ehrle, *Archiv*, Vol. II, p. 353 ff.

The result of the deliberations at Avignon, and in the Council of Vienna were published by Clement V in the Decretal "*Exivi de paradiso*."⁹¹ This was, of course, a compromise, though under the circumstances it decidedly favored the stricter view. But the great desire of the Spirituals—final separation from the Order—remained unsatisfied.

In 1321 a dispute arose between the Inquisitor, John of Belna, and the Minorite Berengarius, which changed the whole aspect of the Franciscan controversy. Belna stamped as heretical the statement that Christ and the Apostles, following the way of perfection, possessed nothing individually or in common. Berengarius, on the other hand, defended it as orthodox, and indeed defined by the Decretal "*Exiit qui seminatur*." The controversy was soon brought before the Holy See. While the decision of the Pontiff was still pending a general chapter of the Order, held under Michael of Cesena at Perugia in 1322, declared their adhesion to the Decretal "*Exiit*" of Nicholas III and their belief that Christ and the Apostles possessed nothing by right of dominion whether individually or in common.

On December 8, 1322, John XXII issued the Decretal "*Ad Conditorem*" in which he declared that the Decretal "*Exiit*" which allowed only the "*usus facti*" to the Minorites (dominion being vested in the Roman Church) is not understood of those things which are consumed by use. Hence the dominion of these things is restored to the Friars. This Decretal did not touch the question of the poverty of Christ. But in November, 1323, Pope John issued the Bull "*Cum inter nonnullos*" in which he declared the proposition that Christ and His Apostles possessed nothing individually or in common to be erroneous and heretical. These Bulls were ardently opposed, and the controversy took an unfavorable turn for the Order by the fact that Louis of Bavaria availed himself of it in his struggle with the Holy See. John XXII replied to his adversaries in another Bull "*Quia quorundam*" in 1324, in which he vindicated and confirmed his former constitutions. This was soon followed by a complete schism of many of the Friars,

⁹¹ Clementin, V, tit. XI, c. I.

but the Order in general remained faithful to the Holy See.⁹² A summary of the errors of the Fraticelli may be found in a Bull of John XXII published in 1318 and beginning with the words "Gloriosam Ecclesiam."⁹³

As we go on through the years we find many echoes of the controversy and many traces of the old Joachimite ideas. The questions at issue were still being agitated warmly in 1349 when Fitzralph, on the occasion of a visit to Avignon, was commissioned by the English clergy to lay before the Pope certain complaints against the Friars. This memorial was presented on July 5, 1350.⁹⁴ But some time previous to its presentation Fitzralph and two other Doctors were appointed by the Pope to make enquiry concerning the questions of property, dominion, possession and the right of use, which had long been agitated among the Mendicants. They came to no definite conclusions, and Fitzralph was urged by some of the cardinals to undertake an independent treatise on the subject.⁹⁵ This treatise "De Pauperie Salvatoris" was completed in seven books not earlier than 1353.⁹⁶ The text of the first four books and the table of contents of the last three have been published by Reginald Lane Poole as an appendix to Wycliffe's "De Dominio Divino."⁹⁷

The work is composed in the form of a dialogue. The dedication recounts the circumstances in which it was written, and the first chapter states the problem of which he seeks a solution. Men have attached different meanings to the words "dominion," "property," "possession," "right of using," "use" and the "voluntary renouncement" of the things of this world for God's sake. Hence arose the difference in the rules of the various religious orders. It is therefore desirable to examine thoroughly the true meaning of these words.

⁹² Heimbucher, "Die Orden und Kongregationen der Katholischen Kirche," Vol. I, p. 298 ff. For a reconciling of the Decretals of John XXII and Nich. III, cf. Natalis Alexander, "Hist Eccl.," Vol. VIII, p. 410 ff.

⁹³ "Bull. Rom.," Vol. IV, p. 261 ff. For the difference between the early Spirituals and the Fraticelli cf. Ehrle, *Archiv*, Vols. III and IV.

⁹⁴ Cf. list of writings infra, p. 84.

⁹⁵ These facts are told by Fitzralph himself in the dedication of the "De Pauperie Salvatoris."

⁹⁶ It was dedicated to Pope Innocent VI who was elected in December, 1352.

⁹⁷ "De Dominio Divino Libri Tres," London, 1890. Cf. pp. 257-476. Also Introd., p. xxxiv ff.

The first book treats of dominion, possession and use as found in God and the Angels. The second book treats of original human dominion, namely, that which man had before the fall of Adam. It is in this book that he develops the celebrated doctrine that dominion is founded in grace. In the third book he considers the relation in which original dominion stood to possession and use, and the objects on which it can operate. In the fourth book he treats of property and civil dominion.⁹⁸ In the succeeding books Fitzralph treats of the questions which more immediately concern the Mendicant controversy. Unfortunately these three books have not been published by Mr. Poole as they were not in line with his purpose of showing how Wycliffe was indebted to Fitzralph for his views on dominion. To attempt a reconstruction of his views from the headings of the chapters, which alone are published, would be more than hazardous without a knowledge of his definitions and distinctions; hence we shall be content with merely pointing out the general scope of these books, viz., the fifth, sixth and seventh of the treatise.

The fifth treats "*de principiis ditantibus Deum, angelos bonos et malos, et homines bonos et malos.*" This book is divided into twenty-three chapters.⁹⁹ The sixth book treats "*de gradibus paupertatis,*" and is divided into thirty-seven chapters. It is here that he treats specially of the poverty of Christ and the evangelical poverty of the Friars. The seventh book "*Contrarietates famosas et alias magis occultas inter constitutiones dominorum Summorum Pontificum Nicholai III et Johannis XXII, ac ipsius libellum 'Quoniam vir reprobus,' super paupertatis Christi et Apostolorum ipsius materia, quæ paupertas regulæ ordinis fratrum minorum ascribitur et eisdem, certis traditis documentis, absolvit.*" This book is divided into eighteen chapters.

This work was very likely finished before Fitzralph left Ireland for the last time in 1356.¹⁰⁰ In this year he went to London on some business connected with his diocese, and found

⁹⁸ We could not obtain this work in time to be able to give a complete exposition of his views, as originally intended.

⁹⁹ Table of contents apud Poole, "*De dominio Divino*," p. 264 ff.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Poole, "*De Dominio Divino*," p. xxxvii (Intro.).

there an ardent dispute "*super mendacitate et mendicatione Christi Domini Salvatoris Nostri.*" Being asked several times to preach to the people, he delivered seven or eight sermons in the vernacular, and expressed in public his famous nine conclusions. This he did, however, with the protestation that he did not intend to affirm rashly anything prejudicial to the doctrine of the Church, and that he did not advise the total abolition of the Mendicant Orders, but only a return to the purity of their original institution. Moreover in everything he laid himself under the correction of the Pope.

On account of these nine conclusions and what he said in the London Sermons, the Friars, "*licet frivole,*" appealed to the Holy See.¹⁰¹

Ware says that the guardian of the Franciscans at Armagh, and others both of that order and of the Dominicans, had him cited to Avignon.¹⁰²

The king forbade him, April 1, 1357, to quit the country without special leave,¹⁰³ but this prohibition must have been withdrawn, since he defended his position before the papal court on the eighth of November of that year in the sermon entitled "*Defensorium Curatorum.*"¹⁰⁴ In this he again put forth his nine conclusions and defended them *seriatim*. It may be well to add that he urged these conclusions merely as probable. The first seven conclusions pertain to our present matter. It will be noticed from their contents that a new phrase of the Franciscan controversy is being emphasized, namely, that relating to mendicancy and mendicity.

The first conclusion was: "*Quod Dominus Jesus Christus in sua conversatione humana semper pauper erat, non quia propter se paupertatem dilexit aut voluit.*"

The difference between his adversaries and himself, he relates, is not about the fact that Christ was poor, but about the added modification: *non quia propter se*, etc.

We shall point out briefly his principal arguments for up-

¹⁰¹ "*Defensorium Curatorum,*" ad init., Brown, Appendix, p. 466.

¹⁰² Ware-Harris, Vol. I, p. 82.

¹⁰³ Rymer, "*Fœdera,*" III, pt. I, 352, ed. 1825, cited by Poole; "*Dict. of Nat. Biog.,*" XIX, 196.

¹⁰⁴ Edited by Brown, "*App. ad Fascic.,*" pp. 466-486.

holding this conclusion. (1) To be poor is to be miserable; but nobody loves misery for its own sake. (2) His next argument is drawn from the doctrine of Aristotle: *Nihil est propter se diligibile, nisi quod sublato omni commodo sequente gratuite captaretur.* (3) No effect of sin is lovable propter se. But there would be no poverty if our first parents had not sinned. (4) No privation of good is per se lovable. It seems puerile, he adds, to insist on this, since no one except through deficiency in philosophy or logic would argue the opposite.

The second conclusion was: "*Quod Dominus Noster Jesus Christus nunquam spontanee mendicavit.*"

Such a practise is against God's commandment: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house . . . nor anything that is his (Exod. XX, 17). In Deuteronomy XV, 4, it is said "there shall be no poor nor beggar among you." Again, "*Christus esset hypocrita, apparens mendicus non existens.*" Again, if Christ, the Supreme Pontiff, taught voluntary begging by His example, the Church knowingly erred when she laid down that no one should be promoted to sacred orders without a sufficient title. Again, if Christ begged voluntarily He would have given scandal to the clerical order, since according to the canonical sanctions a begging bishop or cleric brings opprobrium on that order. Again, if Christ begged voluntarily, voluntary begging pertained to the perfection of life. Then why did Christ ordain in the Old Law that priests, in whom there ought to be the greatest perfection of life, should have possessions and tithes? Moreover, the Spouse of Christ would also have erred in admitting the endowment of churches, if mendicity pertains to the perfection of the Gospel. Again, if mendicity pertains to the perfection of Christian life, as the Friars claim, it is wonderful that neither our Lord nor the Holy Spirit (in the Scriptures) has ever instructed us on this. Indeed, Christ commanded the contrary to His disciples when he sent them out to preach the Gospel, viz., that they should get food and drink as the wages of their labor (Luke X, 7); and Christ probably earned His own bread as a carpenter.

We have given here but a few of the reasons put forth to show that Christ did not beg voluntarily.

The third conclusion was: "*Quod Christus nunquam docuit*"

spontanee mendicare." The Acts speak of the things which Christ "began to *do* and to teach" (I, 1). If Christ taught others to beg and did not do so Himself, He would have rendered His doctrine liable to suspicion. All the reasons given above apply here too.

The fourth conclusion was: *Quod Dominus Noster Jesus Christus docuit non debere hominem spontanee mendicare.* "If any man will not work, neither let him eat" (II Thess. III, 10). He also refers to the "*De Opere Monachorum*" of St. Augustine, who attempts to show that labor ought to be preferred to the "*otium contemplationis*," and to the Rule and Testament of St. Francis, who enjoined work on the brethren. Hence, it is wonderful with what effrontery the Friars dare to exercise voluntary begging, or prefer begging to work, contrary to the wishes of their founder. It is to be wondered the more because "*man is born to labor*" (Job V, 7), and begging is contrary to the law of our first institution, in which, had it been preserved, there would never have been any begging. Moreover, Christ performed a miracle rather than beg the didrachma for Himself and Peter (Matth. XVII, 26). From these it can be judged with probability that Christ taught men not to beg voluntarily.

The fifth conclusion was: "*Quod nullius potest prudenter et sancte spontaneam mendicitatem super se assumere perpetuo observandam.*" This conclusion naturally follows from the preceding. Christ, the Apostles, Scripture and the Church dissuade us from begging. Moreover, a person acting thus places himself in the way of temptation according to the words of Solomon: "Give me neither beggary nor riches: give me only the necessities of life: lest perhaps being filled, I should be tempted to deny, and say: who is the Lord? or being compelled by poverty, I should steal, and forswear the name of my God" (Prov. XXX, 8-9); and the words of Ecclesiasticus "Through poverty many have sinned" (XXVII, 1).

The sixth conclusion was: *Quod non est de regula fratrum minorum mendicitatem spontanee servare.*

We found especially noteworthy the fifth chapter of the Rule, and the words of St. Francis in his last will: "I labored with my hands, and I will labor, and I wish firmly that my brethren should work at some honest labor."

The seventh conclusion was: "Quod bulla Domini Alexandri Papæ quarti, quæ magistrorum libellum condemnat, nullam præmissarum conclusionum impugnat." John XXII in the Constitution "Quia Quorundam" says expressly that Pope Nicholas III revoked that Bull and all the letters of Alexander IV in so far as they related to the articles which his own declaration contains. It is evident, moreover, that the strict poverty enjoined by Pope Nicholas III is understood by the Friars to mean mendicity. Even in the Bull itself of Pope Alexander Fitzralph can remember nothing that would militate against his conclusions.

In this brief sketch we have in no wise been able to do justice to the very subtle, if not always sound, reasoning of Fitzralph in the matter of the poverty and mendicancy of the Friars. But even the mere statement of the celebrated nine conclusions (the last two of which we shall consider in the next chapter) subserves the purpose of the historian because it condenses in a few simple sentences the thought and feelings of the parish clergy of the fourteenth century in regard to their rivals in the vineyard of Christ.

St. Francis told his brethren, in his last will, to ask for alms when the price of their labor was not paid them. But many among the Franciscans—how many it is difficult to tell—had very exaggerated notions of the place of mendicancy and mendicity among the virtues. They praised mendicity whether it meant the asking of the price of their labor or not. It is not surprising that a man of Fitzralph's active temperament should grow indignant over a practice like this. But in his role of a special pleader he did not tell us just how prevalent this mere begging was.

More than five centuries have passed away since Fitzralph scored the current exaggerated notions of the Friars in the matter of poverty and mendicancy, but there is yet wanting, as far as we know, a really disinterested and well-balanced treatment of the true place of these practices in the Christian economy. The theologians of the Mendicant Orders, it is true, have treated the matter more or less at length. But they mostly lack that fine sense of equilibrium which takes into account the actual and changing conditions of human society. Secular writers, as a rule, leave the radical points at issue severely alone.

One thing seems certain, that the phenomenon of mendicity as it confronted Fitzralph will never appear in history again. The theoretical grounds on which his position rested did not seem to be very clear even to himself. Yet, even with due account for his prejudices, he must have vaguely felt that his face was turned in the direction pointed out by the finger of social progress. In the spirit of his age, he tried to solve peremptorily with an array of syllogisms a practical problem which was working itself out gradually by the force of actual conditions. This was his weak point, but it was an inevitable weakness, since it is given to few to be right in their conclusions and their arguments.

IV.

Soon after the rise of the Mendicant Orders there came about between them and the diocesan clergy a conflict which raged almost continually for three hundred years. The active nature of the Friars' mission and the privileges they enjoyed made this antagonism almost inevitable.

As to the condition of the parish clergy, it must be admitted that the tone of education among them was low; the ruinous system of Provisions, Patronage, Chantryes and the like had helped to bring about a further lowering of their efficiency. Still the "povre Person of a toun" of Chaucer's Prologue must have had many a prototype in these days. Hemmed in as they were by the monasteries and non-resident, sometimes foreign beneficiaries on the one side, and by the rising Mendicants on the other, they would be more than human if they did not fight for more control in their parishes. The Friars especially were a thorn in their side. For both pride and pocket were touched when their churches were emptied by these more popular rivals.

We have noticed the noble work which the children of St. Francis performed in the thirteenth century; but in the days of their deterioration even good and earnest men might plausibly argue that they had outlived their usefulness, and had become a disorganizing force in the Church.

The conflict between the two parties related to confession, preaching, sepulture, tithes and a host of minor matters. The

privilege of hearing confessions without the permission of the parish priest was, however, the great matter of contention. Before the twelfth century there were few exceptions to the general discipline of the Church that the faithful should confess their sins to the parish priest and him alone.¹⁰⁵ But the contrary custom was evidently creeping in at this time, probably due to the preaching of the Crusades. The famous canon "Omnis utriusque sexus" of the fourth Lateran Council was directed against the abuses connected with this departure from the old discipline. With the advent of the Mendicants an endless dispute arose in regard to the interpretation of this canon. The diocesan clergy maintained that the words "proprius sacerdos" should be taken strictly, whilst the Friars, on the other hand, would have them extended to all those whom the ecclesiastical authorities would approve.¹⁰⁶

The cause of the Friars, as a rule, prevailed before the Holy See; nevertheless, the controversy went on without any cessation. In 1281, Martin IV tried to conciliate the opposing parties by a constitution which permitted the Minorites to hear confessions without permission of the parish priest, but which at the same time required the faithful to confess to their own parish priest once a year according to the decree "Omnis utriusque sexus."¹⁰⁷ But this constitution only shifted the ground of the conflict. The parish priests maintained that the faithful should confess to themselves *the same sins* which they had already confessed to the Friars, whilst the latter denied this obligation. The French clergy sought a decision from Rome, but Pope Nicholas IV left the matter undecided, and it is still in suspense says Evrard in 1292.¹⁰⁸ Popes Boniface VIII, Benedict XI, Clement V and John XXII tried to pour oil on the troubled waters, with what small measure of success we shall see more in detail in the course of this narrative.

The controversy was especially bitter in England about the middle of the fourteenth century,¹⁰⁹ and all the lines of accusa-

¹⁰⁵ Migne, "Theol. Cursus Completus," XX, p. 425 ff.

¹⁰⁶ M. de Launoy, "Dissertation sur le sens du canon 'Omnis utriusque sexus,'" apud Migne, op. cit., p. 430.

¹⁰⁷ Hefele, "Concilien-geschichte," Vol. VI, p. 242.

¹⁰⁸ Apud Migne, l. c.

¹⁰⁹ Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, Vol. VIII, p. 126.

tion against the Friars meet in the powerful plea of Fitzralph. We have already related the proceedings that lead to his citation to Avignon. He protests in the beginning of his "Defensorium" that he does not advise the abolition of the Mendicant Orders, but only that they be reduced to the purity of their original institution; and in everything he lays himself under the correction of the Holy See. His position in regard to the privileges of the Friars is laid down in the last two of the famous nine conclusions. These two conclusions read thus:

"Octava conclusio et prima de privilegiorum materia erat ista, quod pro confessione parochianorum alicujus ecclesiæ faciendæ cum exclusione loci alterius eligibilior est parochialis ecclesia, quam Fratrum oratorium sive ipsorum ecclesia.

"Nona conclusio erat ex secunda in ista materia quod ad confessionem parochianorum cujusvis ecclesiæ uni personæ singulariter faciendam eligibilior est persona ordinarii quam fratris persona."¹¹⁰

The proofs of these two theses occupy the greater part of the Defensorium. He proceeds in the usual scholastic method. The arguments for each thesis are arranged under three general headings, showing that the parish church and the parish priest are *safer* for the spiritual welfare of the penitent, *more useful*, and cause *less inconvenience* than the churches and persons of the Friars. To prove each of these sub-theses he brings forth an appalling array of arguments, drawn from every imaginable source, and expressed with rare vigor and power of speech.

We shall not follow him in his subtleties and syllogisms, but shall take up briefly under their proper headings his reasons for demanding the abolition of the privileges of the Friars.

I. *From the Institution of the Priesthood.*—The parochial churches and the parochial clergy are the ones chosen and prescribed by God for the faithful, and all other churches and pastors are forbidden.¹¹¹ Hence the parish churches should be preferred to those of the Friars, and the parish priests to the persons of the Friars, since the latter are merely permitted by concession of the Supreme Pontiff.

¹¹⁰ Brown, "Append. ad Fasciculus Rerum Expet. et Fug," pp. 466, 467.

¹¹¹ Deut. XII, Levit. IV.

II. *Confessions*.—He argues from the very state of Mendicancy that the Friars should not be allowed to hear confessions. Solomon said "Give me neither beggary, nor riches: give me only the necessities of life."¹¹² There is too much temptation connected with the former states. Now a penitent might reasonably argue thus: why should this Mendicant hear my confession and at the same time desist from acquiring the necessities of life, if he did not expect help from me? Hence he cannot be as independent and equitable a judge in the tribunal of penance as the parish priest who has his fixed salary.

Moreover, from his ideas on Mendicancy the Friar is inclined to impose almsgiving for every kind of sin; whereas each disease requires its proper remedy. Thus when the apostle failed to cast out the devil our Lord said "this kind is not cast out but by prayer and fasting."¹¹³ In this imposition of almsgiving there is also a temptation for the Friars to consult their own interests. That they are influenced by these subtle temptations is confirmed by the fact that after obtaining the privilege of hearing confessions the Friars everywhere build stately edifices, but never before that. You never hear of their imposing these alms for the support of the parish church, or for the repair of bridges or highways. Hence, it may be judged with a good show of reason that their anxiety to hear confessions is dictated to a great extent by their own self-interest.¹¹⁴

This tendency to build was strenuously resisted by the stricter party among the Friars. Some great Franciscan Houses, however, arose, such as those at London and York, which might vie with the Benedictine Monasteries.¹¹⁵ But Mr. Brewer points out that generally their buildings, even to the last, retained their primitive squat, low and meagre proportions, and that rigid poverty was the rule rather than the exception.¹¹⁶

As to the repair of highways and bridges it seems likely that each village took care of its own, and that the owners of the

¹¹² Proverbs XXX, 8.

¹¹³ Matth. XVI.

¹¹⁴ Brown, App., p. 469.

¹¹⁵ Gasquet, "Henry VIII and the English Monasteries," Vol. 11, p. 238 ff., 6th edition.

¹¹⁶ "Monum. Franc.," Vol. I, Introd., pp. xviii, xx note.

scattered properties likewise attended to the means of communication between their estates. But Thorold Rogers admits that the evidence "as to local taxation for roads up to the sixteenth century is entirely negative."¹¹⁷ Road-making and bridge-building were also included among meritorious acts of charity, and Mr. Cutts states that the calendar of chantries, etc., contains a number of endowments which were given or bequeathed for these purposes.¹¹⁸ Fitzralph's words would seem to argue a wide range of charity in this regard, which had fallen off through the encroachments of the Friars.

The Friars are accused of violating the decree "Religiosi" of Pope Clement V which forbids all Religious, under pain of excommunication, to absolve from sentences pronounced through provincial statutes or synodal statutes of any kind.¹¹⁹ The Irish primate thinks that in his own diocese of Armagh there are two thousand excommunicated annually through the sentences against murderers, public robbers, incendiaries and the like, of whom scarcely forty in the year come to him or his penitentiaries. But he adds, "*recipiunt sacramenta omnes tales ut ceteri, et absolvuntur et absoluti dicuntur, nec per alios quam per Fratres, non dubium, cum nulli alii absolvant, absoluti creduntur.*"¹²⁰

He brings up the contention in regard to the decree "*Omnis utriusque sexus*" in the following proposition: *quisque parochianus confessus Fratribus, ordinariis neglectis juxta potestatem quam habent, post confessionem hujusmodi remanet in peccato mortali et a nullo peccato mortali absolvitur.*¹²¹ The reason of this is that a penitent who neglects to go to his parish priest for a whole year violates the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council, and hence is in mortal sin. Evidently as long as he remains in this state his confessions to the Friars will be fruitless. He does not deny the power of the Friars to absolve nor of the Popes to grant them this power, but at the same time he maintains that the precept of the Lateran Council still binds.

Confession to the Friars is a matter of free choice; confes-

¹¹⁷ "The Economic Interpretation of History," p. 483, 1889.

¹¹⁸ "Parish Priests and their People in the Middle Ages in England," p. 527.

¹¹⁹ Clementin V, tit. VII, Ch. I.

¹²⁰ Brown, App., p. 468.

¹²¹ Brown, App., p. 470.

sion to the parish priest once a year is a matter of precept. But the former does not dispense with the latter. Hence the Primate escapes the condemnation of John de Polliaco,¹²² and at the same time upholds the old contention against the Friars. He cites the decree of Martin IV, mentioned above (p. 52), and also the decree "Inter Cunctas" of Benedict IX,¹²³ which bids the Friars to exhort their penitents to confess the same sins at least once a year to their own priests. He does not add, however, that this is enjoined by Pope Benedict not because it is necessary, but because it is useful.

The relations of the canon "Omnis Utriusque" with such decrees of the Popes were a matter of continual dispute between the Friars and the parish clergy in the fourteenth century; and more than fifty years after Fitzralph's death we find the University of Oxford asking for a clearing up of the ambiguity in the matter.¹²⁴

Another evil which he lays at the door of this privilege is the levity which it occasioned in the Friars, and the scandal arising therefrom: "Procurantur (contra regulam S. Francisci) ut audire possint concilia secretissima mulierum, reginarum et aliarum omnium indistincte, etiam capite inclinato ad caput multum obedienter,¹²⁵ non insequentes vestigia Sancti Job qui dicit: pepigi foedus cum oculis ne cogitarem de virgine: ita ut per tale consortium jam cum pulcherrimis dominabus philosophantur in cameris: unde per orbem scandala, quæ nolo exprimere, de fratribus sunt exorta patenter (ut multum videtur) per abusum hujus privilegii."¹²⁶

III. *Sepulture*.—(1) In regard to sepulture Fitzralph accuses the Friars of violating the decree "Animarum" of Boniface VIII,¹²⁷ by which the penalty of interdict is decreed against the churches and cemeteries of all religious who induce others by vow, oath or compact¹²⁸ to choose graves in their churchyards or change the location when already chosen else-

¹²² "Decree Vas Electionis, Extrav. Cm.," Bk. V, Tit. II, Ch. II.

¹²³ "Extrav. Com.," Lib. V, Tit. VII, Ch. I.

¹²⁴ Wilkin's "Concilia," III, p. 364; "Articuli concernentes reform. Eccl.," No. 32.

¹²⁵ Goldast has "irreverenter."

¹²⁶ Brown, App., p. 479.

¹²⁷ "Lib. Sextus," Bk. III, Tit. XII, Ch. I.

¹²⁸ De Ferraris, "Bibliotheca ad v. Sepulturam," Vol. VII, p. 158.

where.¹²⁹ That this decree was not universally observed is evident from the fact that later Clement V decreed a further penalty of excommunication against those who should violate it.¹³⁰ He accuses them of violating the decree "Dudum" of Clement V, which requires the Friars to give the parish clergy a fourth not only of all funeral perquisites, but of all offerings of every kind.¹³¹

This fourth, adds the Primate, is often never paid: "quam quartam de multis legatis, donatis, atque oblati Fratres non solvunt curatis sed infinitis caautlis adhibitis, ut curati asserunt, ipsi Fratres sibi appropriant, diversis quæsitis coloribus, quod inter eos et Fratres quasi ubique in populis Christianis sunt lites, contentiones et jurgia infinita ita quod in locis quamplurimis a verbis pervenitur ad verbera et in mentibus caritas procul abjicitur."¹³²

IV. *Tithes and Preaching*.—In the matter of tithes Fitzralph accuses the Friars of incurring the excommunication inflicted by Clement V for appropriating the tithes or acquiring them under artful pretexts.¹³³ He says that by the reception of legacies and donations from which they never gave any tithes, they averted the due revenues of the Church.¹³⁴ Furthermore, he accuses them of violating the decree "Cupientes" of Clement V by which all religious are excommunicated, who in their sermon or otherwise withdraw their hearers from the payment of the tithes due to the Church.¹³⁵ For, he says, they affirm in public "quod nec de elemosynis panis et vini, cerevisiæ aut aliarum rerum hujusmodi modicarum teneantur donantes in decimando lucra mercationis ipsorum aliquid decimare. Ego vero e contrario affirmavi quod de parvis sicut de magnis donariis tenentur inter lucra sua mentionem facere."¹³⁶ The Friars are also charged with neglecting to instruct their penitents on the duty of paying the tithes, as this decree of Pope Clement requires.

¹²⁹ Brown, App., p. 467.

¹³⁰ Clement, Lib. V, Tit. VIII, Ch. III.

¹³¹ Clement, Lib. III, Tit. VII, Ch. II.

¹³² Brown, App., p. 472.

¹³³ Clement, Lib. III, Tit. VIII, Ch. I.

¹³⁴ Brown, App., p. 468.

¹³⁵ Clement, Lib. V, Tit. VIII, Ch. III.

¹³⁶ Brown, App., p. 469.

The parish priests were indeed put between two fires by the Minorites in the matter of tithes. The more radical of the Spirituals, who laid special stress on the doctrine of evangelical poverty, preached against *all* endowments and tithes as contrary to the spirit of the Gospel; whilst the Conventuals, on the other hand, indirectly lessened the revenues of the parish church by the endowments and legacies which they themselves received.

V. Inducing Young Boys to Join the Order.—One of the most serious of Fitzralph's accusations against the Friars was the charge of undue pressure in inducing young boys to join the order. Because they cannot deceive grown men, he relates, they allure these boys by deceit and trifling presents to join the order, and then deny them the liberty of leaving. They cannot even speak with their own parents without being under the custody and consequent fear of the Friars. He cites the story of an Englishman who lately told him that his son, a boy under thirteen years of age, was thus kidnapped at Oxford, and that he could not speak to him unless under the custody of the Friars.

The result of all this was an appalling falling off in the number of students. In the English schools the lay people took away their children altogether, as they would rather see their sons farmers than thus lost to them forever. Thus in Oxford there were formerly, even in his own time, thirty thousand students, who have now dwindled down to less than six thousand owing principally to this practice of the Friars.¹³⁷ It is scarcely necessary to remark that these figures are either misprinted or greatly exaggerated.¹³⁸

But however exaggerated the statements of Fitzralph may be, it is evident that the Friars had fallen into the mistake of too great proselyting zeal, and that anxiety to increase their numbers had become a kind of mania.

There is a story told in the Register of Bishop Stafford, in the year 1411, of the detaining of a young boy against his own and his parents' wishes, which is even more offensive than that

¹³⁷ Brown, App., p. 473.

¹³⁸ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," Vol. II, pt. II, p. 581 ff.

told above by Fitzralph.¹³⁹ Richard de Bury grows indignant over the same practice. "You draw boys into your religion with hooks of apples, as the people commonly report, whom having professed, you do not instruct in doctrines by compulsion and fear as their age requires, but maintain them to go upon beggarly excursions, and suffer them to consume the time in which they might learn, in catching at the favors of their friends, to the offence of their parents, the danger of the boys, and the detriment of the Order."¹⁴⁰

No doubt a certain amount of proselyting is a practical necessity for religious orders, but the abuse of the practice is rather repugnant. However in considering the abuses mentioned here we should remember the havoc played by the terrible contemporary scourge of the Black Death. William of Worcester records in the Register of the Franciscans at Bodwin that in the General Chapter held at Lyons in 1351 it was computed that the Order had lost 13,883 members in Europe through this ravaging disease.¹⁴¹ Fitzralph died at Avignon without effecting any reform in this matter, but the University of Oxford took things into its own hands by passing a statute against the admission into the Mendicant colleges of boys under eighteen years of age.¹⁴² The Friars triumphed over the University, however, in the Parliament of 1366,¹⁴³ and we find the charge brought forward again by the University in 1414 in its "articuli concernentes reformationem Ecclesiae."¹⁴⁴

VI. *Monopoly of Books.*—Fitzralph states also that the Friars buy up all the books on the market so that poor students find it impossible to obtain any. He had three or four students in Oxford himself, one of whom had to return home because he could not get a copy of the Bible or other suitable theological works and he speaks as if he expected the others home at any time.¹⁴⁵ Richard de Bury commends the zeal of the early

¹³⁹ Cf. Capes, "The English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," p. 319.

¹⁴⁰ "Philobiblion," p. 52. New York, 1899.

¹⁴¹ Gasquet, "Henry VIII and the English Monasteries," Vol. I, p. 3.

¹⁴² Quoted at length by Little, "Grey Friars at Oxford," p. 80.

¹⁴³ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," Vol. II, pt. II, p. 385.

¹⁴⁴ Wilkin's "Concilia," Vol. III, p. 364.

¹⁴⁵ Brown, App., p. 474.

Friars in collecting books, and acknowledges his own indebtedness to them.¹⁴⁶ But elsewhere he grows wrathful over their withdrawal "from the study and paternal care of books by a threefold superfluous care, namely, of their bellies, clothing, and houses."¹⁴⁷ Before the time of Fitzralph the Friars had certainly an advantage over their secular rivals in the matter of books,¹⁴⁸ but the statement of the Primate that in every convent there was a grand noble library must have been true no longer in the sixteenth century; for John Leland states that in the Franciscan houses there were cobwebs in the library, and moths and book-worms, but little more.¹⁴⁹ The flagging of library enthusiasm and the stress of circumstances had no doubt done their work.

VII. *Undue Vexation of Litigants.*—The Friars are also accused of undue vexation of priests and others who have lawsuits with them.

When they have two conservatories they cite their opponents before the more distant one, that thus they might desist from pressing the case in order to avoid the consequent inconvenience. The Primate states that this has often happened in the Province of Armagh—*uti aliqui in ista curia præsentis affirmant, et est super hoc fama communis.*¹⁵⁰ This accusation recalls a passage in the decree "Religiosi" of Clement V; *Districte inhibemus ne . . . personas ecclesiasticas, præsertim coram iudicibus delegatis a nobis, suam contra eos justitiam prosequentes vexare indebite ac ad loca plura et præsertim multum remota convenire præsumant.*¹⁵¹

VIII. *They Are Brazen Beggars.*—This is the next accusation brought forth by Fitzralph, and his graphic description of their mode of begging is well worth reading. "*Jam enim istis temporibus non potuit magnus aut mediocris in clero et populo vix cibum assumere, nisi tales non vocati affuerint mendicantes; non more pauperum petentes ad portas vel ostia humiliter,*

¹⁴⁶ "Philobiblion," p. 71 ff.

¹⁴⁷ "Philobiblion," p. 49.

¹⁴⁸ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," Vol. I, p. 497.

¹⁴⁹ Cited by Capes, "English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," p. 319.

¹⁵⁰ Brown, App., p. 472.

¹⁵¹ Clement, Lib. V, Tit., III, Ch. I.

ut St. Franciscus in testamento præcepit et docuit, mendicando; sed curias sive domos sine verecundia penetrantes et inibi hospitantes nullatenus invitati edunt et bibunt quæ apud eos reperiunt; secum nihilominus aut grana aut similia aut panes aut carnes seu caseos (etiãsi in domo non fuerint nisi duo) secum extorquendo reportant; nec quisquam poterit eis denegare nisi verecundiam naturalem abjiciat."¹⁵² Chaucer tells the same story in a less earnest vein when he says of the Frere:

"He was the beste beggere in his hous . . .

For thogh a widwe hadde, noght a sho,

So pleasaunt was his 'In principio,'

Yet wolde he have a farthing, er he wente."¹⁵³

There is no doubt that the mendicancy of the Friars had often enough degenerated into mere shameless begging to call forth the indignation of men like Fitzralph and the satire of men like Chaucer. The professional tramp of to-day, to whom work is the "summum malum," would be sure to have donned the grey habit in the fourteenth century as the easiest way of making a living. But we are far from attributing this ugly feature to the general body of the order.

IX. *They Are Wonderful Gad-Abouts.*—This is a feature which we find continually cropping up in the popular descriptions of the Friar, though it is not always meant in a reproachful sense. One of the best of this type is Salimbene of Parma,¹⁵⁴ whose chronicle throws so much white light on the social life of the middle of the thirteenth century. Of course, there was a great body of men in the order whom this description would ill fit, but the popular character of the mission of Friars Minor made the type sufficiently marked to elicit special attention. As they were continually travelling from place to place, they always had the latest gossip at their fingers' ends, and might be said to have filled, in a way, the role of the newspaper of to-day.

X. *Miscellaneous Reasons for Preferring the Parish Priest to the Friar.*—In going to confession to the parish priest and in

¹⁵² Brown, App., p. 474.

¹⁵³ "Prologue to the Canterbury Tales."

¹⁵⁴ "Sons of Francis," p. 252 ff., London, 1902.

the parish church you have the merit not only of going to confession, but also of going to confession to the person and in the place appointed by God and the common law of the Church. Moreover, there are more parishioners than Friars, hence you shall (or should) get the benefit of more prayers by going to the parish church. The parish priests are bound by more ties to the people and hence are more devoted to their interests than the roving Friars who are here to-day and away to-morrow.¹⁵⁵ Access is more easily had to the parish priest than to the strange Friar, especially in nocturnal sick-calls when access cannot be had to the latter. It is well that the confessor should know the previous life of his penitents that he may be able to advise them more advantageously. There is more shame (and hence more merit) in confessing one's sins to the parish priest than to a stranger. In the case of a man and wife it is much better that the same confessor should hear both, just as it is better to have one physician for two diseased members of the same body than to have one for each. Another result of these privileges is that the parish priests no longer know the faces of their own flocks.¹⁵⁶ The abuses of the privileges of the Friars bring contempt upon the parish priests and lack of devotion and shame among the faithful.

XI. *These Privileges Are Harmful to the Friars Themselves.*—They engender avarice; for the Friars obtain only those privileges to which temporal advantages are annexed, namely those relating to confession, sepulture and the like. They engender pride. Preaching and hearing confessions are offices of honor and dignity; whereas the Friars pretend to make a special practice of humility. These privileges are an occasion to the Friars of injuries and uncharitableness toward the parish priests.¹⁵⁷

He accuses the Franciscans especially of departing from the spirit of their rule. They hold on till death to these privileges, though the order was instituted by St. Francis without them.¹⁵⁸ And no one doubts that observance becomes easier

¹⁵⁵ Brown, App., p. 468.

¹⁵⁶ Brown, App., p. 472.

¹⁵⁷ Brown, App., p. 474.

¹⁵⁸ Brown, App., p. 475 ff.

and more lax, and merit less, when they have the privilege of preaching, hearing confessions, burying the dead, and appropriating to themselves three fourths of all the perquisites. Hence by procuring these privileges they are looking back after putting their hand to the plough.¹⁵⁹ They have also relaxed the rule in the manner of receiving candidates for the order. This power was accorded only to the provincial ministers.¹⁶⁰ But now any Friar may receive a person into the order.¹⁶¹ Moreover, they violate the clause which requires that the ministers examine the candidates carefully on the faith and the sacraments of the Church,¹⁶² because scarcely any one comes to them but youngsters who know very little in which to be examined. "Et nihilominus vix reperitur fratrum locus notabilis, quin sit ibi puerorum infra decennium conventus unus aut saltem dimidius."¹⁶³ St. Francis bids them in his will to show reverence to the priests; but they do not carry out his wishes.¹⁶⁴

The Rule enjoins "that the Brethren must never preach in the bishoprick of any bishop if he opposes it."¹⁶⁵ But this clause also has been set aside. Moreover, St. Francis forbids the Brethren "to demand any letter of the Roman Curia, either for a church or for any other place, nor under pretext of preaching,"¹⁶⁶ whereas in the grant of the privileges themselves we find the words "Vestris precibus inclinati."¹⁶⁷ Indeed, they violate their rule by receiving Holy Orders at all. According to the Rule they must be truly *Mendici*, and hence have no title for ordination.

The Primate thus proceeds at special length against the Friars Minor "quia ipsi in Londiniis inchoarunt negotium, occasionem aliis ordinibus ministrantes. Et quia ipsi præ ceteris de perfectione evangelica disputantes eam spontaneæ mendicitati ascribunt."¹⁶⁸ It appears truly wonderful to him that

¹⁵⁹ Rule, Ch. II.

¹⁶⁰ Rule, Ch. II, in prin.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Bull of Pope Innocent IV, 1245, "Bull. Rom.," III, p. 520.

¹⁶² Rule, l. c.

¹⁶³ Brown, App., p. 476.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. "Will of St. Francis" apud Le Monnier, p. 488 ff.

¹⁶⁵ Rule, Ch. IX.

¹⁶⁶ Le Monnier, p. 490.

¹⁶⁷ F. g., in Bull of Pope Innocent IV, 1249, we find the words: vestris supplicationibus inclinati, "Bull. Rom.," III, p. 542.

¹⁶⁸ Brown, App., p. 478.

St. Francis should have instituted a better road to human perfection than the omnipotent, all-good, and all wise God Himself established in the primeval institution of man. For it is evident that our first parents did not follow the practice of mendicancy when they were placed in the garden of Eden.

V.

Such is in brief Fitzralph's impeachment of the Friars. In treating of the more serious of the charges we have already made such comment as we thought necessary to give them their proper historical background and to help us in appraising the attitude of the Primate. But it may be well to illustrate in a more general way the temper and bearing of the contemporaries or quasi-contemporaries of the great Irish prelate in so far as they voice the discontent elicited by the encroachments of the Friars. It is hardly necessary to speak of the Universities. They grew mainly out of the desire for higher education for the secular clergy, and naturally became the rallying points of the subsequent struggle with the mendicants.¹⁶⁹

This struggle is also reflected in the legislation of the Church. In 1300 Pope Boniface VIII testified to the grave discord existing between the parochial clergy and the Friars, and decreed measures of conciliation in his famous Bull "Super Cathedram," which confirmed the privileges of the Friars, but required permission from the local prelates for the hearing of confessions, and ordered a fourth of all offerings to be given to the parochial clergy.¹⁷⁰

Benedict XI a few years later declared that this Bull only caused greater discord than ever, and consequently revoked it. He decreed among other things that the permission of the local prelates was not necessary for those hearing confessions.¹⁷¹ But Clement V, a few years after, republished the Bull "Super Cathedram" because the legislation of Benedict XI had only further increased the discord.

We hear murmuring voices among the clergy of Italy in 1259, at the council of Ravenna, when some of them complain

¹⁶⁹ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," I, 369 ff.; II, 378 et passim.

¹⁷⁰ Clement, Lib. III, Tit. VII, Ch. II.

¹⁷¹ "Extrav. Com.," Lib. V, Tit. VII, Ch. I.

that they cannot raise the subsidy demanded by the Pope for the war against the Tartars, because of the encroachments of the Friars. The Friars do not preach in favor of the tithes; they hear confessions which should be made to the priests; they bury the parishioners; and they usurp the office of preaching. It must be added, however, that the Bishop of Parma stood up and defended the religious, giving high praise to their good work.¹⁷²

Turning to Germany we find the Fathers of the Provincial Synod of Salzburg in 1274 taking away all privileges granted by themselves or their predecessors in regard to confessions, indulgences and the like. The reason is that these privileges had disturbed the discipline of the Church.¹⁷³ A subsequent synod of Salzburg asked the Pope in 1300 for a fuller explanation of the Bull "Super cathedram," since the Mendicants did not want to observe it.¹⁷⁴

In the preparation for the council of Lyons held in the year 1274, Bishop Bruno of Olmütz advised a withdrawal of these privileges. He complained that the Friars were getting all pastoral duties into their hands except those that were disagreeable, and were monopolizing the legacies of the faithful and the drawing up of wills. He also accused them of disparaging the priests and of claiming unwarranted power of indulgences.¹⁷⁵ In 1282 the Archbishop of Rouen and the Bishop of Amiens tried to devise means of grappling with the privileges of the Mendicants, and mentioned an assembly of Prelates at Paris which suspended these privileges on account of their unwarranted extension.¹⁷⁶ A few years later (1287), we find the Provincial Council of Rheims ordering a collection to defray the expenses of prosecuting a suit at Rome against the Mendicants who unduly extended the privileges granted to them by Martin IV.¹⁷⁷

When we cross the channel to England we find the same note of rancor and opposition. No doubt the Friars came in

¹⁷² Mansi, XXIII, col. 993-4.

¹⁷³ Mansi, XXIV, col. 138.

¹⁷⁴ Hefele, "Conciliengeschichte," Vol. VI, p. 375.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 130.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 226.

¹⁷⁷ Mansi, Vol. XXIV, Col. 847-8.

for their share in the trenchant philippic of the Synod of Exeter in 1287 against the quæstors and pardoners.¹⁷⁸ In a letter of 1297 Archbishop Winchelsey voices the complaints of a provincial council held in London shortly before in which the Mendicants are accused of presuming to interpret the decrees of the Pope in doubtful matters, of absolving from reserved censures without permission and of unduly extending their powers in the confessional; from which it follows that the prelates cannot recognize the faces of their people, who are estranged from them by lack of intercourse and by contempt, and thus escape the salutary discipline of the Church.¹⁷⁹ There is a local flavor in the mandate of Boniface VIII in 1303 to the Bishop of Bath and Wells to protect the rectors and curates of parish churches in the city and diocese of Exeter against the claims of the Friars to preach, hear confessions, and bury the dead without their permission.¹⁸⁰

Even after the time of Fitzralph the old rancor was kept up. In 1366 Archbishop Langham (of Canterbury) states that grave complaints had reached him to the effect that certain of the Friars Minor and Dominicans preached publicly in their sermons that they have a right (*de jure communi*) to preach in the parish churches without asking or obtaining permission, and to hear the confessions of all comers and absolve them even in cases specially reserved to himself, thereby causing grave scandal among the faithful. He accordingly forbids them to exercise these functions unless they can show a privilege from the Holy See or letters patent from the Bishop.¹⁸¹ In 1414 the University of Oxford in its "*Articuli concernentes reformationem Ecclesiæ*" resumes most of the old charges against the Friars.¹⁸² In Fitzralph's native country we find evidence of the same complaints. Thus, many of the accusations brought against the Friars by Fitzralph had been already put forth by the provincial synod of Dublin in 1348.¹⁸³

If we turn to the chroniclers of these times we shall find, for example, Matthew Paris bewailing the loss of authority of

¹⁷⁸ Wilkins, "*Concilia*," Vol. II, p. 154.

¹⁷⁹ Wilkins, "*Concilia*," Vol. II, p. 228.

¹⁸⁰ Bliss, "*Calendar*," I, p. 608.

¹⁸¹ Wilkins, "*Concilia*," III, p. 64.

¹⁸² Wilkins, "*Concilia*," III, p. 364 ff.

¹⁸³ Wilkins, "*Concilia*," II, p. 746 ff.

the ordinary preachers and the audacity assumed by many of the people because they were no longer obliged to confess their sins to their own priests, but could flee under the sheltering wings of the passing Friars.¹⁸⁴ And the author of the *Chronicon Angliæ* utters a mournful "proh dolor!" at the thought of Fitzralph's failure in the attempt to abolish the privileges of the Friars.¹⁸⁵

The pictures of the Friar given in the popular literature of the time are scarcely more encouraging. Indeed we should not expect it. For the satirists give us for the most part but the shady side of clerical life.

Chaucer's Frere is an active, pleasant flatterer who sings well, lisps affectively and can play a tune on the rote. He is loved by the tavern-keepers, sellers of victuals, free-holders and "worthy women of the town." But he avoids the lepers and the poor, and associates with those only from whom there is something to gain.

"Ful swetely herde he confessioun,
And pleasaunt was his absolucion;
He was an esy man to yeve penaunce
Ther as he wiste to hav a good pitaunce;
For unto a povre odre for to yive
Is signe that a man is wel y-shrive.
For if he yaf, he dorste make avaunt,
He wiste that a man was repentaunt.
For many a man so hard is of his herte,
He may nat wepe al-though him sore smerte.
Therefore, in stede of weping and preyeres
Men moot yeve silver to the povre freres."¹⁸⁶

For other samples of this literature the reader may consult the *Somnour's Tale* of Chaucer, *Piers Ploughman's Vision*,¹⁸⁷ and indeed the secular literature of the time in general.

We have here brought into relief a number of protests covering nearly all Europe in point of territory, and extending

¹⁸⁴ Paris, "English History," Vol. III, p. 149, tr. by J. A. Giles, London, 1852-54.

¹⁸⁵ "Chronicon Angliæ ad an. 1358," p. 38.

¹⁸⁶ Chaucer, "Prologue to the Canterbury Tales."

¹⁸⁷ "The Vision and Creed of Pier's Ploughman," ed. Thos. Wright, 2 vols., London, 1887 (2d ed.).

over the century before and the half century after the death of Fitzralph. Only thus can we get a true idea of the universality and persistency of the controversy, and the true inwardness of the radical position taken by the Irish Primate.

There is evidence of extremely forced relations between the Mendicants and the local clergy. When the Church gave the Friars full sway in Europe, she evidently saw an urgent need for their labor. When the vineyards of the parish clergy were entered by others it was because they themselves had neglected to till them. But the state of affairs thus brought about was certainly abnormal, and the tendency to hark back to the ordinary discipline of the Church became more intensified as time wore on and the Friars themselves had gone the road of deterioration. It is in the light of these considerations that we must weigh the motives of Fitzralph and judge his character. There is no need of examining the intrinsic merits of each item in the controversy. No doubt there is much to be said on both sides.

The attack of the Irish prelate produced many responses on the part of the Friars. The best known is that of the English Franciscan, Roger of Conway, and is entitled "*Defensio Mendicantium*."¹⁸⁸ It would be interesting to enter into a detailed statement of his defense, but our primary purpose is not with the controversy but with Fitzralph. We shall point out, however, some reserves that must be made in dealing with the charges generally made against the Friars of this period.

1. We must remember the general slackening of the bonds of society brought about by the ravages of the Black Death. When the fell disease swept over Europe the Friars died by thousands at their posts of duty, but the plague reacted sadly on the personnel of the Order.

2. These accusations are penned for the most part by unfriendly hands; and the Friars left little written material behind them, like the great Benedictine annals, to justify their daily conduct.

3. The ideal of St. Francis was so high and unearthly, and the Friar moved so openly before the eyes of the world, that it

¹⁸⁸ Printed with Fitzralph's "*Defensorium*" at Lyons, 1496, and in Goldast's "*Monarchia*."

was an easy matter for the satirist to find some weakness on which to dilate.

4. However much the parish priests resented the encroachments of the Friar, and however much the people hit off his frailties with their rude jests, it is certain that he was popular with the masses of the people even on the eve of the dissolution of the monasteries.¹⁸⁹

VI.

We may now return to the outcome of Fitzralph's plea at Avignon. "A notarial instrument of the case, of which there is a copy in the Bodleian MS. 158, f. 174, contains the information that Fitzralph's case was entrusted by the Pope to four cardinals for examination, November 14, and gives the particulars on which this should proceed. But unfortunately we have no record of the conclusion arrived at."¹⁹⁰

We can find no proof for the statement of Irish Church historians,¹⁹¹ that Fitzralph was expressly condemned or silenced except the unsupported word of Wadding.¹⁹² It is true, however, that Pope Innocent VI sent a letter to the English bishops on October 1, 1358, forbidding any innovation to be made, or any molestation of the Friars in their functions whilst the suit of Fitzralph was pending before the Holy See.¹⁹³ It is also indisputed that the Friars were confirmed in their privileges.¹⁹⁴ But it is generally agreed that Fitzralph died in peace at Avignon before any formal pronouncement on his "conclusions" was given by the Holy See.

It has been stated in a previous chapter that the dispute between Fitzralph and the Friars was more of English than of Irish import. It is significant in this connection that during his stay at Avignon Fitzralph got financial support from the clergy of Lincoln diocese, of which he had formerly been chan-

¹⁸⁹ Gasquet, "Henry VIII and the English Monasteries," *passim*.

¹⁹⁰ Poole, "Dict. of Nat. Biog., XIX, 196. See also the papal letter of 1358 mentioned below.

¹⁹¹ E. g., Brennan, "Ecl. History of Ireland," p. 337, Dublin, 1864; Malone, "Church History of Ireland," II, 34, 35, 3d ed.

¹⁹² *Annales Minorum*, VIII, 129.

¹⁹³ "Bullarium Ordinis Prædicatorum," Tom. II, p. 250; Wadding, l. c., p. 128.

¹⁹⁴ Walsingham, "Hist. Anglic.," I, 285.

cellor;¹⁹⁵ and Wycliffe countenances a rumor that the English bishops in general contributed towards his expenses.¹⁹⁶

The *Chronicon Angliæ*, under the year 1358, stating that a great controversy had arisen between Fitzralph and the English clergy on the one hand, and the four Mendicant orders on the other, bewails the fact that, through the default of the promises of the English clergy and the abundant resources of the Friars, the latter obtained a confirmation and even an extension of their privileges whilst the suit was still pending.¹⁹⁷ According to Harris it is stated in a fragment of Henry of Knighton that the Archbishop had a subsidy from his clergy to maintain his suit at Avignon, and that the Abbot of St. Alban's was his proctor there.¹⁹⁸

But the question was more than a matter of local importance. Fitzralph made no restrictions in his plea for the abolition of the privileges of the Orders. His failure in this attempt did not, however, remove the controversy. Many afterwards took up even a more radical attitude than his. Thus in 1409 we find Pope Alexander V restating the discipline of the Bull "Super Cathedran," and condemning again the errors of John de Poliacó, which some maintained to be true notwithstanding the condemnation of John XXII (who, they say, was a heretic at the time), as well as some new errors of the same tenor.¹⁹⁹

In the course of time the parochial clergy gradually gained their point, and the relations between the two parties took on their present more agreeable aspect. Thus in the sixteenth century we find various councils going back to the legislation of the fourth council of the Lateran, such as the council of Milan in 1565,²⁰⁰ and the council of Rheims in 1583.²⁰¹

Fitzralph was advocating a course which, sooner or later, to a less or greater extent, had to be taken. Like a volunteer

¹⁹⁵ Reg. Gynewell, apud Tanner, "Bibliotheca Britt.," p. 284, note C.

¹⁹⁶ "Fascic. Zizan," p. 284; Trialogus IV, 36, p. 375, ed. G. V. Lechler cited by Poole, "Dict. of Nat. Biog.," XIX, p. 197.

¹⁹⁷ "Chronicon Angliæ," p. 38.

¹⁹⁸ Ware-Harris, I, p. 83.

¹⁹⁹ Wadding, Vol. IX, p. 508.

²⁰⁰ Mansi, XXXIV A, col. 21.

²⁰¹ Mansi, XXXIV A, col. 691, confirmed by Gregory XIII; Mansi, l. c., 715.

army the Friars had been called into the field for a special emergency. They had done their work, and done it well. In the mind of Fitzralph the time had come for their disbandment. Having lost their primitive zeal, he considered them a disorganizing element in the work of ministering to the spiritual needs of the faithful, neither doing that work properly themselves nor allowing the parish priests, the ordinary shepherds, to do it. He saw that the existing relations between the diocesan clergy and the Friars bred only scandal and dissension. The former were the pastors designated by the canon law of the Church. Rightly or wrongly he also thought that they were the ones best fitted for feeding the flock.

Two hundred years afterwards, when the old discipline was being reinstated, his plea would have caused little comment. His attitude was dictated by no petty personal dislike to the Friars. It was no mere domestic quarrel, as some writers would maintain.²⁰² His earnestness and ability in presenting the claims of the parochial clergy had made him the spokesman in a cause of universal interest.

In his theoretical views even Wadding admits that he sinned rather "*intellectus exuberantia quam voluntatis perversitate.*"²⁰³ His nine conclusions were urged merely as probable propositions, and in everything he laid himself under the correction of the Holy See.²⁰⁴

He was a man of wonderful activity, of powerful and subtle reasoning and of rare oratorical powers; exuberant perhaps in his fancies, and in the heat of argument prone to exaggeration, but a man of elevated motives, imbued with a spirit of filial obedience to the Church and sincerely devoted to her general interests.

JOHN J. GREANEY.

PITTSBURG, PA.

PRINCIPAL WRITINGS OF RICHARD FITZRALPH.

A. PRINTED.

Defensorium Curatorum. Printed by John Trechsel, Lyons, 1496; also in Edward Brown's "*Fasciculus Rerum Expetendarum et Fugiendarum*," II, 466-486;

²⁰² "*Irish Eccl. Record*," I, 528.

²⁰³ "*Ann. Min.*," VIII, p. 129.

²⁰⁴ "*Defensorium Curatorum*, ad init."

London, 1690; in Melchior Goldast's "Monarchia S. Romani Imperii," II, 1392 ff. Frankfurt, 1614. It is also printed elsewhere.

- De Pauperie Salvatoris.** The first four books of this treatise with the chapter-heads of the remaining three, are published by Reginald Lane Poole in his edition of Wycliffe's "De Dominio Divino," pp. 257-476. London, 1890.
- Summa In Quæstionibus Armenorum.** Edited by John Sudoris together with four of the sermons preached at St. Paul's Cross, London, 1356-57, and printed by Jean Petit at Paris in 1511.

B. IN MANUSCRIPT.

- Sermons:** The Bodleian Ms. 144 contains no less than eighty-eight of his sermons in full or in reports. There are also several minor collections, e. g., *Sermones de Tempore et de Sanctis*. New College, Oxford, XC 2. *De Laudibus Sanctæ Deiparæ Trin.* Coll., Dublin and elsewhere.
- Propositio ex Parte Prælatorum et Omnium Curatorum Totius Ecclesiæ coram Papa in Pleno Consistorio . . . adversus Ordines Mendicantes.** Presented July 5, 1350. Bodl. MS. 144, f. 251 b. He wrote many other minor tracts against the mendicants, among them a reply to Roger Conway. Cfr. Tanner, *Bibliotheca*.
- Propositio ex Parte Illustris Principis Domini Regis Edwardi III in Consistorio pro Gratia Jubileæ Ejusdem Domini Regis Populo Obtinenda.** Bodl. MS. 144, f. 246 b.
- Minor Tracts against the Armenians.**
- Richard Radulphi Armachani Opus in P. Lombardi Sententias in Quæstiones XXIX Distributum.** Oriel College (Oxford) XV.
- Lectura Sententiarum*, lib. IV, *ibid.*; *Quæstiones Sententiarum*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *Lectura Theologiæ*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *De Statu Universalis Ecclesiæ*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *De Peccato Ignorantiæ*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *De Vafritiis Judæorum*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *Epistolæ ad Diversos*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *Dialogi Varii*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *Contra Validos Mendicantes*, lib. I, *ibid.*
- Dialogus de Rebus ad Sacram Scripturam Pertinentibus** MS. in *Biblioth. Lincoln. Oxon. Austr.* 75.
- Vita Sancti Mancheni Abbatis.** For fuller particulars see Tanner's *Bibliotheca Brittanico-Hibernica*, p. 284 ff.; Poole, "Dict. of Mat. Biog.," Vol. XIX at word Fitzralph. *Irish Eccles. Record*, Series I; Vol. I, p. 530 ff. Ware-Harris, Vol. II (*Writers of Ireland*), pp. 84-85. *Notes and Queries*, No. 110; Series II, Vol. V, pp. 110-111, 159.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.¹

A. ORIGINAL SOURCES.

1. On Fitzralph.

- Bliss, W. H.** *Calendar of Entries in papal registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland.* 3 vols. (1198-1362). London, 1893-97. 3d vol. in coöperation with C. Johnson.
- Brown, Edward.** Appendix (i. e., Vol. II) to *Fasciculus rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum* of O. Graes. London, 1690. Def. Curat.
- Camden, William.** *Gulielmi Camdeni et illustrium virorum ad G. Camdenum Epistolæ.* London, 1691.

¹ This list does not aim at being exhaustive.

- Chambre, William de.** *Continuatio Historiæ Dunelmensis (1336-1571)* in *Historiæ Dunelmensis Scriptores Tres*. Ed. James Raine. Surtees Soc, London, 1839.
- Chesterfield, Thomas.** *Historia de Episcopis Conventrensibus et Lichfeldensibus (656-1347 with continuation to 1559)*. Ed. Henry Wharton. *Anglia Sacra*, I, 421-59. London, 1691.
- Foxe, John.** *Acts and Monuments*. Ed. by Stephen R. Cattley. 8 vols. London, 1837-41 (2d vol.).
- Gilbert, John T.** *Ed. Chartularies of St. Mary's Abbey, Dublin, with the Register of the House at Dunbrody, and Annals of Ireland (1162-1370)* (Rolls Series). 2 vols. London, 1884 (2d vol.).
- Higden, Ranulf.** *Polychronicon*, 9 vols., London, 1865-86. See 8th vol. (First continuator.) Ed. J. R. Lumby. London, 1882. (Rolls Series.)
- Le Neve, John.** *Fasti Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ, or a Calendar of the Principal Ecclesiastical Dignitaries in England and Wales, and of the chief officers in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge from the earliest time to 1715. Corrected and continued by T. Duffy Hardy*. 3 vols. Oxford, 1854 (2d vol.).
- Leland, John.** *Commentarii de Scriptoribus Britannicis*. Edited by Anthony Hall. Oxford, 1709.
- Poole, R. L.** *Joannis Wycliffe De Dominio Divino Libri Tres*, to which are added the first four books of the treatise *De Pauperie Salvatoris* of Richard Fitzralph. London, 1890.
- Prince, John.** *Worthies of Devon*. London, 1810.
- Riley, Henry T.** *On Balliol College MSS.* 4th Report of the Roy. Comm. on Hist. MSS., Pt. I, London, 1874.
- Theiner, Augustin.** *Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum Historian Illustrantia (1216-1547)*. Rome, 1864.
- Thompson, E. M.** *Edited Chronicon Angliæ (1328-88). Auctore monacho quodam Sancti Albani*. Rolls Series. London, 1874.
- Tanner, Thomas.** *Bibliotheca Brittanico-Hibernica*. Ed. Dav. Wilkins. London, 1748.
- Walsingham, Thomas.** *Historia Anglicana (1272-1422)*. Ed. H. T. Riley. Rolls Series. 2 vols. London, 1863-64 (1st vol.).
- Ware-Harris.** *Whole Works of Sir James Ware Concerning Ireland*, translated, revised and continued by Walter Harris. 2 vols. Dublin, 1764.
- Wilkins, David.** *Concilia Magnæ Brittanïæ et Hiberniæ, A. D. 446-1718*, 4 vols. London, 1737 (4th vol.).

2. On the Franciscans.

- Brewer, J. S.** *Edit. Monumenta Franciscana (Vol. II by Richard Howlett)*. Rolls Series. 2 vols. London, 1858-82.
- Bullarium Romanum.** *Taurinensis Editio*, 1857 sq. (vols. 3 and 4).
- Chaucer, Geoffrey.** *The Students Chaucer*, being a complete edition of his works, edited by W. W. Skeat. Oxford, 1900.
- Corpus Juris Canonici.*
- Mansi, J. D.** *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova Et Amplissima Collectio (1724)*. 35 vols. Paris, 1901-02 (Vol. 23, sq.).
- Thomas de Eccleston.** *De Adventu FF. Minorum in Angliam*. Translated into English by F. Cuthbert (q. v.).

B. LITERATURE.

1. *On Fitzralph.*

- Irish Ecclesiastical Record. 1st Series, Vol. I, pp. 486 ff., 524 ff. Dublin, 1865.
 Poole, Reginald Lane. Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XIX, under word "Fitzralph." New York, 1889.
 Felten, J. Richard Fitzralph in Wetzer and Wreite, Kerchen lexicon, X, 1174-1180.

2. *On the Franciscans.*

- Alexander, Natalis. *Historia Ecclesiastica*. 10 vols. Venice, 1778-1793 (Vol. 8).
 Beissel, S. *Die Culturgeschichtliche Bedeutung des hl. Franz Von Assisi*. *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*. Vol. 33 (1887).
 Capes, W. W. *The English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*. New York, 1900.
 Cutts, Edward L. *Parish Priests and Their People in the Middle Ages in England*. London, 1898.
 Cuthbert, Father. *The Friars and how they came to England, being a translation of Thomas of Eccleston's "De Adventu FF. Minorum in Angliam" with an introductory essay on the Spirit and Genius of the Franciscan Friars*. London, 1903.
 Denifle and Ehrle. *Archiv fuer Literatur und Kirchengeschichte*. Vols. I, II, III, IV, passim. Berlin, 1885 sq.
 Gebhart, Emile. *l'Italie Mystique. Histoire de la Renaissance Religieuse au Moyen Age*, 2d Ed. Paris, 1893.
 Huck, J. C. *Ubertin Von Casale und dessen Ideenkreis*. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1903.
 Hefele, Carl Joseph von. *Conciliengeschichte*. 2d Ed., 9 vols. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1873-1890 (Vol. VI).
 Heimbucher, M. *Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche*. 2 vols. Paderborn, 1896-7.
 Jessop, A. *Coming of the Friars to England*. *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. XIV, p. 78.
 Le Monnier, Léon. *History of St. Francis of Assisi*. Tr. by a Franc. Tertiary. London, 1894.
 Little, A. G. *Grey Friars in Oxford*. Oxford, 1892.
 Little, W. J. Knox. *St. Francis of Assisi, His Life and Times and Work*. New York, 1897.
 Meehan, C. P. *The Rise and Fall of the Irish Franciscans' Monasteries, and Memoirs of the Irish Hierarchy in the Seventeenth Century*. 6th ed. Dublin.
 Rashdall, H. *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*. 2 vols. in 3 pts. Oxford, 1895.
 Sabatier, Paul. *Life of St. Francis of Assisi*. Tr. by Louise Seymour. Houghton, New York, 1894.
 Smith, Lucy T. *English Popular Preaching in the XIV Century*. *Eng. Hist Review*, Jan., 1892, Vol. VII.
 Wadding, Luke. *Annales Minorum seu Trium Ordinum a S. Francisco Institutorum*. 2d Ed., 17 vols. Rome, 1731-41. Vols. XVIII-XXV by John de Luca and others, Rome, etc., 1740-1886.

BOOK REVIEWS

Vie de Sainte Thérèse, Ecrite par Elle-Même, traduite sur le manuscrit original par le P. Marcel Bouix, de la compagnie de Jésus, 15^{me} édition, revue etc par Jules Peyré. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. xix + 642.

La Vie et les Révélations de Sainte Gertrude (1256-1302) vierge et abbesse de Saint-Benoit, traduites du Latin en français par un religieux du même ordre. Paris: Lecoffre, 1903. 8°, 2 vols., pp. 414, 420.

Œuvres Mystiques du Bienheureux Henri Suso, de l'ordre des Frères Prêcheurs (? 1294-1366) traduction nouvelle, par le P. G. Thiriot, O. P. Paris: Lecoffre, 1899. 2 vols. 8°, pp. lxvii + 306, 437.

1. The autobiography, if it may properly be called such, of Saint Theresa, had been several times translated into French before Fr. Marcel Bouix published (1852) his translation. Since then it has held a foremost place among French classics of piety, and deservedly so. The flowing style, the personal note of enthusiasm that rings in the French phrase, and the harmonious dignity of the diction, made this translation a favorite "livre d'édification." It is said that the house of Lecoffre alone has sold more than thirty thousand copies of it. A confrère has revised and enlarged the Bouix translation, improved some defects, restored here and there the concision, picturesqueness, and laconic force of the original, and retranslated some paragraphs from the critical edition of *La Fuente* (Madrid, 1861-1862) and the photographic fac-simile (Madrid, 1873) of the autograph life kept in the Esecorial. The valuable historical notes and excursus of Fr. Bouix are reprinted, and Fr. Peyré has added four "Relations" or confidential letters of the saint to her confessors; they complete and illustrate the original "Vida," that is really not an autobiography, since it stops at 1565, but a description of her spiritual condition, experiences, and "états d'oraison" within a given period, i. e., up to her fiftieth year. It is well known that the best historians of Spanish literature like Capmany (1848) and Ticknor (1867), look on the writings of St. Theresa as models of pure Castilian. Her "Letters" in particular, are declared to be written in a style incomparable for simplicity, naturalness and lively wit. They were also translated into French by Fr. Bouix, as well as the "Book of Founda-

tions," and her other writings. The life and letters of the saint were translated into English by Fr. Coleridge (London, 1881, 1896, 3 vols.).

2. Saint Gertrude of Helpede (Helfta) near Eisleben, is one of the most charming figures of the thirteenth century; it is a pity that Montalembert did not make of her life a companion-piece to his exquisite Saint Elizabeth. Her "Revelations" have always been a beloved manual of the mystical life, and may be said to have received a solemn ecclesiastical approval by her canonization in 1677. The pious and learned Blossius is said to have read them through once a month. Of the five books in which they are now extant (e. g., *Revelationes Gertrudianæ ac Meehtildianæ*, Solesmes edition, Paris, 1875) the first and fifth are biographical additions by other hands; the second book, properly entitled "*Legatus divinæ pietatis*," is her own composition; the third and fourth were dictated by her to one of her companions. They are all now extant only in Latin, but it seems probable that the three books of the "Revelations" proper were originally composed in German. In the two volumes before us an anonymous Benedictine has translated these "Revelations" into French, and thus made them accessible to many readers, to whom the Latin is an unknown tongue, or to whom the peculiarities of mediæval Latin are insuperable. The translator has added a very useful preface in which he describes the character of these intimate communings of a chosen soul with Jesus Christ, and the temper of reverence in which they should be read. Is he right in continuing to assert that she was an abbess? Dr. Kaulen maintains in the last edition of the "*Kirchenlexikon*" that she never held a position of authority in any of the monasteries in which she lived.

3. The mystical writings of the German Dominican, Blessed Heinrich Suso, include his famous "*Exemplar*," some sermons, and a number of letters. The "*Exemplar*" is divided into four books, the first of which contains an account of his life, the second is entitled "*The Book of Eternal Wisdom*," the third "*The Book of Eternal Truth*" and the fourth "*The Little Book of Letters*." Originally each book was independently composed and circulated, though their collection into a whole is the work of Suso himself. He is one of the most delicate emotional souls that German mysticism ever produced. His "*minnereiches Herz*," or heart overflowing with spiritual joy, was the source at once of an irrepressible apostolic zeal and of noble outpourings of love and adoration expressed in a highly imaginative and picturesque South-German dialect that has no superior for warmth and richness and tenderness. Fr. Baumgartner says that he wrote the most beautiful German prose of the

fourteenth century and that he turned with ease and accuracy the most difficult scholastic terms. He is free from those errors of the Beghards and the Brothers of the Free Spirit that even Meister Eckhart did not wholly avoid. In the "Book of Eternal Wisdom" fourteenth and fifteenth century Germany recognized a work of devotion that contained the essence of all the holiest and most intimate contemplation that devout German souls had risen to since the days of Saint Gertrude. His "Life" is not so much an autobiography as a description of the manner in which a true servant of God must dispose his internal and external life, if he would be pleasing to his Creator. During the nineteenth century his writings have been a beloved theme of the literary historians of mediæval Germany, and generally of writers on the history of mystical theology. Görres, Diepenbrock, Greith and Denifle among Catholics, Preger and Schmidt among Protestants, have studied them profoundly and illustrated them with much learning and theological acumen. In Eckhart, Johann Tauler and Heinrich Suso they have recognized the three purest and loveliest flowers of German mediæval mysticism. The "Exemplar" of Suso was excellently edited by Father Denifle (Munich, 1876). Together with the other writings of this holy man it was translated into French by Cartier (1856) from the Italian of del Nente (1663). Father Thiriot has now executed a new translation of all the works of Suso, thereby rendering them accessible to many who cannot read or appreciate the richly emotional language of this loving Suabian "Minnesinger of Eternal Wisdom," his lady and his joy, for whom he underwent atrocious sufferings and whose arms (IHS) he had stamped with a heated iron on his breast. In the preface of this book the French translator narrates critically the life of Suso, describes the origin of his works and the history of the manuscripts, appreciates their intrinsic worth and their great local influence, as well as their close kinship with the doctrine of Saint Thomas, and their practical helpful tendency.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

La Vierge Marie dans L'Histoire de L'Orient Chrétien, par l'abbé Joseph Lemann. 2d edition. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. 640.

We opened this work expecting to find a documented exposition of the "cultus" of the Blessed Virgin in the Christian Orient, especially in the earliest period of liturgical development. That thesis is an admirable one and has never been done with anything

like the thoroughness that Liell and Lehner, and we might add Fr. Livinus, have shown in treating the ecclesiastical history of the Blessed Virgin in the West. This volume contains a series of warm and fervorous oratorical disquisitions on the Blessed Virgin at various "tournants" of Oriental ecclesiastical history. It is also dominated strongly by an historical mysticism that seems likely soon to lose its only *raison d'être*, given the momentous changes that are supervening in the farther Orient, and the reaction that they will probably call forth, in conjunction with the grave internal modifications of the ecclesiastical conditions of France. The work is a tribute to the Blessed Virgin on the occasion of the semi-centenary of the Immaculate Conception.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Histoire de la Charité. Par Léon Lallemand. T. I, pp. x + 191. Paris: 1902; T. II. Paris: 1903. 8°, pp. 195.

In the first of these two very interesting volumes the author passes in review the legislation and practice of the principal nations of antiquity in relation to the various classes of society dependent on others, whether as slaves, or as composing the great mass of the weak and indigent. Beginning with the Hebrew people the author examines the enactments of the Mosaic law bearing on the condition of widows and orphans, slaves and strangers dwelling within the territory allotted to the children of Israel, and indicates as far as possible how far these enactments were observed and enforced. In the second and succeeding chapters he makes a similar inquiry with regard to the Egyptians, the Assyrians and Babylonians, the Greeks, the Romans to the reign of Constantine, the Gauls and the Germans. In a concluding chapter the author sums up the results of his investigations. These are not of a nature to support the theory of the constant moral progress of the human race; but on the contrary they very clearly show that in the pre-Christian ages the condition of all the weaker ranks of society grew steadily worse, while at the same time the ruling powers became more and more indifferent to the grievances of those whose unrequited labors maintained them in boundless luxury.

In the second volume we look upon a far different spectacle. From the moment that the doctrines of Christianity began to be propagated in every province of the Roman Empire, the condition of the poor and the weak, of widows and orphans, of the slave and the despised outcasts of society began to improve. Converts to the new religion from the ranks of the wealthy were made to understand that

the legion of slaves who ministered to their wants were creatures of God, equal, possibly superior according to the degree of virtue attained, in His sight with themselves. They were taught to believe that the wretched crowd of the blind, the lame and the indigent who piteously begged an alms from them when they appeared in public followed by a crowd of only less needy sycophantic clients, belonged to the class on which Christ during His earthly life had conferred His greatest benefits; and furthermore that His Apostles themselves were men who had followed one of the humblest and most ill-requted of avocations. So great was the influence of these doctrines even on the pagan world that one of the bitterest enemies of Christianity, the Emperor Julian, during his brief term of power saw that his efforts to prolong the existence of paganism would be vain unless he could prevail on his indifferent followers to observe the principles of Christianity in relation to society. His attempt to destroy the Church with some of her own weapons was, however, futile. Those who applauded his exertions in the cause of the gods were not led to do so in the interests of humanity at large but of their own selfishness. So well was this recognized that the moment Julian passed away the Empire returned again to the guidance of a line of Christian Emperors who controlled its destinies until the vigorous invaders from the North at last succeeded in settling on its ruins. It was during this long period of invasion that the charitable institutions of the Church obtained their first great development in the West. Wave after wave of invasion swept for centuries over Western Europe. The unfortunate people had scarcely time to recover from the disasters caused by one warlike horde when another was upon them. The only institution capable of coping with the invaders was the Church. The barbarians themselves entertained for her the greatest respect, and so she was able to alleviate in a great degree the general distress. Her hospitals, homes for the aged, orphan asylums, and similar charitable institutions were open to all. The great estates of the Church, especially of the Roman Church, were the patrimony of the poor from which they derived sustenance at a time when without these resources nothing but starvation or slavery remained.

These volumes will prove of great service, especially to priests, and to those of the laity who wish to obtain information in a clear and succinct form relative to the charitable institutions of the Church up to the reign of Charlemagne. Three other volumes, covering the period from Charlemagne to the present day, are to follow.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

The Middle Ages: Sketches and Fragments. By Thomas J. Shahan.
New York: Benziger, 1904. 8°, pp. 432.

In turning over the pages of this truly charming collection of essays, there come involuntarily to one's lips the words of A Kempis: "If thy heart were right, then every creature would be to thee as a mirror of life. . . . If thou wert good and pure within then wouldst thou see all things without hindrance and understand them aright." Truly, the author of this book has such a "pure mind and a simple intention," and so he not only knows books but he also understands aright the people they tell about; is able to live in the past and sympathize with the hopes and passions of once vigorous civilizations. Hence, although a mere collection of essays, this book will go farther toward dispelling the myth of anti-mediævalism than any formal history. The author's sympathy enables him to so understand the times he writes of that he can seize the salient points in their history—the characteristics of their mental and moral makeup—and present them to his readers unobscured by that unnecessary multitudinous detail in which the average mediæval writer revels. Of course all the many sides of that marvellously varied life of the Middle Ages could not be handled in a production of this character. The close student, moreover, will notice that the author's attention is directed more to the early and later Middle Ages than to those wonderful twelfth and thirteenth centuries which are the Middle Ages par excellence. In any case, the reader will find here a remarkably skilful presentation of all the principal elements that make up life from Gregory the Great to Leo X.

Now that we have a similar collection of essays on the "Beginnings of Christianity" by the same author, it is to be hoped that the series will be continued to our own times. There is no satisfactory study at hand of the Reformation period along such lines. Dr. Shahan is certainly capable of writing such a one, all the more as the materials for it are now so accessible. Archbishop Spalding's *Essays* on the same period are now rather out of date, and moreover, are marred by a bitter controversial spirit characteristic of his time. Catholics now need and eagerly await a new presentation of that subject, learned yet popular, Catholic yet sweetened by that sympathetic charity of mind and grace of expression so prominent in the volume under discussion.

In the meantime may the "Middle Ages" be read widely by at least Catholics! Somehow or other American Catholics seem to prefer a Protestant like Hallam to a writer of their own creed. In a sense they are justified by the general amateurishness of American Catholic

scholarships, at least in things mediæval. That reproach is now removed in part. This book is in real learning away beyond Hallam, and fully equal in style to the best put forth by that able writer, while for a true appreciation of mediæval life Hallam is distinctly inferior.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

La divinité de Jésus-Christ. Conférences prêchées à Saint-Jacques du-Haut-Pas. Par D. Viellard-Lacharme. Lecoffre: Paris, 1904. 8°, pp. 287.

We have here in book-form the conferences given by the author in Paris last winter. They are eight in number, and deal effectively with the attacks recently made by critics on the Divinity of Christ.

Attention is first called to the pre-eminence of Christ in history and to the moral elevation of the race due to this pre-eminence. On friends and foes alike the attractive personality of Christ exerted an uplifting influence. He opened out the perspective of the Infinite, taught the dignity and worth of the human individual, and initiated a moral progress of which He himself is the visible ideal. Intellectually, morally and religiously Christ's work is a renewal and purification of humanity. Thought and action alike drew inspiration from the Perfect Life once lived on earth.

How explain this universal attractiveness of Christ's personality? As the inheritance of beliefs which our fathers held before us and transmitted ready-made? Hardly, for this theory of atavism would have made faith in Christ's personality impossible at the outset, and is belied by the facts of the first conversions no less than by those of the Oxford movement in our own times. However much the perpetuation of belief may be influenced by the three forces of heredity, environment, and education, there comes a time in most men's lives when the acceptance of the faith of the fathers is no longer perfunctory, but the free, vital, moral and personal work of the individual upon due examination. Christianity is an appeal to all the faculties of man, not merely to the intellect. Man whole and entire is concerned in its acceptance. It is only by divorcing these complex interests that the critic succeeds in weakening the force of the appeal, as if it were an affair of pure logic and in no wise presupposed good will, a moral element.

Nor can the fact of Christ's universal attractiveness be explained on the theory of His sovereign and exceptional genius. The impression which genius makes is not lasting. It soon becomes an affair of memory, whereas Christ's influence is one of life, of actuality, now as

heretofore undiminished. The critic cannot suppress Christ's divinity by exalting his humanity. The theory of an exalted humanity is a makeshift wholly inadequate to the burden of explanation which the critic places upon it.

Every naturalistic theory breaks down of its own weight. The Catholic solution that Christ is divine forces itself upon the mind in consequence. The author, to bring out the proof of Christ's divinity, studies in detail the title "Son of God" in its progressive manifestation by Christ from the day in the temple when He said He must be about His Father's business to the day when He solemnly affirmed His divine Sonship to the High Priest. Is this title "Son of God" to be understood in a proper or only in a moral sense?

The moral theory cannot account for the facts either of Christ's personal affirmations or of the Apostle's understanding of them. A meaning much more profound attaches to Christ's personal declarations concerning Himself, and is demanded by the absolute uniqueness of His Person.

Recognition of the historical fact that these statements were made leads to the question of their value. Christ's doctrinal and moral teaching so utterly surpasses in sublimity, purity, and simplicity of expression the teaching of the ancients, and his sinless, self-contained, and unfanatical life is raised so high above all the characters of history, that it is impossible to admit either self-deception, or a willingness to deceive in this "ideal type of Moral Beauty." His works are additional attestation of the value of His words, and the Church is ever a living witness to the same.

Belief in Christ's divinity is neither the product of an excited imagination on the part of the Apostles, nor an after-thought due to St. Paul's speculative genius, and the importation of Greek philosophy into the simple faith of the Synoptists. It is impossible that ignorant men, as were the Apostles, could have invented, much less carried through successfully, a movement based on so great a mystery as that of God made man; all the more so as the Jewish spirit was jealously monotheistic, and contemporary belief could not by one man, even a St. Paul, be lifted permanently out of its traditionally appointed grooves. The primitive Church was not of such a character as to receive passively a metaphysical view like this unless it expressed the content of the actual faith it already had in mind and heart.

Of this living faith the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, the struggle against the early heresies, the rites of worship, the professions of faith made by the martyrs and sealed with their blood, are a cloud of witnesses. It was not philosophy or theory that produced faith in

Christ's divinity, but it was the living faith of the Christian community that created a philosophy and theology to give rational and systematic expression to what it already believed.

This work gives a good insight into the general trend of current criticism and meets the critic on his own ground. Of course, in these conferences one will not find, and should not expect, the minutiae of specialized studies. The view taken is large, clear, and cogent. It enables the reader to appreciate the total drift of Faith and to contrast this with the partialities of Criticism.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Catholic Ideals in Social Life. By Fr. Cuthbert, O.S.F. Benziger, 1904, 8°, pp. 250. \$1.25.

It is generally recognized that a complex process of readjustment is going on in society, between state and society, between them and religion, particularly the Catholic Church, and between traditional views of persons, of duties, and newer broader conceptions of life and its relations. When we hold tenaciously to the old, as many do, or holding to old phrases, coerce these into new meanings as some do we find real hindrance to objective appreciation of facts and tendencies. When we scout the old, break with it and yield to the fascination of new attitudes, we find equal difficulty. The author of this volume has happily avoided extremes and has given us a work full of real human sympathy, loyal faith and fine discernment. In treating such border question as State, Church, Liberty, Woman, The Priest and Social Reform, The Spiritual Apostolate of the Working man, he speaks with the frankness of clear insight as well as with its reserve. The aim of the book is to direct Catholic thought and action toward the demands made by modern conditions, "to give expression to the Catholic mind touching some of the most urgent questions of the hour in regard to social life and conduct." However, the author tells us more about the Catholic mind as it should be than as it is. He calls attention rightly to the "over-systematizing and overformulating" within the Church which have tended to stamp out individuality; to the present duty of the Church "to reconstruct her social and political life"; to the fact that "Christianity is tolerant of defective social systems whilst absolutely uncompromising within the more intimate sphere of personal life"; to the farce seen when a man endows "a hospital whilst at the same time he systematically sweats his workmen and starves the workman's children"; to the fact that not infrequently "the immediate duty springing from our Christian fellowship lies not in the direction of the Church, but in that of the ballot

box." The book is filled with the most attractive common sense views of life and faith and social duty. If one bring human sympathy and some Christian zeal to the reading of it, one will not fail to profit greatly.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

Het Boek der Rechters. Door D. A. Sloet, 's Hertogenbosch, 1904.
Het Eerste en Tweede Boek der Koningen. Door Dr. A. Jansen, 's Hertogenbosch, 1904. 8°, pp. 202, 285.

Among the Catholic commentaries on the Book of Judges we do not know of any superior in merit to the recent work of Father Sloet. The author follows in the footsteps of Father Lagrange, to whom, of course, he owes a great deal. The commentary on the Books of Samuel also, by Dr. A. Janssen, bears testimony to the great learning of its author. Let us hope that these two commentaries may soon be translated into a language in which they shall find a large circle of readers.

The future historian of biblical studies in Holland will be able to make an interesting comparison between the Introduction to Genesis by Dessens and the Preface to the Book of Judges by Sloet: rapid movement is no longer an exclusive characteristic of the New World.

HENRY POELS.

Summa Theologia Moralis, Scholarum usui accommodavit H. Nolden. Vol. I, de Principiis, Theologiæ Moralis; Vol. II, de Præceptis; Vol. II, de Sacramentis. Eniponte: Fel. Rauch, 1904.

A new edition of Father Nolden's *Summa Theologia Moralis* has lately come from the press. The fact that this is the fourth edition of the volumes "De Principiis and de Præceptis" and the fifth of "De Sacramentis" attests the popularity of the work. The general division into which the author has thrown his *Summa* is a logical one and will help to make it more serviceable for practical use. Father Nolden's style is clear and simple, and his latin in marked contrast to Fr. Lehmkühl's can be read with ease.

But while a useful compendium Fr. Nolden's work can hardly lay claim to be a true *summa* of moral theology. For like so many manuals of our day it is lacking in just those elements which are necessary in anything like a full and adequate work on this science. Like them it gives comparatively scant treatment to the fundamental principles of morality while enlarging upon rules and methods of application. Thus the author's first volume "De Principiis" is by far the smallest one, while it should be, we venture to say, if not larger than the others at least as large. For in it are the tracts "De

Ultimo Fine, de Actibus Humanis, de Conscientia, de Virtutibus," tracts which set forth the fundamental principles of the Christian life. A more extended discussion of the matter that would come within the range of this volume—of the "virtues," of the passions and of habits, we judge to be absolutely necessary even in works that ambition to be only of the general scope of Fr. Noldin. Then again the treatise on sin, we think, has taken on too much the restricted character of casuistry. This may be sufficient for the confessional; but more than this is required if moral theology is to hold its right place among the moral sciences.¹ It is because of the absence in the late works on morals of its speculative side of the failure to present what may be called its essential and dogmatic phase that moral theology has come to be reckoned as being but a mass of jejune rules and prohibitions uninformed with the vitalizing principles of a true and high science. Such was not the moral theology of St. Thomas and Suarez, as seen in the *De Legibus* of the one and the *Secunda Secundæ* of the other. It were well for the character and repute of this branch of theology if the ideals presented by these works were kept more in mind.

JOHN WEBSTER MELODY.

The Life of St. Teresa of Jesus written by herself and translated from the Spanish by David Lewis. Third edition, enlarged; with additional notes and an introduction by Rev. Fr. Benedict Zimmerman, O.C.D. London: Thomas Baker, 1904. Pp. xliii-489. Price 8/ net.

The autobiography of the foundress of the reformed Carmelites is too well known to need comment or recommendation, except with regard to the care exercised by the translator, the editor, and the publisher; and, in the case of the volume before us, at this moment, we are happily able to speak in the highest terms of the way in which all three of these have done their work. We have in the present book a piece of spiritual literature, of enduring value both to the hagiologist and to the pious reader, rendered into irreproachable English and printed in a manner to delight the most fastidious. It is questionable if in any language, there exists a more generally acceptable version of the Saint's life. As originally edited by David Lewis, this publication attained the high standard of all the work done by the distinguished translator of the writings of St. John of the Cross. In the present edition, except for the regrettable omission of the

¹ See "Moral Theology at the End of the Nineteenth Century," by Very Rev. Thos. Bouquillon in *CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN*, April, 1899.

first editor's marginal notes, we have a reproduction of the first, with an addition of no mean value in the shape of a long preface from the pen of Father Zimmerman.

St. Teresa's account of her own spiritual life is not what one would call light reading; her pages really require considerable careful study in order that their lessons may be brought home to the mind. They are not of an order to attract the frivolous or the shallow; and they do introduce one to some of the deepest problems of mystical theology. But the people who can learn from these confessions are no small number. Recent times have witnessed something like a general spread of interest in the phenomena of the spiritual geniuses who are called "saints" in the Church; few such geniuses have been the subject of more careful attention than the great Spanish mystic whose life we are at present considering. It is a pleasant thing therefore, to find that the book, which is of all books the most reliable and illuminating for the manifesting of her characteristics, has been placed within reach of the English reader in a form so satisfactory that few critics will discover defects worth mentioning.

JOSEPH MCSORLEY.

Life and Life-work of Mother Theodore Guérin, Foundress of the Sisters of Providence at St.-Mary-of-the-Woods, Vigo County, Indiana. By a member of the same Congregation. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1904. Pp. 500.

Cardinal Gibbons, in his introduction to the *Life of Mother Guérin*, reminds the reader of the debt of gratitude which the Catholics of America owe to the Religious women who have played so large a part in the pioneer work of building up the Church in this new world of ours. Prominent among those who possess such a claim on us is the subject of the present biography. In the early days of the diocese of Vincennes, this valiant woman, strong, prudent, practical, energetic, a leader, an educator of no ordinary merit, and a nun given over heart and soul to the cause of religion, proved herself to be a providential instrument for the carrying on of God's work in a place and under circumstances which would have rendered many a willing laborer helpless. The volume which tells the story of her characteristics, her trials, and her successes will be of interest and profit to many souls more or less familiar with duties and obstacles of the same sort as those by which this remarkable woman achieved her mission.

JOSEPH MCSORLEY.

L'Abbé Eusèbe Renaudot, *Essai sur sa vie, et sur son oeuvre liturgique*, par Antoine Villien. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. 288.

It is not usually known to what an extent the best modern studies on the history of the liturgy are based on the toilsome labors of seventeenth century writers. The liturgies of the East, in particular, were first thoroughly examined, read in the original, and then translated and published by Renaudot in his famous *Collection of the Oriental Liturgies* (Paris, 1715-1716, 2 vols.). As is well known, his translation of the sacramental rituals of the Orientals was published by Denzinger (1863-1864). We owe him also, in very great measure, the "Perpetuité de la Foi" originally planned and partly executed by Arnould, but completed and defended by Renaudot, to so great an extent that it usually goes by his name. This work was compiled in defence of the Oriental belief in the Real Presence and the Transubstantiation, as was his edition of the Eucharist-homilies of Gennadius, Nectarius, Meletius, and other ancient Greek patriarchs (1709). His narrative of the Jacobite patriarchs of Alexandria (1713) is yet a valuable source for the history of Monophysitism, as may be seen by the use made of it by Dr. Neale in his *History of the Church of Alexandria*. Renaudot also edited some mediæval Moslem travels in India and China (1718), and wrote a critical refutation of a multitude of false statements in the *Dictionnaire* of Bayle (1697). His name is forever a shining one in the historiography of Oriental liturgy. Tireless, critical, deeply reverent of the past, he had a large share of ecclesiastical credit and influence. His grandfather and father were the creators of modern French journalism and belonged to the distinguished coterie of men who held with Port-Royal and the Jansenists. Renaudot was a strong Gallican and an anti-Jesuit in the stirring period that centres about the year 1700, and that was so productive of feelings and passions whose final outcome was the French Revolution. As owner of the *Gazette de France*, he was also a politician and had a rôle of importance after the arrival of James II in France and the establishment of his court at St. Germain. This story of his life emphasizes the scholarly labors of French ecclesiastics in the reign of Louis XIV in defence of the ancient faith; Renaudot was in touch with most of these savants, whom the work of the Abbé Villien brings before us in numbers, and with much vividness of presentation. All theologians will welcome the pages (171-267) on the condition of liturgical studies before Renaudot and the advance accomplished by him, as well as the description of his principal theories and ideas concerning the growth, content and spirit of the oldest liturgies.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

La Sainte Vierge, par René-Marie de la Broise (Les Saints). Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. 247.

Saint Paulin de Nole, Evêque de Nole (353-431), par André Baudrillart. Ibid., 1905. 8°, pp. 190.

St. Léon IX (1002-1054), par l'abbé Eugène Martin. Ibid., 1904. 8°, pp. 208.

Les Seize Carmélites de Compiègne, par Victor Pierre. Ibid., 1905. 8°, pp. 188.

Le Bienheureux Curé D'Ars (1786-1859), par Joseph Vianey. Ibid., 1905. 8°, pp. 200.

The hagiographical collection of "Les Saints" has swollen to stately proportions. The volumes before us are all in keeping with the principles and traditions established at the beginning—sufficiency and conciseness of historical information, brevity of narrative, sobriety and timeliness of bibliographical reference, spirit of reverence and critical fair-mindedness, Fr. de la Broise writes of the Blessed Virgin, and draws his material from the approved sources of the New Testament, and from ancient ecclesiastical tradition, also from the consensus of theologians and the intimate spiritual experience of the Saints. His volume is worthy of a careful meditative perusal. Fr. Baudrillart unfolds a chapter of fourth-century ecclesiastical life in a remote town of Central Italy. Paulinus of Nola, a Gallo-Roman grandee of the first order, is exhibited to our view in a very pleasing and instructive manner. Nobleman, convert, ascetic, gentleman, writer, art-critic, bishop and saint—there is scarcely a phase of the contemporary Christianity which his life and writings and relations do not illustrate. He fits in well between Jerome and Ambrose, Damasus and Augustine; we could ill-afford to lose the side-lights that his correspondence and his poems throw upon the inner life of the new religion in the first century of its triumphal progress through the Mediterranean world. The Abbé Martin, well known for his scholarly works on the local ecclesiastical history of Alsace, keeps up the reputation of Alsatian Catholics for historiographical services, by a very good but strongly condensed life of the great Alsatian noble and bishop, Bruno of Toul, who became pope under the name of Leo IX, and is venerated as a saint. Leo IX is a product of the Cluny politico-ecclesiastical spirit and a near forerunner of the indomitable men who in the next hundred years were to wage a war of life or death for ecclesiastical liberty and the distinction of the temporal and spiritual powers. The touching narrative of the sixteen holy Carmelite nuns who died for the Catholic

faith in the French Revolution, at Compiègne (July 17, 1794), will be new to many readers, at least in the minute details that are here set forth by M. Victor Pierre. Finally, the well-known history of the Curé d'Ars, who is almost of yesterday, is told with sympathy and admiration by his near relative M. Joseph Vianey, a circumstance that, in this case, adds a peculiar value to the life of a holy priest who was distinctly of the people, and whose days were passed in the humble but heavenly service of mankind as a rural parish priest. His beatification (Jan. 8, 1905) by the first parish priest who has risen to the papal throne in many a long day is an event so close to the memory of all as to call for no special comment. Every community, college and academy, not to speak of cultured Catholic families, should subscribe to the entire collection of "Les Saints"; they are a new gallery of portraits of the saints that complete Butler, while they do not pretend to relegate to obscurity that calm and judicious historian of the chosen souls of Catholicism.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Les Sources de L'Histoire de France, des Origines aux Guerres d'Italie, V. Les Valois, Louis XI et Charles VIII (1461-1494). Paris: Picard, 1905. 8°, pp. clxxxvii + 192.

We have always noticed with extreme satisfaction the appearance of the "fascicules" of "The Sources of French History" begun and executed in its first part by M. Auguste Molinier, professor in the Ecole des Chartes. The present (fifth) fascicule brings to completion the first part or section of this epoch-making work. In 5,651 numbers or paragraphs this distinguished master of historical teaching has described scientifically as many historical writings dealing with the history of French territory from the earliest times to the year 1494. As we have more than once explained the great usefulness of this bibliographical manual, it does not seem necessary to do more than indicate its completion. At the same time, it is to be regretted that the author should have passed away while the last pages of his work were going through the press; he did not live to reap the reward of praise and congratulation that he well deserved. Every student of history will appreciate the admirable general introduction (I-CLXXXVII) in which the author describes with the authority of a master the characteristics of mediæval historiography. France need no longer envy Germany her Wattenbach and her Lorenz.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

The Gospel Applied To Our Times. A Sermon for every Sunday in the year. By Rev. D. S. Phelan. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder, 1904. 8°, pp. 473.

Without flattery this is a volume of excellent sermons. The doctrine is timely, well-chosen, correct and sufficient. The diction is pithy and vivid, marked also by a certain fresh candor and boldness that are here in their place. The tone that pervades the collection is one of moral earnestness and responsibility. The sermons are all short, "preachable" within the space of thirty minutes, and deal with subjects of every-day and primary importance. There is very little useless repetition, and almost no useless ornament. Father Phelan himself gives the key-note of his preaching when he calls his book an application to our daily lives of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. He speaks at all times like one who has a message to deliver in the name of another, and that other is the Saviour of Mankind.

The introductory remarks of Father Phelan are conceived in his characteristic vein of honest and fearless bluntness. When he says that his long experience as a writer of editorials in a prominent Catholic newspaper has made him strong in the qualities of "consecutive thought and orderly arrangement," he is uttering no boast. All the world knows that the editor of the "Western Watchman" is master of many literary gifts, among which none are more regularly in evidence than his plain directness of utterance and his logical habit of mind. The thoughts, counsel and speech of such a man are of course at all times valuable. Woe to the cause that neglects the varied wisdom of experience and the distribution of gifts that the Holy Spirit has made! We might object to the statement that "only parish priests know the secret of preaching effectively." On reflection, these words must suffer exceptions and modifications that will at once commend themselves to the author, and are no doubt implicitly accepted by him. Nor do we think that the old sermon-books are yet utterly out of touch with the great modern lines of thought and action. This is scarcely the place to enter more deeply on these considerations. Would that we had a noble "History of Preaching" written from a Catholic point of view, in which all such questions would be discussed, calmly and philosophically, with the pages of our long history open to the writer, and all the gifts of the historical investigator assured to him in their plenitude! In the meantime every priest should possess a copy of Father Phelan's sermons, and not only every priest, but every Catholic institution, and even every Catholic family. They represent Jesus Christ, and as

such have an apostolic mission, to which corresponds the duty of reading and meditating the truths they set forth.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

The Christian Gentlewoman and the Social Apostolate. By Katherine E. Conway. Boston: Thomas J. Flynn and Co., 1904. 16°, pp. 98.

For this timely little book, we are all, both men and women, the debtors of Miss Conway. Unconsciously, but also to a great extent, the woman of the United States has been losing some of the lovely traits that once characterized her. An unintelligent mania of imitation, and an irreligious materialistic atmosphere, are largely responsible for the loss of qualities and the decay of sentiments that once placed woman on a peculiarly high and sacrosanct level, idealized her in a sense at once true and Christian, and counterbalanced her political and juridical inferiority by a chivalrous homage and defence that only Christianity could suggest and sustain. The four chapters of this work are entitled: The Christian Woman and the Social Apostolate, Being Broad-Minded, The Novel-Habit, The Uses of Prosperity. Those who know with what fulness of literary experience, gentle but pointed wit, good taste and moderation, Miss Conway approaches her subject, will not be astonished to learn that they are all largely in evidence on every page of this admirable little book. There is scarcely a public relationship of woman that is not touched on, from a point of view at once Christian, Catholic, and supremely sensible. Every woman should make this book a "livre de chevet," and not only this one, but the entire "Family Sitting-Room Series." The others are entitled: A Lady and Her Letters, Making Friends and Keeping Them, Questions of Honor and the Christian Life, Bettering Ourselves. They are at once tasty in form and cheap in price. Why should not such lovely and useful works be scattered through the land as prizes on the occasion of academic graduation exercises in parochial schools and convents? They might well replace inferior and colorless material for which much money is spent to little avail.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Studies in Biblical Law. By Harold M. Wiener. London: David Nutt, 1904. Pp. ix + 128.

These studies contain some good remarks, e. g., that parts of the Mosaic legislation are not "jural" laws, but exhortations to the people. M. Wiener is profoundly attached to the faith of his fathers

and never uses the name of Jehovah. He hates the critics and speaks very "frankly" of them. In his opinion critics should be lawyers. Many critics are in fact perfectly acquainted with the fundamental principles and history of ancient legislation; but M. Wiener seems to forget that lawyers when dealing with Old Testament topics, should also be critics.

H. POELS.

Questions De Principes concernant l'Exégèse Catholique contemporaine. Par le R. P. P. B. Lacome, O.P. Paris: Bureaux de la Revue Thomiste, 1904, Pp. 207.

This book is one of those which should be read by every one who teaches either dogmatic theology or biblical exegesis. He will find *multa and multum*.

In the opinion of Father Lacome a modern theologian must be a philosopher and a critic at the same time. His philosophical principles are those of St. Thomas. There are none better. But in this work the principles of the Angelic Doctor are reduced to a living science: the author's theology has grown in the new atmosphere of the modern world.

Father Lacome is strongly opposed to some quasi-historical theories, which are founded on false philosophical systems. As a whole we perfectly agree with him. In questions of fact, however, one might be justified in thinking that his description of the present conditions of affairs is too dark, especially if applied to the Catholic world at large. The author himself can hardly expect that all Catholic scholars will approve of his panegyric on the genius of the Latin races. Among Anglo-Saxons and Germans Father Lacome discovers "dans le vieux fond de la race" something which is an obstacle to "le génie catholique." Our answer is a prayer for France and a smile for the author.

However, every reader of the book will agree that it is the work of a scholar. It does not belong to that class of theological writings which critics pass by without notice, because their authors did not keep abreast of modern science.

The book has no index. We do not know whether such is a consequence of the writer's antipathy to German scholarship or not; but even French readers would like to find him in this regard a little more German.

The first chapter treats of Theology and Exegesis. Here Kant is contrasted with Aristotle. As regards the distinction between history and theology, our attention is called to the impossibility of

"le doute méthodique," and we are shown why exegetes need the "theological spirit."

In the second chapter the author examines: "The object of history. The causes. The historical fact." His readers will be especially interested in his remarks on "the literary character of the discourses of Jesus in the Gospel of St. John" (pp. 72 ff.), "the divinity of Christ in the Synoptics" (87 ff.) and "the historical method" (31 ff.).

After this he shows us that *theories* are merely instruments for the discovery of truth. He warns us against identifying them with real science.

The fourth chapter, in which he treats of "Tradition," is the most interesting of all. "La tradition est appelée à nous fournir deux choses: les éléments matériels qui manquent à la constitution des théories, l'esprit dans lequel doit se faire leur choix, leur assemblage, leur emploi" (139). The author shows the absolute impossibility of writing a scientific history without frequently using the "tradition" (150-169). We believe that the written documents conceal more "life" than Father Lacombe seems to admit; but this whole chapter deserves to be carefully studied.

Finally, in his last chapter, on "The future of Biblical Exegesis in the Catholic Church," the learned Dominican points out the course which, in his opinion, Catholic exegetes ought to follow in the future. He shows the weak spots in the methods of our opponents, but no one is more convinced than he that we have to make our own of what we find in their works: "une méthode historique" and several "résultats acquis par cette méthode" (p. 204).

The author hits the nail on the head when says: "On ne saura jamais ce que perd l'Eglise par la diminution de son autorité intellectuelle. C'est à cette autorité qu'elle a dû dans le passé ses succès. L'Eglise du Christ a renoncé dès le début à toutes les puissances de ce monde, sauf à la puissance de l'esprit" (p. 202). The author appeals to the Fathers and medieval Scholastics. "Depuis, au contraire, elle a reculé et perdu du terrain, à mesure que baissait son autorité doctrinale." "En ces siècles de fièvre intellectuelle, d'idolâtrie de la science, elle seule régnait, et celui-la gouverne le monde qui commande au nom de la science (ibid.)."

We cordially recommend this book not only to those who are interested in biblical studies, but also to those Catholics who do not seem to realize the need of a Catholic University in America.

H. POELS.

REV. WILLIAM C. CURRIE.

Rev. William C. Currie of St. Patrick's Church, Philadelphia, Pa., died December 20, 1904. He was a student of the University during the scholastic year 1890-91. From this time until his last illness Father Currie was engaged in parochial work and in this field of labor well fulfilled the promise of his student days. His life was marked by a manifest love for his priestly duties and a generosity of spirit that reckoned no sacrifice too great in their behalf. His simplicity of soul and genial, sanguine temperament bore him up uncomplaining under the "burden of the day and the heats." At his death few ranked higher in the respect and esteem of his brother priests and to be revered as he was revered by those who lived and worked with him is the sure proof of true worth. The memory of this life of one of the first of those who have gone out from her halls, the University will always keep sacred, and for his unflagging interest in her affairs she will ever be grateful. May he rest in peace.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Award from the Carnegie Institute.—Dr. Albert F. Zahm has received from the Carnegie Institute an award of one thousand dollars for the current year to continue his experimental researches in aerodynamics.

Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul.—The patronal feast of the Faculty of Theology was celebrated on January 25. The High Mass was sung by the Very Rev. T. J. Shahan, D.D., and the sermon was preached by the Very Rev. C. P. Grannan, D.D.

Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas.—The patronal feast of the Faculty of Philosophy was celebrated on Tuesday, March 7. The High Mass was sung by his Excellency Most Rev. Diomedea Falconio, Apostolic Delegate to the United States. The sermon was preached by Very Rev. E. A. Pace, D.D., of the Faculty of Philosophy.

Annual Retreat for Students.—The annual retreat for the students was given March 8-12 by the Very Rev. D. J. Kennedy, O.P., S.T.M., Prior of St. Joseph's House of Studies, Somerset, Ohio.

Finances of the University.—The Financial Committee of the University have invested since October, 1904, the sum of \$100,000.

During the month of January a bequest of the late Mr. Patrick Carroll, Albany, N. Y., amounting to \$480.67 was received by the University.

The second annual collection for the University promises to be even more successful than the first. The returns from forty-five dioceses up to February 20 amounts to \$80,000, an increase of \$18,000 over the sums received from the same dioceses last year.

A movement has been inaugurated by the Knights of Columbus at the suggestion of his Eminence Cardinal Gibbons to raise additional funds for the University.

The Exhibit of Catholic Philanthropical Work at the St. Louis Exposition has been acquired by the University.

Annual Meeting of the Alumni Association.—The eleventh annual meeting of the Alumni Association of the Catholic University of America was held at the Bellevue-Stratford hotel in Philadelphia on

February 23, 1905, the President, Rev. Wm. J. Higgins, being in the chair. In a few gracious words the President welcomed the members of the association to Philadelphia in the name of the alumni of that city.

The minutes of the previous meeting were read and adopted. The treasurer's report showed a balance on hand of \$134.35. The historian, Rev. Father Duffy, gave an interesting account of the literary work that had already been done by a number of the alumni and told of the distinction achieved by several of the members in various spheres of activity. He regretfully recorded the deaths of Rev. Thos. C. McGolrick and John T. Stinson of the Archdiocese of Boston, honored members of this association, who had passed away during the previous year.

Dr. Kerby made a report from which it appeared that \$1,200 had been paid over to the Rector of the University for the Bouquillon Library. It was voted that Dr. Kerby be instructed to issue a circular letter to the alumni calling attention again to the Bouquillon Library Fund, and requesting subscriptions. It was further voted that such a letter be issued every six months until the three years' time originally agreed upon for the receiving of subscriptions shall have expired.

The committee appointed last year to draw up a new constitution made its report through Rev. Dr. Maguire. After the report of the committee was accepted and the committee itself discharged a detailed discussion of the proposed constitution followed. With some few amendments the constitution submitted by the committee was accepted, and the secretary was instructed to have the instrument, as amended, printed and sent to every member of the association.

Rev. Dr. Kerby announced to the meeting the determination of the trustees to open an undergraduate department at the University the beginning of the next scholastic year. He bespoke the lively interest of the association for the new department and the support that must follow such interest. Rev. Father Duffy introduced resolutions expressive of sympathy for the University in its late financial straits, from which happily it was emerging, and of loyalty to and approval of its prospective departure in inaugurating a department for undergraduate students. On motion of Father McSorley the secretary was instructed to request the faculties of the University to forward such information and advice to the members of the Alumni Association as would enable the latter to coöperate the more effectively with the University in making the proposed undergraduate department a success.

It was decided that the next meeting of the Association should be held in Albany, N. Y.

The following were elected officers for the ensuing year: President, Rev. E. A. O'Connor; First Vice-President, Rev. J. T. Driscoll; Second Vice-President, Rev. J. J. Lynch; Secretary-Treasurer, Rev. J. W. Melody, D.D.; Historian, Rev. F. O. Duffy. Executive Committee, Revs. J. W. McDermott, P. H. McClean, Messrs. F. Guilfoile, Wm. Kennedy, F. Garvan. Membership Committee, Revs. McSorley, Wiest, Martin, Kerby, Fitzgerald and O'Neill.

After a vote of thanks had been voted to the alumni of Philadelphia for their cordial hospitality shown on the occasion of the eleventh annual reunion, the meeting, on motion, adjourned.

At the banquet which followed the business session of the Alumni his Excellency the Apostolic Delegate responded to the toast "Our Holy Father," the Right Rev. Rector to that of "The University," and Very Rev. P. J. Garvey, Rector of St. Charles Seminary, Overbrook, Pa., to that of "Our Philadelphia Hosts." His Grace Archbishop Keane of Dubuque, former Rector of the University, who was among the guests of honor, was the third speaker. His presence at the banquet was a source of the deepest gratification to the members of the Alumni Association, and his stirring and inspiring words brought back memories of the days when as head of the University he gave himself so unsparingly to the work of advancing the cause of Catholic higher education, not only within the University itself but throughout the country at large, where he pleaded for higher and nobler ideals of Catholic life and the means of attaining them through the enlargement and advancement of Catholic University education. In his address the Archbishop referred to the hopes entertained twenty years ago by the hierarchy and by his Holiness the late Pope Leo XIII of the good that would be accomplished by the foundation of a Catholic University in the United States, and to the degree in which these hopes have since been realized. An interesting reminiscence of a conversation about that time with Leo XIII relative to the character and government of the contemplated Catholic University was related by the Archbishop as follows:

"This evening recalls to my mind a conversation I had with Pope Leo XIII nearly nineteen years ago. He was then considering the question of the Catholic University of America. Ought it be established? If so what should be the manner of its conduct? He made up his mind that this country ought to have a University. He asked me what I thought of its government. I told him that some persons in this country thought it ought to be in charge of the Society of

Jesus. He brought his clenched hand vehemently down on the table at which we sat and exclaimed: 'jamais! I love the Society of Jesus—in its place; but a great institution of the Church's learning in your country must be organized like the Church itself—hierarchically.' ”

His Grace Archbishop Ryan made a brief address at the close of the banquet in which he called attention to the lesson every priest should learn from the humility of His Holiness Pope Pius X, and the reverent awe with which he accepted his exalted office.

DISCOVERY OF THE BASILICA OF SS. FELIX AND ADAUCTUS IN THE CEMETERY OF COMMODILLA.

The most important discovery made by the Commission of Sacred Archæology during the year 1904 was the cemeterial basilica of SS. Felix and Adauctus in the cemetery of Commodilla.¹ Like so many of the ancient Christian cemeteries of Rome the cemetery of Commodilla derives its name from a member of the community who donated the property under which it was excavated to the Church as a place of interment for her co-religionists. Professor Marucchi is of the opinion that this cemetery existed as early as the latter part of the first or the beginning of the second century; as to its foundress nothing is known except her name. The two martyrs in whose honor a cemeterial basilica was erected, Felix and Adauctus, suffered, according to their legendary acts, in the persecution of Diocletian; Merita, another martyr interred in this cemetery, according to the equally unreliable documents relative to her martyrdom, won her crown in the persecution of Valerian. The only reliable information from an ancient source that we possess relative to the former martyrs is that contained in the metrical inscription erected in their honor by Pope Damasus (366-384); and even this tells us nothing more than that a priest named Verus was commissioned by Pope Damasus to adorn the tomb of the martyrs Felix and Adauctus, who, with faith undefiled, had confessed Christ and attained a heavenly reward:

O semel atque iterum vero de nomine Felix
Qui intemerata fide contempto principe mundi
Confessus Christum cœlest(ia re)gna petisti
O vera pretiosa fides co(gnose)ite fratres

Qua ad cœlum victor parit(er proper)avit Adauctus
Presbyter his Verus Da(maso rect)ore jubente
Composuit tumulum sanctorum limina adornans

The basilica of SS. Felix and Adauctus was erected as a memorial

¹ Cf. *Nuovo Bulletino*, 1904, p. 41 sqq.; 161 sqq.; and *Röm. Quart. Erst. Heft*, 1904, p. 40 sqq.

to these martyrs during the pontificate of Pope Siricius (384-398). It consists of a single chamber excavated in the tufa, irregular in form, and in dimensions twelve by four meters. The natural tufa wall was, however, here and there reinforced by walls of mason-work, which were elevated, like the walls of the basilica of St. Petronilla, above the level of the campagna and sustained the roof. These walls are covered with stucco on which are depicted a number of highly interesting paintings, most of which Wilpert assigns to the sixth century. Several of these representations are very well preserved, and as the number of cemeterial frescoes painted subsequently to the capture of Rome by Alaric (410) is not very great, those recently discovered are for this reason all the more precious.

The first fresco that came to light in this cemeterial basilica represents a subject of which this is the first example discovered in the catacombs: the conferring of the keys on St. Peter. In the center our Lord, clothed in purple, is seated on the globe; His garments consist of the tunica talaris ornamented with the broad clavus, and the pallium. In His left hand He holds the codex of the Gospels, studded with gems; in His right are two keys which He is in the act of handing to St. Peter. The Prince of the Apostles, at His side, reaches forward to receive with veiled hands the precious volume. Although somewhat injured the traditional type of St. Peter in Christian art is easily recognized in this representation of the Apostle. On the other side of our Lord is an excellent and well-preserved picture of St. Paul; his hands, like those of St. Peter, are enfolded in his pallium, and in them he holds a package of six volumes.

Four other saints are represented on both sides of these, the central figures, SS. Adaeuctus and Merita on the left, St. Felix and the Protomartyr St. Stephen on the right. The picture of St. Stephen is especially well-preserved, that of St. Felix is only slightly injured; but on the other side the representation of St. Adaeuctus is almost wholly destroyed, and only the upper portion of that of St. Merita remains. The heads of all the figures are encircled with the nimbus, and the name of each personage, with the exception of our Lord, preceded by a cross and the abbreviated title SCS., is inscribed beside him. The Saints in whose honor the basilica was erected, Felix and Adaeuctus, hold their crowns in their veiled hands; the crown of St. Felix, studded with gems, is excellently preserved. St. Stephen and St. Merita have their hands outstretched in prayer—Orantes—the former, as well as St. Felix, has the large tonsure. St. Merita is represented without a veil, which shows that she was a virgin.

The style of this fresco, Wilpert tells us, is "relatively good"; the colors employed by the artist are excellent, and the whole scene produces a highly agreeable impression on the spectator. Our Lord is of the youthful type familiar in the frescoes of the catacombs; the four Saints nearest to Him, all advancing eagerly in His direction, recall the attitude of the Magi offering their gifts to the infant Saviour, a favorite subject of the earlier Christian artists. The absence of the cross from the nimbus of Christ is a strong indication that the fresco belongs to the early part of the sixth century, and as the basilica was restored by Pope John I (523-526) it is highly probable that they date from his pontificate.

A second fresco of this basilica in an excellent state of preservation represents the blessed Virgin, with the Child Jesus, seated majestically on a splendid throne. Christ holds in His right hand a sealed roll; Mary is clad in purple, with red shoes, and her head is covered with her cloak (*palla*). A white band projects from under the cloak on her forehead and in her left hand she holds the usual *mappa*. St. Felix and St. Adauetus stand on the right and left of the throne; the former is aged, resembling somewhat the type of St. Peter, and wears a full beard; the latter is youthful in appearance. Both Saints have the large tonsure, which proves that Adauetus as well as Felix, in the early part of the sixth century, was regarded as having belonged to the ranks of the clergy. In front of St. Adauetus is a lady, robed in purple like the blessed Virgin; in her hands, covered with a cloth, she holds a partially unfolded volume. From an inscription beneath the fresco we learn that this lady was a matron named Turtura who was granted the rare privilege of being buried near the bodies of the martyrs, that she was widowed at the age of 24, that this painting was placed above her tomb by her only son to whom she had faithfully fulfilled the duties of both father and mother, and that she died at the age of sixty. The right hand of St. Adauetus rests on the shoulder of Turtura in the fresco, which signifies that she is being presented to Christ by the holy martyr.

In another part of the basilica there is a representation of St. Luke painted, as an inscription states, in the time of the Emperor Constantine Pogonatus (668-685). As was to be expected from its later date this painting is much inferior in style to the others described. In his right hand the Evangelist holds a roll—the symbol of his vocation; while a reminiscence of his former calling is seen hanging on his left arm—a physician's satchel containing four surgical implements, one of which is a lance.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.